Meeting of Senior Advisor for

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000748 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: Meeting of Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution with CNDP ¶1. (SBU) Summary: CNDP told Senior Advisor Shortley September 4 that it agreed in principle to (1) withdrawal to positions held on August 28; (2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a proposed plan by MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1 disengagement, disarmament and integration with the agreement to further discuss timing and modalities; and (4) public statement reaffirming this agreement. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution to the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tim Shortley led a U.S. - only team to meet CNDP political and military officials September 4 at CNDP headquarters at Bwiza, north of Kirolirwe. CNDP Chairman, General Laurent Nkunda was unavailable (reportedly in Gungu). Shortley regretted that much time had been lost in fulfilling the promise of the Goma agreement with all sides, including the international facilitation, responsible for missing many opportunities. Shortley highlighted General Didier Etumba's insistence that all sides disarm without military disengagement as a critical reason for the present fighting and a reason for the failure of AMANI to date. He noted that on his last visit the international facilitation had obtained both President Kabila's and General Nkunda's agreement to a phase one of the disengagement, disarmament and integration program that could test and build the system necessary to be successful. Shortley pressed CNDP to (1) return to positions held on August 28; (2) return to disengagement discussions; (3) affirm its agreement to implement Phase 1 of the disengagement, disarmament and integration program; and (4) make a public statement announcing this agreement. ¶3. (SBU) Ten of the CNDP officials spoke. They lamented that the government co-chair of the Joint Technical Commission, General Etumba, had so narrowly focused on immediate disarmament, without disengagement and without appropriate capacities and agreements on brassage. CNDP representatives stressed that there has been a total collapse of confidence between CNDP and Government officials as AMANI was more than just disarmament (and more than just disarmament of CNDP). CNDP representatives stressed that the international facilitation bear responsibility as well for the state of AMANI stating that it allowed the domineering and uninterested leadership from Kinshasa to bankrupt dialogue in the AMANI process. ¶4. (SBU) Shortley stated that the Goma agreement was a ceasefire and a commitment to engage in dialogue in an effort to resolve underlying causes of conflict, and that a holistic approach was necessary. Shortley reviewed efforts to fulfill the Nairobi communiqu, which he saw as parallel to the Goma agreement. Deputy Executive Secretary Kambasu insisted that Nairobi was not parallel but integral to Goma and cited the reference to Nairobi in the Goma agreement (Article 2) and stressed that combating FDLR was a fundamental principle for CNDP. Others cited the government's failure to meet CNDP's basic claims, some of which had been enshrined in the Acte d'Engagement (such as amnesty and lifting road blocks). They noted that the AMANI program had lapsed in early August and a new framework was needed. Shortley refused to consider a new framework, noting that Goma Agreement was not time-bound. They condemned the government for stirring up the populace and claimed that truckloads of soldiers had just passed through Goma shouting anti-CNDP slogans and that forty CNDP had been arrested in Goma. CNDP spokesman Rene Abandi said CNDP agreed to withdraw to positions held as of the signing of the Acte d'Engagement on January ¶23. Shortley disagreed and said that both parties must agree to return to positions held two weeks ago and that anything else would be too difficult. Shortley said that the government had a long list of its own criticisms of CNDP, such as Special Operations training, redeployment, violations of the ceasefire, nonparticipation in the Amani process, forcing human displacement, and recruitment of child soldiers. ¶5. (SBU) After a long break for internal discussion, Abandi said CNDP would agree to (1) withdrawal to positions held on August 28; (2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a proposed plan by MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1 disengagement, disarmament and integration with the agreement to further discuss timing and modalities; and (4) a public statement reaffirming this agreement. He said that CNDP believed that creation of buffer zones was a priority, but that, in areas where it faced FDLR, CNDP would not be able to withdraw. It would agree only to Kimoka as the site for continuing technical work on disengagement. Abandi said that a holistic approach, covering a range of issues beyond disengagement and integration, was fundamental. ¶6. (SBU) Shortley said it was possible to use the Nairobi process to seek disengagement of FDLR in areas bordering CNDP. Shortley agreed to go on Radio Okapi to outline discussions and agreements and to call for immediate renewed efforts on AMANI. He expressed support for CNDP's request that there be talks within the AMANI KINSHASA 00000748 002 OF 002 process on broader political issues per the Goma agreement and said that the U.S. would approach Kinshasa on this point. Shortley pressed that both sides must work together in the coming days to calm tensions, refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, and move swiftly into technical disengagement negotiations at Kimoka, with talks beginning on Monday 8 September. GARVELINK