Goma Report September 3 - Stoning of

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000728 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG UN, EUN SUBJECT: Goma Report September 3 - Stoning of Facilitation Team at Rutshuru ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The international facilitation team traveled via MONUC convoy September 2 to three sensitive areas along the confrontation line between FARDC and CNDP in Rutshuru territory, hoping to affirm FARDC withdrawal from two newly occupied positions. FARDC still occupies those positions and appears to have instigated crowds near Rutshuru to block the convoy's return and to stone its vehicles. General Etumba stormed out of a meeting September 3 with the team when it suggested FARDC responsibility. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) At a meeting with the international facilitation team on September 1, Generals Etumba and Mayala gave assurances that the positions FARDC had occupied at Ntamugenga and Mutabo in the "buffer zone" east of the Rutshuru road in clashes that occurred August 28-29 had been or would very soon be evacuated. North Kivu brigade had affirmed to the team that there are no positions occupied by CNDP in the buffer zone near Kanombe (east of Rumangabo),as claimed by FARDC. Etumba asserted that CNDP and Rwanda were bent upon an imminent two-pronged attack on the Rutshuru corridor, with two CNDP battalions (500 men) moving in from the west and two Rwandan battalions (1,100 men) added to CNDP forces moving in from the east. Deputy Eastern Coordinator M'hand Ladjouzi reported that on the previous day FARDC had pointed weapons at North Kivu brigade units at Rugari (first major village north of the Congo-Nile divide) and instigated the populace to throw stones at the brigade and that it appeared that there had been armed FDLR in the crowd. ¶3. (SBU) On September 3, the facilitation team (UK, France, U.S., and MONUC, led by Ladjouzi) took an all-day road trip to Rutshuru, with the objective of determining on the ground whether FARDC had withdrawn from the newly occupied positions and the extent of popular sensitivities. North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Bipin Rawat accompanied the team on the first part of the trip, to Rugari, where CNDP forces come closest (only one kilometer) to the highway. Barriers along the track leading half a kilometer to the parish (former village center, now moved to the highway) were still partially in evidence, having been thrown up by the villagers on August 28, the first day of clashes further north. Rawat noted that, just prior to SRSG Doss's visit to Rugari on August 31, FARDC 
had confiscated MONUC cameras when crowds interlaced with armed FDLR were photographed. Rawat pointed to the nearby hill, called Himbi (overlooking Rugari and the nearest CNDP position to the highway), and said he hoped he would be able to persuade CNDP to withdraw to hills somewhat further back where CNDP would not be within such easy firing range of the highway. ¶4. (SBU) The team proceeded north to Kako, north of Kalengera, where the track to Ntamugenga intersects the highway. There a convoy of the North Kivu brigade was parked, having waited since August 30 to proceed to Ntamugenga to establish a base but prevented by stone-throwing crowds that had barricaded the track. The team called 8th Region deputy commander Col. Delphin, who instructed the Rutshuru (6th brigade) commander, Col. Antoine Mushimba, to proceed to Kako to open the track. Col Mushimba was reluctant but obeyed. The team eventually passed through the crowd at Kako, suffering a few hurled stones. It drove five kilometers to the largely abandoned village of Ntamugenga, near to which an exchange of fire had occurred on August 29, and ascertained that it was now occupied by FARDC. Two captains admitted that the area had been a no-man's land for some months but asserted that MONUC had had a base there until two months previously and since then CNDP had "become master" of the area. FARDC had now occupied it, they said, as a result of attacks by CNDP. The team returned to the highway, again encountering minor stoning by the crowd at Kako. ¶5. (SBU) At Rutshuru, Col. Mushimba warned the team that it should not proceed northeast on the track to Mutabo, as he claimed that a CNDP force was moving down the track and was now located only two kilometers from Rutshuru. He was visibly angry, citing losing a windshield to stones being thrown at Kako. The team proceeded to Mutabo without difficulty, encountering neither hostile crowds nor a CNDP force. At the eastern side of the village, the team was welcomed to the small North Kivu brigade base, whose commander explained that there had been no exchange of fire in the Mutabo area, but on the morning of August 28 two FARDC platoons had moved from their previous position west (3.5 kms. back toward Rutshuru) to a new position on the hill the east of the North Kivu brigade base. The brigade had attempted to stop the platoons, explaining that they were violating the undertakings made to MONUC about the buffer zone, but the platoons insisted on going through. The team proceeded eastward, climbed the hill, and met the FARDC commanding officer, who admitted that he had received an order just after firing commenced further south on the early morning of August 28 to move forward, and he had received no order to withdraw. He pointed to KINSHASA 00000728 002 OF 002 distant positions of the CNDP, on higher hills some four kilometers to the east and south, saying that both CNDP and FARDC sent out daily patrols much nearer each other's positions. ¶6. (SBU) The team returned most of the distance back toward Rutshuru without incident. However, it was blocked at the outskirts of the town by hostile crowds (interspersed with some FARDC) that had felled a large tree over the track and built a bonfire. The North Kivu brigade escort soldiers (Indian) dismounted from their vehicles, covered themselves with shields, and, when the crowd began throwing stones and rocks, their commanding officer fired five shots. The team called Col Mushimba to get the 6th brigade to ensure its safety and clear the barricade. A group of young men came forward as spokesmen, and, in a heated and confused discourse, accused MONUC of doing nothing to combat CNDP and indeed, of being an ally of CNDP. The men knew that Col. Mushimba's windshield had been broken and appeared to blame MONUC for it. Within half an hour, the 6th brigade cleared the obstruction but, when leading the convoy through the crowd, halted long enough for the convoy to be showered with stones and rocks, some large. Closer to the center of Rutshuru, at the 6th brigade headquarters (located on the same track),the FARDC escort insisted that the team enter the headquarters, where they were treated to a harangue by Col. Mushimba along similar lines to that offered by the village spokesmen, i.e., that MONUC was doing nothing to use its perceived considerable capabilities to combat CNDP, and the populace was fed up. On driving away from the compound the convoy again suffered a shower of stones and boulders, with the result of nine windows shattered in MONUC vehicles. There were, however, no significant injuries. By now much delayed, the convoy returned to Goma at nightfall, without further incident. ¶7. (SBU) On the following day, September 3, the facilitation team met General Etumba, with General Mayala, Col. Delphin and other officers, at MONUC. The team reviewed its findings and experiences of the previous day, noting that FARDC still occupied Ntamugenga and Mutabo despite assurances of withdrawal, and lamenting that crowds at Koku and particularly at Rutshuru had been stirred up and had stoned the convoy. The team noted that armed FDLR elements appeared to have been present at Rugari and Ntamugenga. Etumba said that any attacks on MONUC or the facilitation team were unacceptable, but any insinuation that FARDC was manipulating the population needed to be verified. There was no doubt that the populace was very disappointed in MONUC's unwillingness to use its force to assist in dealing with CNDP. He lamented that the Indian-dominated North Kivu brigade mainly spoke Hindi and English and had difficulty communicating with the populace or FARDC. He said he hoped MONUC and FARDC could do a better job of communicating MONUC's objectives and limitations, in a public-awareness campaign. Etumba promised to give orders to ensure that there would be no possibility of FARDC's stirring up crowds in the future. ¶8. (SBU) General Mayala and Col. Delphin claimed they had needed to proceed carefully in any withdrawal of forces from Ntamugenga and Mutabo, as the populace was so angry that it would also react against FARDC if it tried to withdraw, particularly when there were continued exchanges of fire. M'hand Ladjouzi pointed out that there had only been minimal continued exchange of fire over the past three days. Delphin claimed that CNDP was still occupying two positions in the area of Kanombe and resented the facilitation team's focus only on the two positions occupied by FARDC. The team explained that it had understood from the North Kivu brigade that there were no positions in the buffer zone occupied by CNDP. The discussion moved to the apparent FDLR presence at Rugari, at which point Etumba changed his tone. He claimed to be outraged and said that he could only conclude that the facilitation team was bent on hurling accusations at FARDC and not CNDP. He stood up, took off the belt of his uniform as if to hurl on the table (but did not),and stormed out of the room. ¶9. (SBU) Meanwhile, on September 3, Eastern Coordinator Alpha Sow received a CNDP delegation led by Betrand Bisimwa, coming to Goma for the first time since August 27. The delegation condemned the government's August 30 decision to close the Bunagana frontier post (controlled by CNDP) and FARDC's move into the buffer zone at Ntamugenga and Mutabo, and called for a declaration of ceasefire by the government. It claimed not to have closed the door to future CNDP attendance at the working groups on disengagement. Note: The North Kivu working group has so far done little, on account of CNDP non-participation. End note. GARVELINK