Breakthrough with Nkunda

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000065 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG SUBJECT: Breakthrough with Nkunda REF: Kinshasa 0064 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: After a discouraging day January 22, (reftel) the morning of January 23 brought a breaking of the impasse with the CNDP. Nkunda has ordered his delegation to return to Goma and sign an agreement with a few more changes in his favor. The key was direct telephonic contact between Nkunda and conference leaders Kamerhe, Malu Malu, and Ruberwa. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) As reported reftel, the hoped-for day of closure of the Kivus Conference ended in huge disappointment, with the CNDP delegation returning to its territory to confer with their boss. The government side appeared to have hardened on language in the opening of the draft document, insisting that it could not be seen to be on a par with the CNDP. ¶3. (SBU) Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer, reached Nkunda by telephone early on January 23 and, with EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and SRSG Alan Doss, began a long parley with him (often broken by rupture of the connection). Nkunda insisted on five points: -- The government would have to commit to giving the agreement the force of law. -- The Technical Commission established to oversee disengagement, brassage, and DDR would need to be chaired by the government and co-chaired by the international community. -- The section dealing with the Commission's handling of modalities of brassage would have to be linked with the continued threat of FDLR. -- SRSG would sign for the United Nations rather than for MONUC. ¶4. (SBU) Van de Geer and Shortley communicated these demands to conference leaders Apollinaire Malu Malu and Vital Kamerhe, who were attending a reconvened plenary of the conference and came immediately to the Karibu Hotel, with Minister of State Denis Kalume and Azarias Ruberwa, to confer on Nkunda's changes. ¶5. (SBU) After a relatively brief discussion with van de Geer, Doss, and Shortley, and a brief private discussion among themselves, they agreed to compromise on every point. Shortley got Nkunda back on the telephone, put Doss on with Nkunda briefly, and then put on first Kamerhe and then Malu Malu, both of whom spoke with Nkunda at some length, hammering out precise language and emphasizing that they needed to seize the historic moment. Nkunda agreed on language for every point. MONUC gave the signal to its force to bring the CNDP delegation (with Nkunda at Kimoka, an hour and a half drive from Goma) back to Goma to sign the accord. ¶6. (SBU) The agreed changes are as follows: First, the opening language now specifies, "We, the CNDP, Political-Military Group, PARECO/FAP (and seven other named Mai Mai groups),with the solemn commitment, especially as concerns Article 4 (which covers political and judicial guarantees by the government, including amnesty for insurrection),of the Government and the Representatives of the International Community, facilitators of the present undertaking ("acte d'enagement") -- the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the United States of America, the African Union, and the European Union -- ..." This language much more directly commits the government to the entirety of the document, but it avoids the appearance of putting the government on the same level as CNDP and other military groups. ¶7. (SBU) Second, the language setting up the Technical Commission now reads: "A mixed Peace and Security Technical Commission, under the co-chair of the Government and the international facilitation of this undertaking (engagement),will be legally instituted by the Government to examine and finalize the following issues, notably ..." (followed by numerous sections on disengagement, brassage, and DDR). This language differs from wording hammered out the previous day, by specifying co-chairmanship by the Government and the international community (without who within the international community),rather than merely calling for facilitation by the international community. ¶8. (SBU) Third, among the responsibilities of the Technical Commission was previously agreed: "Determination of the modalities of brassage," to which a phrase is now added: "taking into account the presence of foreign armed groups addressed by the Joint Communique of Nairobi of November 9, 2007." Hereby, Nkunda signaled his intent to integrate his forces only to the extent that ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FDLR are adequately controlled. Fourth, the KINSHASA 00000065 002 OF 002 signature line for MONUC was changed to United Nations, with the concurrence of SRSG Doss. ¶9. (SBU) With this undertaking ("acte d'engagement") now agreed, and the CNDP delegation on the way back to Goma, the closing ceremony of the Kivus Conference and signature of this agreement are now scheduled for the afternoon of January 23. BROCK