STORM CLOUDS GATHER AROUND AMANI PROCESS; WILL FIGHTING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000625 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: STORM CLOUDS GATHER AROUND AMANI PROCESS; WILL FIGHTING RESUME? REF: KINSHASA 613 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Defense Minister Chikez convened a meeting July 28 with ambassadors of major donor countries and MONUC to discuss security sector reform (SSR),focusing specifically on three main areas: peace processes in the east; rapid reaction force training; and overall institutional development of the military. Chikez was clear that multilateral approaches to SSR will not interfere with bilateral military cooperation programs. The SSR meeting was held against the backdrop of a number of discouraging developments in Goma, where the Amani process is losing steam, with the CNDP appearing to distance itself from the process altogether. There is no conclusive evidence the process is broken, but several individual reports, when taken together, suggest that Amani needs big infusions of resources and high-level attention if it is to stay alive. The possibility of renewed fighting between the FARDC and CNDP cannot be dismissed. End summary. Minister Chikez takes control of SSR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Defense Minister Chikez called a meeting for July 28 with ambassadors of major donor countries and MONUC to discuss several security-related issues. That meeting was preceded by a preparatory meeting July 26, called by UN/SRSG Alan Doss to coordinate donors' positions. The July 28 meeting, which was dominated by the Defense Minister, centered on topics of the peace processes in the east, coordination of training of a rapid reaction force, and the military's overall institutional development. The ambassadors or charges of the U.S., UK, France, Belgium, South Africa, Italy, the Netherlands, Angola and the EU attended, as did SRSG Doss. China was represented by its defense attache. DATT's from all aforementioned countries were also present. The FARDC's chief of staff, Lt. Gen Kayembe Mbandakulu, was noticeably absent. ¶3. (SBU) Chikez was in an ebullient mood, having just returned from South Africa where he received treatment for high blood pressure. He described the period after the February Round Table on SSR as initially filled with doubt regarding his plan (which Kayembe opposed); more recently, however, his plan was being viewed in a more positive light. He saw the next few months as a period of time for consolidation of the plan. A huge step forward, he said, was a commitment he has made to monthly co-ordination technical and political meetings. (Note: Chikez clearly took pleasure in having prevailed over Kayembe, with a plan for a much larger army than that proposed by the Chief of Staff. End note.) Chikez emphasized that while multilateral assistance was necessary to implement his plan, bilateral military cooperation programs were not to be affected by multilateral efforts. Agreement on way forward -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Defense Minister emphasized that MOD and donors were essentially in agreement in three areas: -- How to proceed with the conflict in the east, including DDR; Brassage of Amani Armed groups; FDLR and other negative forces; and Disengagement. -- Training of a Rapid Reaction Force, including number of battalions (12); post "brassage" units; non Integrated FARDC Units -- Long Term Institution Building, particularly in the areas of logistics, training, administration, finance, and human resource management A significant outcome from the meeting is that Chikez agreed to the holding of regular technical working group meetings around these three areas with donor representatives below the ministerial/ambassadorial level; he also agreed to more frequent meetings with ambassadors on this subject. Amani process stalled -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Admiral Didier Etumba, Senior FARDC Representative in the east, then spoke about developments in that region. His main points were: -- Stabilization had gone fairly well but there were still problems in a number of areas. -- Apart from the CNDP and FRF, international groups and other negative forces had worked out a plan for brassage although no location had been chosen. -- CNDP and FRF have effectively withdrawn from the Amani process. KINSHASA 00000625 002 OF 002 -- Progress has been made in getting FDLR groups to demobilize. Money is needed for processing centers where the FDLR can prepare for repatriation. -- Resources to support the Amani program are greatly needed. -- International pressure should continue to get all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities. ¶6. (SBU) With regard to developments in the east, Amani Program coordinator Fr. Apollinaire Malu Malu called USAID-contracted adviser Willet Weeks July 26 from Zanzibar to inform him of the July 28 meeting, which was to be followed by an unscheduled meeting of the Amani Steering Committee ("Comite de Pilotage" in French). Malu Malu told Weeks he is cutting short his stay in Zanzibar and returning directly to Kinshasa and will return to Goma as soon as possible. He also told Weeks he is fearful that there has been a decision by the GDRC and CNDP to return to war. CNDP and International Facilitation are not talking -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) We note there has been no direct contact between the International Facilitation and Nkunda for several weeks. Nkunda did not call EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer - as requested through CNDP intermediaries in Goma - following the July 23 incident in which CNDP soldiers prevented a Facilitation convoy from traveling to Kirolirwe for a previously scheduled meeting with him (reftel). The Facilitation has continuously asked CNDP representatives to ensure that Nkunda contact one of the senior envoys as soon as possible. ¶8. (SBU) MONUC and International Facilitation representatives at a July 27 meeting in Gisenyi took seriously the threat of renewed fighting between the FARDC and CNDP. Participants highlighted the possibility of military action in August, to precede the beginning of the rainy season. They noted too the aforementioned radio silence on Nkunda's part as well as the fact that the GDRC is showing little political will to reach a diplomatic solution, as indicated by GDRC representative Admiral Etumba's absence from Goma for over one month. ¶9. (SBU) The participants also discussed the role of Bosco Ntaganda in CNDP and the rumors circulating in Goma that he may be trying to assert himself within the organization and sideline Nkunda (Note: Other rumors are that Nkunda is sick or otherwise incapacitated. End note.) They noted how a Bosco takeover could unleash an unpredictable chain of events, to include possible military action. Unconfirmed reports suggest, for example, that it was Bosco who gave the order to prevent the Facilitation convoy from reaching Kirolirwe July 23. OCHA reports as well that, per their sources, there has been a reorganization of top advisors within CNDP and Nkunda has decided to work through subordinates with respect to contact with the Facilitation. We emphasize that these are only unconfirmed rumors. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: The reasons for what appears to be the CNDP'a disengagement from the Amani process are not clear. We are reluctant to speculate, but we note that many knowledgeable sources believe Nkunda and his forces are preparing for a resumption of hostilities with the FARDC. We will monitor the situation closely and report on developments. End comment. GARVELINK