JULY 18 MEETING OF JMG TASK FORCE DEALS WITH ANTI-FDLR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000603 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE SUBJECT: JULY 18 MEETING OF JMG TASK FORCE DEALS WITH ANTI-FDLR ACTIVITIES AND DDRRR PROCEDURES ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The 31st meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group Task Force on July 18 was, overall, a cordial gathering. U.S. members of the International Facilitation in attendance were DCM Sam Brock and Program Officer Geoffrey Parker. In the absence of Jean-Michel Dumont, the EU chairmanship of the Task Force was delegated to Bernard Sexe of the French embassy. The Congolese delegation first updated the Task Force on GDRC activities in support of the Nairobi Process. MONUC made a presentation on the joint MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR. This was followed by a litany of reasons by the Rwandan delegation on why operations were ill-conceived. Finally, the Task Force discussed ways to avoid continued discrepancies between the DRC and Rwanda on the exact number of demobilized combatants that undergo their respective screening processes. End summary. Recent Congolese Steps -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After opening remarks, Colonel Mamba of the Congolese delegation announced that his government had appointed Major General Marcellin Lukama as the commander of all FARDC forces deployed to the Kivus to take part in MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR. MG Lukama would be introduced to the Task Force as soon as he was present in the East. The Congolese delegation also announced the creation of a technical commission for the Nairobi Process. This commission would advise members of the Pilot Committee on National and International Armed Groups in Kinshasa and would be a resource for Special Envoy Ambassador Seraphin Ngwej. Both developments were presented by Col. Mamba as a sign of Congolese commitment towards the Nairobi Process. Major Franco of the Rwandan delegation acknowledged the DRC's gesture. MONUC Briefs anti-FDLR Activities -------------- ¶3. (SBU) British Colonel Cunliffe, MONUC Chief of Staff for the Eastern Region, made a Powerpoint presentation on the concept of joint MONUC/FARDC operations against the FDLR. In developing the planned operations MONUC Force Commander Lt. General Gaye had given the following four points of guidance: -- Protecting civilians remains MONUC's number one mission. -- Operations against the FDLR must not result in additional IDP's. -- All operations carried out must be within FARDC's capacity. -- Integrate DDR and DDRRR into operations by conducting military and sensitization activities simultaneously. ¶4. (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued): The concept of operations in general terms is (a) all activities would grow progressively in complexity and aggressiveness; (b) MONUC/FARDC would follow a three-pronged approach (initial concentration on two geographical triangles each in North and South Kivu, military activity would support DDR/DDRRR operations, target FDLR economic resources); and (c) the desired end state for Eastern Region was stability, extension of state authority, and establishment of rule of law. ¶5. (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued): The four triangles are as follows: Lutunguru-Lubero-Kikuko (North Kivu),Walikale-Masisi-Hombo (North Kivu),Mwenga-Shabunda-Walungu (South Kivu),and Fizi-Lulimba-Mulembe (South Kivu). The activities in the triangles are happening in four phases: -- Phase 1 (May 15-31): Preliminary operations including reconnaissance, force buildup, and base establishment. -- Phase 2 (June 1-30): Joint reassurance activities such as visibility patrols in population centers, ensuring proper behavior of FARDC elements vis-a-vis civilians. -- Phase 3 (July 1 onwards): Domination activities such as robust patrols, removal of illegal checkpoints, restriction of FDLR movement at chokepoints, and inviting the Congolese National Police (PNC) to join patrols. This phase is currently ongoing but should not be overestimated. MONUC stressed repeatedly that operations were still at a crawl given FARDC capacity. These activities should not be considered aggressive, offensive actions. The PNC has not yet joined the MONUC/FARDC patrols. -- Phase 4 (September 1 onwards): Consolidation activities including securing of illegal mining sites and physical removal of the FDLR from the triangles. Again, MONUC stressed that phase 4 could take months and would progress slowly. ¶6. (SBU) MONUC Briefing (continued): Col. Cunliffe then cited some achievements already attained. Quality joint patrols were ongoing KINSHASA 00000603 002 OF 003 and about 50% of the time was spent conducting solid planning and rehearsal exercises. Sensitization activities were increasing and MONUC was conducting focused training in command and control, leadership, small unit tactics, and logistics. Challenges cited by Col. Cunliffe were the size and nature of the terrain, the capacity of the FARDC, pressure from the Rwandans to accelerate activities, and overcoming FDLR fears over repatriation that prevent them from readily entering into DDRRR. Rwandan Reactions and MONUC/DRC Response -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Having previously been given a written copy of the concept of operation, the Rwandan delegation made several comments on the plan as briefed by MONUC. Displaying a rather precise understanding of FDLR deployments, Major Franco explained how the triangles did not cover what he would consider the areas of concentration of the FDLR. The triangles in particular covered neither the FDLR 1st Division Reserve Brigade - considered by the Rwandans as one of the strongest FDLR units - nor FDLR deployments in immediate proximity to the border and from where infiltrations into Rwanda were supposedly conducted frequently. ¶8. (SBU) The Rwandans continued, asserting that securing a few illegal mining sites would not have much effect since - much to the irritation of the Congolese delegation - the FDLR essentially controlled all economic activity in the Kivus with perhaps the exception of Beni Territory in the North and the island of Idjwi. What concrete steps, therefore, were being taken by MONUC? ¶9. (SBU) Col. Cunliffe replied that MONUC was aware the triangles did not overlap the central heartland of FDLR territory. He felt strongly that attempting phase 4 activities in these areas at this time would undoubtedly lead to MONUC/FARDC failure. The eight FARDC battalions (8,000 men) and eight MONUC companies (800 men) currently deployed were not robust enough to go head to head with concentrated FDLR formations. On the positive side, however, the DRC planned to eventually deploy an additional 16 battalions to the area. ¶10. (SBU) Col. Mamba of the Congolese delegation explained that the FARDC had multiple brigades stationed in the Kivus, not just the eight battalions that were specifically tasked with anti-FDLR activities. These brigades already provided a stabilizing presence. He continued to mention a few examples of where the brigades' presence had already led to displacement of the FDLR into the bush and the resumption of civilian economic activity. He felt it was absolutely erroneous to state FDLR was "in control" of the Kivus and he also claimed to be unaware of frequent FDLR infiltrations into Rwanda, but promised to inquire into this matter. DDRRR Discrepancies -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The final portion of the meeting dealt with the discrepancies between the number of demobilized FDLR combatants claimed by both the DRC and Rwanda, the latter's numbers being significantly lower. This is mostly due to the much more stringent screening process on the Rwandan side that is slow to label anyone a real combatant. The issue had been discussed in previous meetings and it had been agreed to establish a working group to handle the issue as well as send a delegation to Kigali to discuss it with Rwandan authorities there. At the 31st JMG meeting the working group was supposed to brief the Task Force on how the issue would be resolved and prevented in the future. ¶12. (SBU) It turned out that no working group had been formed and that the delegation sent to Kigali included only the EU and MONUC, but no Congolese or other Task Force representatives. Both the Congolese and Rwandans were quick to display their unity in blaming MONUC for having botched the Kigali visit and done nothing about setting up a working group. Needless to say there was no briefing from MONUC DDRRR on how the counting issue had been resolved. After much back and forth the Task Force agreed that on a monthly basis MONUC and Rwanda should compare DDRRR numbers and brief these at one of the JMG meetings. ¶13. (SBU) Finally, the Congolese delegations felt it would be necessary to agree upon a single definition of combatant. Col. Mamba felt the Rwandans would not accept anyone who had not been fighting in Congo for several years already - or at least since before the signing of the Nairobi Accord. Since it is assumed that the FDLR is actively recruiting, this would mean a lack of incentive for recent recruits to disarm. At the suggestion of U.S. representative Brock, MONUC agreed to work with Headquarters in New KINSHASA 00000603 003 OF 003 York to help clarify the definition of combatants, particularly irregular combatants, according to international conventions and precedent. This may or may not put the argument to rest, and the Task Force agreed that if the problem persisted it should be handled at the Special Envoy level. ¶14. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was unnecessarily long, in large part due to the chair's inexperience and lack of familiarity with issues. The Congolese and Rwandans were respectful towards each other and agreed on most points. The DDRRR counting issue is important for sensitization purposes. Resolving it would allow MONUC and the FARDC to show that demobilized combatants were successfully completing the process and getting on with their lives in Rwanda. Rwanda's continued inability to account for the lower numbers of combatants would certainly raise questions about what happened to those missing. The idea of briefing the official MONUC/FARDC numbers versus the Rwandan numbers every month is good, but it implies going through the lists of names in some forum outside the weekly JMG Task Force meeting. Otherwise, the monthly briefing would only prove the two screening processes are not compatible and the entire meeting would be wasted trying to lay blame for this. End comment. GARVELINK