Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KINSHASA586
2008-07-14 16:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

CNDP UNHAPPY WITH GDRC AMANI PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES DECREE

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE 
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VZCZCXRO6561
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0586/01 1961601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141601Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8197
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000586 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE
SUBJECT: CNDP UNHAPPY WITH GDRC AMANI PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES DECREE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000586 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG BE SUBJECT: CNDP UNHAPPY WITH GDRC AMANI PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES DECREE ¶1. (SBU) Summary: U.S. Embassy Goma office and CNDP leadership met July 11 to discuss CNDP concerns about the GDRC decree establishing Amani program provincial commissions and CNDP roles in the sub-commissions. The CNDP is concerned about the absence of humanitarian structures and the level of CNDP participation, and interprets the perceived shortcomings of the decree as indicative of GDRC lack of commitment to the Amani program. U.S. Goma officers countered that the CNDP issues are likely explained by oversight and errors of omission on behalf of the GDRC vice a directed effort to undermine the process. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Rene Abandi and Bertrand Bisimwa of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP in French) requested a meeting with DCM Sam Brock and USAID Goma officer Nicholas Jenks at the Ihusi hotel July 11. Abandi and Bisimwa explained that CNDP president Laurent Nkunda had instructed them to meet with U.S. representatives to discuss CNDP concerns about the government decree ("arrete" in French) naming individuals to the provincial structures of the Amani Peace, Security, and Development Program. ¶3. (SBU) Amani program coordinator Apollinaire Malu Malu distributed copies of the decree to all participants (including CNDP) at the end of the Amani Program Joint Technical Commission for Peace and Security (JTCPS) meeting July 10. Abandi did not have time to study the document before he left for Kirolirwe and Malu Malu departed for Kinshasa. Abandi took the decree to Kirolirwe (CNDP headquarters) and discussed it with Nkunda and the CNDP political and military leadership. Nkunda and CNDP leadership were displeased with the decree itself and with Abandi and Bisimwa for not protesting strongly to Malu Malu about the perceived failings of the decree. Nkunda ordered Abandi and Bisimwa back to Goma to discuss the decree with U.S. Goma officers. (Note: Abandi and Bisimwa appeared shell-shocked during the meeting at the Ihusi, in contrast with the confidence they usually display. End note) ¶4. (SBU) CNDP (Nkunda first and foremost) was dissatisfied with three points: First, no provincial structures for the humanitarian sub-commission were established. The structures that were established are the provincial military committee, the disengagement cell, the brassage cell, and the state authority cell. The structures not established were the provincial
humanitarian cell, the internally displaced person (IDP) return cell, and the refugee return cell. The decree is silent on these latter structures. These structures are important to CNDP as CNDP and Malu Malu apparently had reached an agreement that it was in the context of these structures that the "political" discussions that CNDP wants would be held. ¶5. (SBU) The second point of contention is that CNDP Colonel Antoine Manzi was named to the position of "Secretary/Reporter" of the Provincial Military Committee, but should have been named to be "Secretary/Reporter" of a higher-level coordinating committee that would supervise, at the provincial level, both the provincial and humanitarian committees. This CNDP officer has been functionally demoted, according to CNDP. ¶6. (SBU) The third point Abandi and Bisimwa made was that instead of naming Nkunda explicitly as one of the members of the brassage cell, the decree basically leaves the second CNDP seat on the cell open, with the notation "a pouvoir" (translation: "to be filled") on the list. ¶7. (SBU) CNDP interprets these concerns as a clear indication of GDRC non-seriousness, lack of political will, take-it-or-leave-it approach, and generalized disrespect for the Amani process and the CNDP. According to the CNDP, the GDRC is deliberately ignoring the humanitarian structures because they want to focus only on military issues and do not care about IDPs and refugees and do not want any real political dialogue with CNDP. In addition, per Abandi and Bisimwa, the GDRC is disrespecting CNDP and Nkunda by not naming Nkunda openly to the brassage cell and not using CNDP military titles. CNDP asked for U.S. Goma office reaction to these points. ¶8. (SBU) At this point Nkunda called Abandi, who passed the phone to Jenks. Nkunda said that the GDRC wanted them to surrender whereas CNDP was interested in "joining" the GDRC vice surrendering to them. He said that the GDRC had to understand that CNDP had legitimate concerns that the GDRC was simply refusing to deal with, and that they would need to adopt a different attitude. Nkunda stated, "We are not cargo to be wheeled around willy nilly in wheel-barrows." Jenks explained to Nkunda that the U.S. did not completely share the radical position that CNDP was taking regarding the structures as defined in the decree, and that there could be benign explanations for what had been done or omitted. Jenks and Nkunda agreed that Jenks would give uncensored reactions to CNDP's concerns to Abandi. KINSHASA 00000586 002 OF 002 ¶9. (SBU) Jenks told Abandi that CNDP analysis was unnecessarily radical and that it is not justified to see a nefarious plot lurking behind what could be simple administrative errors. CNDP would be ill-served to raise these concerns in public, as they need to be seen as being cooperative at this point and working with the system with all its faults. ¶10. (SBU) Jenks explained that it was unknown to the U.S. why the GDRC did not create the humanitarian structures or changed the status of Colonel Manzi's position, but it could have been simply that they were focused on getting the military structures identified. Jenks told CNDP that there could be a number of benign reasons why this happened and that the best way to approach this was to have the Facilitation contact Malu Malu for clarification. ¶11. (SBU) Jenks said that CNDP was being unnecessarily radical regarding the nomination of Nkunda to the brassage cell and that it is widely known that it would be difficult for the GDRC to name Nkunda officially. The GDRC had quite elegantly opened the door for his participation, while not designating him officially. And what CNDP wanted, per their statements, was his participation on this cell, which is attained. ¶12. (SBU) CNDP then raised the idea of putting out a short communique describing their issues with the decree, and Jenks countered that it would be better to let the International Facilitation work on the concerns about the humanitarian sub-commission structure and Colonel Manzi's position. Jenks asked about CNDP participation in the establishment of Kimoka, North Kivu as a neutral meeting place and CNDP responded that this did not depend on them. ¶13. (SBU) Comment. CNDP's comments indicate the level of concern they have about the commission structures and may reflect the increasing influence of hard liners within CNDP. The Facilitation will raise these issues with Malu Malu July 12. End comment. GARVELINK

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