SENIOR ADVISER SHORTLEY'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000522 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISER SHORTLEY'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER CHIKEZ REF: A. Kinshasa 463 B. Kinshasa 488 C. 07 Kinshasa 659 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley and Defense Minister Chikez Diemu reviewed progress on the Goma and Nairobi processes and military reform June 2 in Kinshasa. Shortley highlighted the Kisangani FDLR conference as a positive step, which should also be used to pressure Nkunda. They discussed the idea of sending CNDP troops to the Luberizi brassage center in South Kivu as a way to start the process soon. Chikez called for weapons for the FARDC. Shortley noted that uncoordinated efforts of donor countries on the rapid reaction force and security sector reform are unhelpful. End summary ¶2. (SBU) A/S Frazer's Senior Adviser Tim Shortley, joined by EU Great Lakes Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer, discussed progress in the Goma and Nairobi processes and reform of the Congolese army (FARDC) with Defense Minister Chikez Diemu June 2 in Kinshasa. DCM, A/DATT, and POLOFF (notetaker) also participated in the meeting at Chikez's office. ¶3. (SBU) Chikez said that the GDRC expects around 2,500 FDLR members and dependents to disarm and relocate or repatriate as a result of the process established at the May 26-27 Kisangani conference (refs A and B). Shortley said the USG views the Kisangani commitments as a positive step which, if successful, should be used to pressure Nkunda to send a commensurate number of his troops to brassage. Shortley cautioned against giving Nkunda the impression that there will be a "one-to-one" ratio between the number of FDLR combatants disarming and relocating and CNDP soldiers sent to brassage. Chikez cited the necessity of a strong community-based reinsertion and reintegration program. ¶4. (SBU) Shortley and Chikez discussed at some length the issue of brassage centers for CNDP ex-combatants. Shortley emphasized that sending some of Nkunda's troops initially to the Luberizi brassage center in South Kivu (ref C) is a necessary enticement for Nkunda to fully engage in the brassage process. Shortley said CNDP troops can be sent subsequently to centers outside the region. Chikez characterized the idea as a "favor" to Nkunda, but relented somewhat after van de Geer suggested that sending ex-combatants to Luberizi would only be a "first phase." ¶5. (SBU) Chikez claimed that, while a number of governments are providing or planning FARDC training, what the Congolese military needs most is weapons. He complained about the unwillingness or inability of European Union member states to sell arms to the DRC, and said he had written EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana for assistance. He noted that President Kabila also plans to write to Solana to approve the renewal of EUSEC's mandate. ¶6. (SBU) Shortley characterized the disparate efforts of donor governments on the rapid reaction force and security sector reform as unhelpful. He suggested that the U.S. and UK could partner to provide training for the FARDC in an endeavor to concentrate efforts. DCM noted that the USG is working to place a U.S. military advisor at the defense ministry. ¶7. (SBU) Finally, Chikez reported that Kabila has agreed to send one FARDC battalion and elements of the Presidential Republican Guard to Dungu in Orientale Province to pressure the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). (Note: Separate reports place the number of battalions at three. End note.) ¶8. (U) This message has been approved by Senior Adviser Shortley. GARVELINK