ANGOLA'S INFLUENCE IN THE DRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000435 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR AO CG SUBJECT: ANGOLA'S INFLUENCE IN THE DRC REF: A. IIR 6 934 0028 06 ¶B. LUANDA 1203 (2007) ¶C. LUANDA 1208 (2007) ¶D. LUANDA 1251 (2007) ¶E. LUANDA 624 (2007) ¶F. KINSHASA 318 (2007) ¶G. KINSHASA 290 (2007) ¶H. LUANDA 1221 (2007) Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael OBryon for reasons 1. 4 (b&d) ¶1. (U) Background and summary: This cable provides an overview of Angola's political and military interests and goals in the DRC. Angola is one of the DRC,s closest allies and the two countries cooperate closely on economic matters, border security, and between militaries. The nature of the current relationship dates from Laurent Kabila,s ascent to power in 1997. It intensified with Angola,s assistance to the DRC in the war with Rwanda and Uganda, and has continued to grow closer ever since. This is in marked contrast to the relationship between Angola and Zaire under dictator Mobutu Sese-Seko, given Mobutu,s support for the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Angola,s immediate interest in supporting Laurent Kabila was to deny UNITA the sanctuary it enjoyed under Mobutu. This has since expanded into a broader agenda in the DRC, which principally connects back to protecting Angolan economic interests. ¶2. (U) Background and summary continued: Opportunities related to oil and mineral extraction dominate Angola,s economic agenda in the DRC. Talks are under way on a number of issues, including fishing and mining rights. The two countries this week signed an agreement on revenue sharing from offshore oil exploration. Angola is also looking to gain access to electrical power generated by the DRC,s Inga hydroelectric installations, which have the potential to provide enough electricity to satisfy all of Angola,s current power demand. Protecting these interests will require active Angolan involvement in two key areas: ensuring the stability of the Joseph Kabila regime and border security. End background and summary. Regime stability a prime objective for Angola -------------- ¶3. (U) Friendly ties with a stable Democratic Republic of the Congo are a strategic foreign policy objective for the Government of Angola. In Joseph Kabila, Angola has an ally who refuses to harbor anti-Luanda rebel groups, particularly secessionists in Cabinda, Angola's oil-producing enclave wedged between the DRC and the Republic of the Congo. Angolan support for Kabila is made manifest in many ways. Of particular note is the military and police training Angola provides to the DRC. This has not only allowed Angola to play a key role in the process of strengthening the Congolese army and police but has also strengthened Luanda's ability to influence events in the DRC in those areas it considers to be most important: border security, military intelligence, and access to key officials within the security sector. ¶4. (SBU) According to an officer attached to the EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC (EUSEC),one of the key sites for Angolan military training is at Kitona base, located in Bas-Congo province and jointly administered by Angola and the DRC. Angolan instructors have been there for several years, providing what amounts to basic training to FARDC soldiers. They have also trained three DRC commando battalions. ¶5. (C) Angola has in recent years continued to call on its military to address actively potential security problems in the DRC. The business intelligence firm STRATFOR assessed that Angola was prepared to intervene in the DRC during the 2006 presidential elections to block any opposition unrest that might threaten Kabila,s campaign. Separately, military reporting from 2006 notes too that the Angolan army implemented contingency plans to deal with any problems associated with the elections. The main concern was that turmoil in pre and post-election periods could cause a migration of civilians into Angolan territory (ref A). ¶6. (C) The actions taken at that time were reportedly defensive in nature and focused on border security and protection of Angolan personnel in the DRC. They included an KINSHASA 00000435 002 OF 003 army deployment to Kinshasa to provide protection for Angolan diplomatic personnel, an increased presence of forces along the border, and preparations to evacuate the army instructors at Kitona (ref A). A MONUC officer notes as well that Angola continues to provide a military detachment to act as bodyguards for Kabila. Efforts to diminish fighting in the East -------------- ¶7. (C) Angola was also involved in promoting a SADC effort in 2007 to bring peace to eastern Congo, which focused on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or repatriation of members of armed groups and exile for Laurent Nkunda. As a last resort, SADC members would provide logistical support to the FARDC to quell the disturbances (ref B). Additionally, in a December 4, 2007 meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward, Acting Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Chicoti provided additional details about Angola's plan for peace and stability in eastern DRC, which would include a small SADC task force to ensure that all parties stay on their side of the border (ref C). ¶8. (C) At the same time, Angola was not eager to become militarily engaged in the area. Chicoti made this point to General Ward (ref C). In a statement to the press following a meeting between Angolan and DRC military officials in December 2007, Angolan Assistant Chief of Staff General Geraldo Nunda downplayed the possibility of Angolan participation in offensive military operations in eastern DRC (ref D). Additionally, in June 2007 Angolan Foreign Minister Joao Bernardo de Miranda told Assistant Secretary Frazer that Angola would not provide troops to participate in any operation to disarm directly rebels operating in eastern Congo (ref E). Border Security -------------- ¶9. (C) Angola and the DRC share a 2,511 km border, which is a security issue for both. Border disputes have been an area of significant controversy between Angola and the DRC, despite relations that are generally excellent. In March 2007, the two nations agreed to resolve a dispute over the demarcation of the border, following an accusation that Angolan troops had moved into the DRC diamond-bearing area of Kahemba (refs F&G). Additionally, a report from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) spoke to a report by the DRC,s parliament in July 2007 which accused the Angolan army of infiltrating other DRC territory along the border. ¶10. (U) The expulsion of Congolese nationals from Angola has also been a point of controversy. According to a EIU report, around 400,000 Congolese are thought to live in northeastern Angola, many working illegally as artisanal diamond miners or running small businesses for their local communities. The increasing hostility of the Angolan authorities towards them has put a strain on relations with the DRC. Expulsion of illegal diamond miners has gathered pace and, since the launch of a bloody operation in 2003-2004 to remove illegal migrants, the army has expelled as many as 400,000. The vast majority of those expelled are Congolese, with an estimated 44,000 forced out of Angola in 2007 alone. Human rights abuses -------------- ¶11. (U) In December 2007, Doctors Without Borders accused the Angolan army of pervasive and systematic abuse of Congolese migrant workers before deporting them across the border into the DRC. According to testimonies collected by the group, the abuse has included mass rape, beatings, and torture (ref H). ¶12. (U) The Angolan enclave of Cabinda also presents significant challenges to relations between the two countries. Located north of the DRC,s Bas-Congo province, Cabinda is separated from the main body of Angola and land access requires travel through DRC territory. The enclave plays a significant role in Angola,s oil industry, and is also home to a group agitating for separation from Angola, the Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). ¶13. (U) According to a EIU report, the FLEC continues to carry out a low-level insurgency in the area, with sporadic attacks on army patrols and oil workers. Following an KINSHASA 00000435 003 OF 003 attack in December 2007 that killed a Brazilian paramedic working for an oil company, in early March 2008 FLEC fighters seriously wounded a Portuguese technician who was working for Tecnovia. In late March, they attacked an installation belonging to the Portuguese company Emcica, killing two workers, one from Cabinda and another from Congo-Brazzaville. According to a subsequent announcement by FLEC, three Angolan soldiers were also killed. ¶14. (SBU) The DRC shares Angola's concern about Cabinda, particularly given the reported ties between the FLEC and the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK),a mysterious group in Congo's Bas-Congo province that has used violence in recent years to press for greater autonomy from Kinshasa. According to a MONUC officer, the Angolan chiefs of national police and intelligence have met with Bas-Congo provincial police chief General Raus to discuss issues related to the FLEC and the BDK. BROCK