ANGOLA'S INFLUENCE IN THE DRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000435

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS MARR AO CG
SUBJECT: ANGOLA'S INFLUENCE IN THE DRC

REF: A. IIR 6 934 0028 06

B. LUANDA 1203 (2007)

C. LUANDA 1208 (2007)

D. LUANDA 1251 (2007)

E. LUANDA 624 (2007)

F. KINSHASA 318 (2007)

G. KINSHASA 290 (2007)

H. LUANDA 1221 (2007)

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael OBryon for reasons 1.
4 (b&d)


1. (U) Background and summary: This cable provides an
overview of Angola's political and military interests and
goals in the DRC. Angola is one of the DRC,s closest allies
and the two countries cooperate closely on economic matters,
border security, and between militaries. The nature of the
current relationship dates from Laurent Kabila,s ascent to
power in 1997. It intensified with Angola,s assistance to
the DRC in the war with Rwanda and Uganda, and has continued
to grow closer ever since. This is in marked contrast to the
relationship between Angola and Zaire under dictator Mobutu
Sese-Seko, given Mobutu,s support for the rebel group
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
Angola,s immediate interest in supporting Laurent Kabila was
to deny UNITA the sanctuary it enjoyed under Mobutu. This
has since expanded into a broader agenda in the DRC, which
principally connects back to protecting Angolan economic
interests.


2. (U) Background and summary continued: Opportunities
related to oil and mineral extraction dominate Angola,s
economic agenda in the DRC. Talks are under way on a number
of issues, including fishing and mining rights. The two
countries this week signed an agreement on revenue sharing
from offshore oil exploration. Angola is also looking to
gain access to electrical power generated by the DRC,s Inga
hydroelectric installations, which have the potential to
provide enough electricity to satisfy all of Angola,s
current power demand. Protecting these interests will
require active Angolan involvement in two key areas: ensuring
the stability of the Joseph Kabila regime and border
security. End background and summary.

Regime stability a prime objective for Angola
--------------


3. (U) Friendly ties with a stable Democratic Republic of the
Congo are a strategic foreign policy objective for the
Government of Angola. In Joseph Kabila, Angola has an ally
who refuses to harbor anti-Luanda rebel groups, particularly
secessionists in Cabinda, Angola's oil-producing enclave
wedged between the DRC and the Republic of the Congo.
Angolan support for Kabila is made manifest in many ways. Of
particular note is the military and police training Angola
provides to the DRC. This has not only allowed Angola to
play a key role in the process of strengthening the Congolese
army and police but has also strengthened Luanda's ability to
influence events in the DRC in those areas it considers to be
most important: border security, military intelligence, and
access to key officials within the security sector.


4. (SBU) According to an officer attached to the EU advisory
and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC
(EUSEC),one of the key sites for Angolan military training
is at Kitona base, located in Bas-Congo province and jointly
administered by Angola and the DRC. Angolan instructors have
been there for several years, providing what amounts to basic
training to FARDC soldiers. They have also trained three DRC
commando battalions.


5. (C) Angola has in recent years continued to call on its
military to address actively potential security problems in
the DRC. The business intelligence firm STRATFOR assessed
that Angola was prepared to intervene in the DRC during the
2006 presidential elections to block any opposition unrest
that might threaten Kabila,s campaign. Separately, military
reporting from 2006 notes too that the Angolan army
implemented contingency plans to deal with any problems
associated with the elections. The main concern was that
turmoil in pre and post-election periods could cause a
migration of civilians into Angolan territory (ref
A).


6. (C) The actions taken at that time were reportedly
defensive in nature and focused on border security and
protection of Angolan personnel in the DRC. They included an

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army deployment to Kinshasa to provide protection for Angolan
diplomatic personnel, an increased presence of forces along
the border, and preparations to evacuate the army instructors
at Kitona (ref A). A MONUC officer notes as well that Angola
continues to provide a military detachment to act as
bodyguards for Kabila.

Efforts to diminish fighting in the East
--------------


7. (C) Angola was also involved in promoting a SADC effort
in 2007 to bring peace to eastern Congo, which focused on the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or
repatriation of members of armed groups and exile for Laurent
Nkunda. As a last resort, SADC members would provide
logistical support to the FARDC to quell the
disturbances (ref B). Additionally, in a December 4, 2007
meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward, Acting Angolan
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Chicoti provided
additional details about Angola's plan for peace and
stability in eastern DRC, which would include a small SADC
task force to ensure that all parties stay on their side of
the border (ref C).


8. (C) At the same time, Angola was not eager to become
militarily engaged in the area. Chicoti made this point to
General Ward (ref C). In a statement to the press following
a meeting between Angolan and DRC military officials in
December 2007, Angolan Assistant Chief of Staff General
Geraldo Nunda downplayed the possibility of Angolan
participation in offensive military operations in eastern DRC
(ref D). Additionally, in June 2007 Angolan
Foreign Minister Joao Bernardo de Miranda told Assistant
Secretary Frazer that Angola would not provide troops to
participate in any operation to disarm directly rebels
operating in eastern Congo (ref E).

Border Security
--------------


9. (C) Angola and the DRC share a 2,511 km border, which is
a security issue for both. Border disputes have been an area
of significant controversy between Angola and the DRC,
despite relations that are generally excellent. In March
2007, the two nations agreed to resolve a dispute over the
demarcation of the border, following an accusation that
Angolan troops had moved into the DRC diamond-bearing area of
Kahemba (refs F&G). Additionally, a report from the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) spoke to a report by the
DRC,s parliament in July 2007 which accused the Angolan army
of infiltrating other DRC territory along the border.


10. (U) The expulsion of Congolese nationals from Angola has
also been a point of controversy. According to a EIU report,
around 400,000 Congolese are thought to live in
northeastern Angola, many working illegally as artisanal
diamond miners or running small businesses for their local
communities. The increasing hostility of the Angolan
authorities towards them has put a strain on relations with
the DRC. Expulsion of illegal diamond miners has gathered
pace and, since the launch of a bloody operation in 2003-2004
to remove illegal migrants, the army has expelled as many as
400,000. The vast majority of those expelled are Congolese,
with an estimated 44,000 forced out of Angola in 2007 alone.

Human rights abuses
--------------


11. (U) In December 2007, Doctors Without Borders accused the
Angolan army of pervasive and systematic abuse of Congolese
migrant workers before deporting them across the
border into the DRC. According to testimonies collected by
the group, the abuse has included mass rape, beatings, and
torture (ref H).


12. (U) The Angolan enclave of Cabinda also presents
significant challenges to relations between the two
countries. Located north of the DRC,s Bas-Congo province,
Cabinda is separated from the main body of Angola and land
access requires travel through DRC territory. The enclave
plays a significant role in Angola,s oil industry, and is
also home to a group agitating for separation from Angola,
the Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC).


13. (U) According to a EIU report, the FLEC continues to
carry out a low-level insurgency in the area, with sporadic
attacks on army patrols and oil workers. Following an

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attack in December 2007 that killed a Brazilian paramedic
working for an oil company, in early March 2008 FLEC fighters
seriously wounded a Portuguese technician who was
working for Tecnovia. In late March, they attacked an
installation belonging to the Portuguese company Emcica,
killing two workers, one from Cabinda and another from
Congo-Brazzaville. According to a subsequent announcement by
FLEC, three Angolan soldiers were also killed.


14. (SBU) The DRC shares Angola's concern about Cabinda,
particularly given the reported ties between the FLEC and the
Bundu dia Kongo (BDK),a mysterious group in Congo's
Bas-Congo province that has used violence in recent years to
press for greater autonomy from Kinshasa. According to a
MONUC officer, the Angolan chiefs of national police and
intelligence have met with Bas-Congo provincial police chief
General Raus to discuss issues related to the FLEC and the
BDK.
BROCK