Goma Report for January 16 -

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000042 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG SUBJECT: Goma Report for January 16 - Kamerhe-Shortley Meeting ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In his meeting with National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe January 16, Senior Adviser Tim Shortley urged Kamerhe (and similarly Foreign Minister Mbusa, Conference President Malu Malu and Conference Moderator Ruberwa) to get the authorization of President Kabila (who arrived in Goma January 15) to meet rebel leader Laurent Nkunda urgently. Shortley said that meeting Nkunda face-to-face would significantly increase the chances of finalizing a peace agreement to end the DRC-Nkunda conflict before the end of the conference. Shortley stressed that discussions between Nkunda and senior Congolese interlocutors were the only way to achieve an agreement on the most contentious and difficult issues to include the status of CNDP leadership (e.g., exile). Kamerhe welcomed and agreed with Shortley's message and stated that he would carry it as forcefully as possible to Kabila. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tim Shortley opened his meeting with Kamerhe (one of the key leaders of the Kivus Conference as Chairman of the Wisemen's Committee) by noting the intensified commitment by the United States Government to the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past six months to bring about the end of conflict in eastern Congo and assist the government to deal with foreign armed negative forces. ¶3. (SBU) Kamerhe said that the Kivus conference was a crucial opportunity for ending conflict in eastern Congo. The conference had brought together ethnic communities and armed groups, all of which had emphasized their respect for the constitution and state institutions, but all had decried marginalization, the fragility of the government, the inability of government forces to protect the population, and the lack of the state's capacity to meet the needs of the people. Armed groups had complained that they were not treated equitably in allocation of responsibilities in integrated units and that efforts at demobilization had been a failure. Kamerhe said that the Wise Men's Committee had met South Kivu leaders January 15 to discuss the highly emotive issue of a separate territory for the Banyamulenge. He believed that there would be a way to make this happen. ¶4. (SBU) Kamerhe said that the most difficult issue was the disengagement of armed groups. It was essential for the conference to agree on the need to reinforce the ceasefire among all armed groups. FARDC, MONUC, and CNDP would have to provide exact locations and numbers of troops. Assembly centers would be set up to prepare for brassage or demobilization. The CNDP would insist on some conditions, but the other armed groups were not as complicated, as they said they would stop fighting once the Nkunda situation was resolved. ¶5. (SBU) The President had now arrived in Goma, Kamerhe said, and he would soon be giving directions to the government about the extent to which it could negotiate with Nkunda. Kamerhe said that he was convinced that "if discusions with Nkunda go well and if there is pressure on Nkunda and Rwanda from the United States, we an arrive at a solution." Kamerhe noted that Nkunda needed a guarantee that if he stopped fighting he would not be arrested, but it would be difficult for the populace to accept Nkunda's staying in Goma or being integrated as part of the army. South Africa had said that it would accept his exile and guarantee he would not be extradited to DRC. Kamerhe stressed that Nkunda could stay in South Africa two to three years, depening on his behavior there, and then be pardoned; perhaps he would only need to stay one year. Kamerhe said that he and his conference colleagues would try to get President Kabila to make the necessary concessions -- it was vital to achieve this political agreement, despite the "small humiliations" that would be involved. ¶6. (SBU) Kamerhe detailed, as well, the conference's focus on issues such as return of refugees (it would be necessary to work with UNHCR to identify refugees especially in Rwanda and create the necessary security conditions for their return),the humanitarian crisis (the conference was producing an urgent plan for ensuring return of IDPs),and reconstruction (a project such as rebuilding the 150-kilometer Goma-Bukava road would occupy many workers who now have no employment and would otherwise be tempted to stay as fighters in armed groups). ¶7. (SBU) Shortley noted that the difficult issues for Kabila were amnesty and exile. He also noted that Nkunda was focused on those issues as well as integrating his troops with appropriate security guarantees. Shortley highlighted that when he met with Nkunda on January 12, Nkunda was wearing a civilian suit and that Nkunda was fixated on urgent next steps beyond the conference and beyond the paper agreement. Shortley underscored that Nkunda wanted an exchange among his Congolese peers making up the leadership of the KINSHASA 00000042 002 OF 002 Conference. He wanted to sit with conference leaders Kamerhe, Foreign Minister Mbusa, conference president Abbe Malu Malu, and RCD leader Ruberwa, together or separately, to have a tough discussion about the country's problems, his status, and guarantees for him and his forces. Shortley said that the time had come for the Congolese to step up and provide the leadership necessary to end the conflict. Shortley stressed that with the conference ending on Monday, January 21, time was of the essence. ¶8. (SBU) Shortley said that Nkunda had made it clear that a key component of the agreement was a role for MONUC in protecting the population in his area of control and ensuring that his troops could go to brassage without fear that FDLR, Mai Mai, and Pareco would fill the void. Shortley highlighted that President Kabila's Chief of Staff and Advisers had designed a technical committee that would seek agreement in the areas of disengagement, brassage/DDR, and other technical matters and deal with political questions such as exile and CNDP integration thereafter. Shortley recommended to Kabila's advisers Tshibanda and Chissambo that the participants in this technical committee include FARDC/GDRC and CNDP sitting across from each other at a table, with the U.S. and MONUC as observers, chaired by a senior Congolese. ¶9. (SBU) However, Shortley said, the presidential advisers did not want a senior Congolese to chair the meetings and preferred the U.S. play that role. They did not want the appearance of equality between CNDP and the government. They were pushing for separate military and political forums. Shortley said that he feared their approach would remove the government too far from the discussion and slow things down or freeze the process as it would demonstrate a lack of commitment to the process to end the conflict. Shortley stressed that Kabila did not want to make necessary concessions or approve a rapid and direct process, while Nkunda was holding back on any concessions until he obtained direct negotiations with Congolese counterparts. Shortley believed that if respected senior leaders, such as Kamerhe himself, met Nkunda directly, an agreement could come in less than two days. Shortley noted that it would be essential for Nkunda that any agreement be public. Shortley stated that he believed an agreement could be reached by the end of the conference January 20. Shortley noted that the conference could be immediately followed by announcing a peace agreement and process, and the convening of the technical committee on January 22 for implementation, before Shortley's unavoidable departure January 23. ¶10. (SBU) Kamerhe said that he anticipated seeing President Kabila in the course of the day. He would strongly urge all the points that Shortley had made to him and hoped that Shortley would also have an audience. Shortley's concept exactly fitted with his own, Kamerhe said. For Nkunda to stop fighting, he would have to have guarantees for himself and for his troops and his CNDP leadership. Time was very short, and failure to seize the occasion would be a disaster. Failure would prompt the populace to further despair and Nkunda would become even stronger, and possibly even spur him to take Goma. Sadly, if the government had had talks with Nkunda before December it would now be in a much better position. Unfortunately, Kamerhe said, Kabila was surrounded by a "very bad entourage." Kamerhe said that he was used to confronting difficult situations such as this one, and he was prepared to confront the President and his entourage. However, in doing so, he joked acidly, he might also need, with the U.S., to prepare his own exile. Garevelink