Joint Monitoring Task Force (JMG-TF)

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000036 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: Joint Monitoring Task Force (JMG-TF) Meeting of 11 January 2008 REF: (A) 07 Kinshasa 1419; (B) 07 Kinshasa 1426; (C) Kinshasa 0007 ¶1. Reftels are reports on prior meetings of the JMG-TF. ¶2. Following are highlights of the Task Force Meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group held in Goma on January 4, 2008. Goma Report January 11, 2008: Task Force of the Joint Monitoring Group ¶3. Summary: At the meeting of the Task Force of the Joint Monitoring Group January 11, GDRC continued to ask Rwanda to provide its list of genocidaires, and Rwanda --mercifully -- tried to explain the difficulties in finalizing the list. MONUC's DDRRR chief urged GDRC to be content with the existing Most Wanted list. GDRC noted the ongoing Kivu Conference's focus on dealing with ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The Rwandans were meticulous about the previous meeting's minutes. End Summary. ¶4. The fourth meeting of the Task Force of the Joint Monitoring Group took place in Goma January 11, with the same Congolese and Rwandan participation as in the previous meeting, Col. Augustin Mamba chairing the two-person Congolese delegation and Major Franco Rutagengwa chairing the four-person Rwandan delegation. ¶5. Mamba said that the on-going Kivus Conference was a major chapter in the sensitization phase of the FDLR plan, presented to Rwanda December 1, to disarm the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The conference was concentrating on making the local population aware of the urgent need for these Rwandans to disarm and leave the Kivus, and as from January 14 DRC officials and leaders of the conference would be meeting ex-FAR/Interahamwe to stress that their time in DRC was coming to an end. It would be helpful to the DRC, he said, if Rwanda would provide the list of genocidaires, as called for in the Nairobi communique. Mamba said that the DRC agreed with Rwanda that dealing with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe was the major objective of the Nairobi communique, but DRC needed to cope with internal armed groups as well as a core "sub-objective." ¶6. Rutagengwa said that Rwanda had fulfilled, or was in the process of fulfilling, its four obligations stipulated under the Nairobi communique. Its short border with DRC was completely sealed. It was providing no support whatever to any armed group inside DRC. It was encouraging ex-FAR/Interahamwe to return home, having put in place a full range of mechanisms for safe return: assistance with food, tools, and building materials, health care, education, and security. As for the list of genocidaires, it would come soon. Rwanda wanted to provide a definitive list and was consulting with its "gachacha" courts. Rwanda interpreted paragraph 9 of the Nairobi communique (DRC's commitments) to mean that the list of genocidaires did not need to be made available before the DRC had relocated ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements to temporary reception centers. DRC did not need the list to get on with its sensitization campaign. ¶7. Mamba agreed that the list was not an essential requirement for commencing the sensitization campaign -- indeed, this campaign was well under way in the Kivus conference -- but having the list would help DRC in this campaign. Mamba did not explain why it would help. MONUC's chief of DDRRR, Phil Lancaster (present at the meeting), noted that DRC already had Rwanda's provisional list of Most Wanted genocidaires with 72 names (Lancaster later corrected the number to 114). He urged DRC to use that list in its sensitization campaign, as it would help show the populace and ex-FAR/Interahamwe elements that some of the FDLR leadership had a personal stake in "holding them hostage," and they might therefore be more amenable to return. However, Mamba said that perhaps "only five or ten" of the FDLR leaders were on the list. ¶8. In an aside, one of the Rwandan delegates told poloff that the complete genocidaire list, whenever it was completed, would likely be "very long," on the order of "tens of thousands." Privately, Lancaster told poloff that when he discussed the Most Wanted list with Mamba after the Task Force meeting, Mamba appeared never to have seen it. Lancaster also commented to poloff that it appeared to be in the interest of neither party to have a list published, since a long list would make the task of bringing about the peaceful return of ex-FAR/Interahame much more difficult. ¶9. The parties had no new recommendations for the Joint Monitoring Group. They repeated the need to for the upcoming Envoys Level meeting to clarify the relationship between the Task Force and Joint Verification Commission, and repeated the recommendation that the Envoys urge the Security Council to adopt sanctions against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The last JMG agreed that there would be a serious discussion on the resources that are necessary to implement KINSHASA 00000036 002 OF 002 the Nairobi Communique. The EU observer to the Task Force suggested that the Task Force might propose that new allegations be put on the table at Task Force meetings but sent to the Joint Verification Commission for investigation, then brought back to the Task Force; alternatively, he suggested there could be some joint Task Force/JVC meetings exclusively reserved to dealing with such allegations. The Rwandan delegation objected to these suggestions, observing that the envoys had not yet decided the fundamental issue of whether allegations should be brought to the Task Force at all. ¶10. Half the meeting was addressed to caviling over the minutes of the previous Task Force meeting, in particular the characterization of the discussion therein of whether DRC should give priority to combating ex-FAR/Interahamwe or Nkunda. The MONUC chairman of the Task Force, Acting Head of Office Gernot Sauer, wanted the minutes to reflect something he had said himself during the meeting. The offending sentence read: "MONUC referred to the statement of Rwandan Envoy Dr. Sezibera during the 16 December JMG-Envoy Level meeting in Goma where he declared that it was DRC's sovereign right to decide for herself what to do next militarily." The Rwandan delegation objected to this sentence, as giving the impression that Sezibera had not been clear that the priority of the Nairobi communique was ex-FAR/Interahamwe. Sauer asked whether the parties disagreed that Sezibera had said what he quoted him as saying and whether it was not appropriate for the minutes to reflect that he, Sauer, had quoted Sezibera. After considerable discussion, the Task Force agreed to keep the sentence but add a phrase to the sentence, that Sezibera had stressed that "priority should be given to ex-FAR/Interahamwe." ¶11. At the conclusion of the meeting, Sauer suggested that the parties might in the future consider being less legalistic, as discussion of the minutes was taking an inordinate amount of time, even if the present meeting (five hours) was shorter than previous meetings (eight hours). Garvelink