GOMA NOTES - NAIROBI PROCESS: 16th MEETING OF JMG TASK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000345 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG UN RW SF EUN SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES - NAIROBI PROCESS: 16th MEETING OF JMG TASK FORCE, APRIL 4, 2008 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The 16th meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task Force for the Nairobi communIque April 4 in Goma was punctuated by several unexpected exchanges. The FARDC's regional military intelligence chief implied that CNDP is an ally against FDLR. The Congolese delegation reported that the FDLR is on the move, with mining sites and other economic resources abandoned, but its intentions are unclear. DDRRR contacts with potential FDLR defectors are up. And finally, the group made a request to the JMG Envoys on coordination with the Congo-Rwanda Joint Verification Mechanism. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The 16th meeting of the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task Force for the Nairobi communque April 4 in Goma, like the previous week, began at 1030 and ended at about 1500. The Congolese delegation was led as usual by Colonel Augustin Mamba, joined by the 8th Military Region's T2 (intelligence chief) Major Peter Chirimwana. The Rwandan delegation was again led Major Franco Rutagengwa. The EU, U.S. and South African delegations were present as usual. The meeting was chaired by MONUC-Goma's new political section chief., with representation at both the Eastern Division staff level and that of the North (IndBatt) and South (PakBatt) Kivu Brigades. For the first time, there was a delegation from the from the Executive Secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR),led by program officer Roger Nsipuka. GDRC presentation -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The opening presentation by Mamba and Chirimwana touched first on a few non-Nairobi issues: -- FARDC Chief of Staff General Dieudonne Kayembe in the U.S.: The expected announcement of a new two-star commander for the campaign against the FDLR has had to be deferred because of Kayembe's trip to the U.S. at the invitation of (as Mamba put it) the "U.S. Chief Of Staff." This gave Mamba an opportunity to bestow fulsome praise on the U.S. for its military cooperation and its contribution to the development of the FARDC. (This was accompanied by many meaningful glances at the Rwandan delegation.) The two-star will be appointed following Kayembe's return. -- Criminality in Goma: Following the previous weekend's wave of killings in the city, there is a task force on the ground trying to get to the root of this. There have been arrests. Restoring law and order in Goma is a priority. Separately, EUSEC told us that there was a raid April 2 on the Kokolo military camp in which the soldiers' residences were searched for stockpiles of clandestine weapons. The raid turned up several hundred weapons, and as many as ten in some houses. -- CNDP Activity: Another Goma-related issue. The Congolese delegation alleged several serious incidents: CNDP movement into Manyarere, NW of Minova, to positions only 1 km from FARDC lines; at Munagana, with the CNDP moving in and appointing local civilian officials; and at Bambo, near Tongo, with CNDP taking over the town. This last would have been very serious, as Bambo is supposed to be the northern anchor of the CNDP-PARECO exclusion zone established the week before. Eastern Division Commander General Birkam Singh assured us later that the alleged takeover there did not occur. -- CNDP no longer an enemy?: In response to a later query from the Rwandans about how and why the FARDC seemed to be pulling out of certain areas near their common border just when the Rwandans were demanding more action in those areas, Chirimwana stated that the Rwandans should have no concern about FDLR expansion into adjacent zones because the CNDP was dug in on the adjoining hills. -- And the GDRC did not let it go at that: in the ensuing discussion, Mamba came out and said, twice, that since the signing of the Goma Acte "we no longer consider the CNDP an enemy." And yet again, at several points, the Congolese seemed to be saying that the CNDP was in effect a proxy for the FARDC, and that if CNDP was present in an area, things in terms of the Nairobi process were under control and the FARDC could withdraw to other, more important areas. The Rwandans maintained a studied silence. (Comment: Even if the inference here was not intended, these remarks may have been a startling insight into Congolese planning. End comment.) ¶4. (SBU) Nairobi-specific items: -- Putting the FDLR on the defensive: There are two main priorities right now: persuading the civilian community to pull back from FDLR locations, and to inhibit FDLR movement and economic activities in mining areas. FDLR is spontaneously withdrawing under KINSHASA 00000345 002 OF 003 the pressure they feel from FARDC and the international community (the UNSC resolutions are having an effect). -- At "Brazomonge," for example, there is an outward movement of FDLR toward the interior. FARDC has been withdrawing to strengthen other units, but CNDP is nearby. In Bikenge and Runyonyi, CNDP ("no longer an enemy") is holding specific areas and preventing FDLR expansion. We have taken control of the diamond fields at Mapema (Walikale),and FDLR has moved out of (and thus is no longer exploiting) a series of areas, including: diamonds -- Iwa, Kimsuka, Isangi; Bauxite Iwa, Kimsuka, Isangi; Coltan -- "Mtoto," "Malembe." Poaching in Virunga National Park is also down due to the FDLR pullouts. -- What are the FDLR's intentions? First Rwanda and then (more oddly in such a public forum) a MONUC major queried whether these withdrawals were such a good thing, or if FDLR might be regrouping to plan a new offensive strategy -- if they're regrouping in some areas, why not hit them now, asked the GOR? Because we don't want civilian casualties, the GDRC responded: our priorities are as stated, right now we are trying to separate FDLR combatants from civilian areas, so our strategy is working. -- Comment: The MONUC major seemed to be questioning whether the GDRC campaign strategy took any account of the likelihood that the FDLR might be regrouping to attack the FARDC. Since FARDC Nairobi-related operations are supposed to be coordinated with MONUC (although we know from MONUC sources that there is in fact very little coordination),this was a jarring thing to do in this forum, with the Rwandan delegation present. Lt. Colonel Legendre of MONUC, tried, with partial success, to make the remark sound like a constructive prompt to the Congolese to come out and say what all the parties knew, but the query seemed to comfort the explicit and repeated Rwandan insinuations that the Congolese plan is being kept under wraps because it is not very well thought out. End comment. DDRRR -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Guillaume Lacaille, political advisor to MONUC DDRRR, did a special-agenda presentation of their latest statistics: -- In a series of graphs that represented the same basic numbers in different forms, he said that, overall, to date and since DDRRR began, there have been 5,800 combatant repatriations (a total of 11,200 when dependents are included). There were 22 repatriations on April 3, and there are 16 pending at the Masisi transit camp. -- This works out to an average of 120 per month. If this rate held steady, there would be 600 combatant repatriations in 2008, taking the total FDLR down to 6,000 combatants. -- But DDRRR expects to do better than that: there is a spike of walk-ins, calls for information, and requests for "extraction." Interviews with defectors and informers indicate that there is a new sense of urgency as a result of UNSC 1804 and 1807, of the French prosecutions, and of perceived pressure, both political and military, from both the international community and FARDC. Improved "sensibilization" techniques and messages are bearing fruit. It would be important from now on for all actions with regard to FDLR to be considered in terms of their potential public impact, taking into account that FDLR leaders will naturally put every action into the worst possible light. -- The GOR asked about the effect in this last regard of its "list" of over 6,000 genocidaires. (This is a recurring JMG TF theme.) Lacaille responded that it had been helpful in getting FDLR worried but hurtful in that it could have increased the determination of many to tough it out, since 6,000 is roughly the estimated number of combatants, so they might be misled into thinking that they all were subject to arrest upon return, a point their commanders have of course been driving home. -- This led to a lengthy Rwandan rant on how the list had been misunderstood, and how it had been misrepresented in the Congolese press. The GOR plopped down a recent interview in the Kinshasa paper Le Potential, in which Foreign Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi was quoted as saying, yes, the list had been a deterrent to returns. He misrepresents the meaning of the list, said the GOR, and this sort of thing must stop. -- Mamba then looked over the article and found the parts where FM Mbusa correctly stated what the list really was: he was just KINSHASA 00000345 003 OF 003 stating the obvious, that the list had, objectively, not helped. There ensued a not very constructive textual exegesis. The U.S. pointed out that the point was not to wrangle over what the list really was (which we all understood) or wasn't, or what its effect had or hadn't been, but to learn from this experience and, as Lacaille had been urging, develop a public information strategy ahead of taking significant public actions (or, as in this case, actions likely to be made public),not after they are taken and the damage has been done. -- The U.S., with eager South African backing, requested that DDRRR data be supplied to the TF on a regular basis, and that the data slides Lacaille showed today be made available electronically or in hard copy. Lacaille said that he would ask for authorization to do this. Other business -------------- ¶6. (SBU) There were no comments at all on the previous week's minutes (probably a first for this forum),and it almost ended around 1400, which would have been unprecedented ... until the South African delegation brought up the dreaded question of the JMG Envoys' Brussels minutes and of when, or whether, the JMG TF would ever be allowed to interface with the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM). No, the minutes had not been transmitted (as they have not been for the previous six or so weeks),making JVM coordination impossible. And the usual wrangle resumed over the question of whether the TF had the standing to make a recommendation to the Special Envoys about coordination with the JVM absent those minutes. ¶7. (SBU) Coming as it did just as everyone else thought that they would get out early for the first time in minuted history, the South African intervention was unwelcome, but it bore fruit: a recommendation was at last being made. The week's minutes would at long last include a recommendation to the Envoys, to be considered at their April 17 meeting in New York. The substance of the recommendation will be that the Envoys (who, in the case of DRC and Rwanda, are the same as those to the JVM) examine the existing terms of reference of the two groups (JMG and JVM) so that these can be "harmonized." or "synchronized." ¶8. (SBU) Field Trips: The Rwandan delegation has for several sessions been requesting that the GDRC and MONUC organize observation trips to the field for the TF, particularly to border areas alleged to have been infiltrated by ex-FAR/IH. This has now been formally put on the agenda, and the chair (MONUC) will make specific proposals for a trip or series of trips. ¶9. (SBU) The repeated South African request that the TF draft and adopt a specific workplan with targets, objectives and time frames, was not really debated Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The decision to recommend that the Envoys consider closer collaboration with the JVM counts as a small but discernible shift in the tectonic plates. The Rwandan delegation finally conceded on this point, although we know from their previous implacable opposition to such a move, as well as through other channels, that they are reluctant to see such cooperation (but it's not clear what the issue really is). ¶11. (SBU) The ideal outcome would be for the Envoys to look at the two terms of reference and state that there is no incompatibility with briefings by the JVM to the TF and that these should commence forthwith. The alternative solution that has been discussed, that the JVM should furnish information on request to the TF puts the burden on the TF to know what to ask for. Without hard facts to discuss (i.e., verified reports, not allegations),the TF is just an audience before which one side or the other can make claims and allegations that are impossible for the group to sort out. End comment. GARVELINK