GOMA NOTES 03/21/08 - GOMA PROCESS: TWO OF THREE "EXCLUSION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000285 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO CG UN SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 03/21/08 - GOMA PROCESS: TWO OF THREE "EXCLUSION ZONES" NOW ESTABLISHED REF: A. Kinshasa 170 B. Kinshasa 278 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Goma process International Facilitation, CNDP and PARECO established two of three planned exclusion zones (where no armed men or men in uniforms are allowed, with the exception of MONUC patrols) in North Kivu during the week of March 15-21. This includes the sensitive zone of Moheto, located northeast of Nkunda's Kirolirwe headquarters in an area hotly contested by CNDP and PARECO and with a strong FDLR position within striking distance. CNDP and to a lesser extent PARECO exhibited a spirit of compromise and collaboration that allowed difficult negotiations to achieve a disengagement agreement. End summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The majority of the approximately 55 cease-fire violations registered by MONUC since the January 23 Acte d'Engagement have occurred in North Kivu, with over 50 per cent involving CNDP-PARECO clashes. International Facilitators (MONUC, U.S. and EU) reached agreement in mid-March with CNDP and PARECO to delineate and establish three "exclusion zones" in areas with high violation counts, with the objective of physically separating CNDP and PARECO forces to reduce the likelihood of violations and permit freer and more secure population movements and economic activity. ¶3. (SBU) Technically, setting up the zones is the responsibility of the Joint Technical Commission for Peace and Security (JC) but, as the JC remains to be established, the parties agreed to proceed in this somewhat ad-hoc but nonetheless official process. The zones define demilitarized areas where armed men or men in uniforms -- other than MONUC forces who are to patrol the area -- are "excluded" from entering. Mgungu exclusion zone -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Mgungu zone is located west of Sake near the South Kivu border. CNDP, PARECO and International Facilitation (MONUC and EU) traveled to the area and established the zone on March 15. It is two-kilometer wide strip, centered on the river Nubulu. Its northern extremity is on the river between the villages of Kibabi and Kininzi. From there, it extends south to the town of Nyabizamo, then to the town of Mgungu and then farther to the west, north of the road. ¶5. (SBU) CNDP and PARECO agreed to immediate and simultaneous evacuation of their troops from the area. All parties signed a memorandum to this effect. In addition to regular patrols, MONUC is to establish a helicopter operating base (a mobile operating base that will be airlifted to the area) in the town of Gasake within the exclusion zone. U.S. facilitators were unable to participate in this effort, so we have no direct information on the tone of the negotiations. Tongo exclusion zone -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Tongo is the town where MONUC South African peacekeepers from the nearby mobile operating base (MOB) exchanged fire with and captured (then released) eight CNDP troops engaged in brutalizing and looting from the population in early March (ref A). It lies on the edge of the hills rising out of the Rutshuru plain and the Virunga National Park, across the valley from Rutshuru town. ¶7. (SBU) CNDP, PARECO and International Facilitation traveled to Tongo on March 17 (ref B). This was a poorly planned and muddled exercise that produced nothing positive while eroding the credibility of MONUC and the rest of the International Facilitation. The South African detachment was not prepared for this visit, and the maps they had available did not permit identification of a zone to be demilitarized. CNDP and PARECO got along extremely well, as the only important discussions concerned the locations of cardinal compass points. ¶8. (SBU) By mutual agreement -- as there was no way to determine where anything was much less who was occupying which positions -- the group agreed to cut the mission short and return to Goma, with the understanding that it would determine another methodology for establishing this zone in the near future. Moheto exclusion zone -------------- KINSHASA 00000285 002 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) CNDP, PARECO and Facilitation (MONUC, U.S. and EU) traveled March 20 to Moheto, located northeast of Kirolirwe in Masisi territory, or a three-and-one-half-hour road trip in MONUC convoy at 12 miles per hour the whole way. Kirolirwe is a CNDP stronghold which includes Chairman Laurent Nkunda's residence. The Indian contingent based in the area was well-prepared for the exercise, with accurate maps and a clear understanding of where CNDP, PARECO and FDLR positions were located. It was thus possible to discuss the exclusion zone with a reasonable mastery of the terrain, topography, villages and markets, and the positions of the forces. ¶10. (SBU) Right from the beginning, negotiations with PARECO and CNDP were very difficult, with both sides trading accusations. PARECO's General Theophile Museveni said repeatedly that MONUC is not responsive or neutral, CNDP is duplicitous and has taken positions in violation of the Acte d'Engagment, and that PARECO would leave the Goma process and go back to war with CNDP. CNDP returned fire with a number of barbed comments indicating that PARECO did not control anything, had never controlled anything, and never would, and so on. ¶11. (SBU) Facilitators, citing all the reasons that the two sides were morally obligated to reach agreement and implement the cease-fire, were able to push them into delineating an exclusion zone. They reached initial agreement on a northern limit at the town of Bushenge; eastern and western limits, respectively one kilometer to the west and two kilometers to the east of the river; a special provision to include the entire town of Moheto in the zone; but not on a southern limit, with PARECO wanting it to extend considerably farther than CNDP wanted. ¶12. (SBU) During these negotiations, CNDP showed a welcome spirit of cooperation, collaboration and compromise, repeatedly accepting to cede more territory and access to the main north-south road and hill-tops in comparison to PARECO's concessions. PARECO took a relatively hard position on most issues. It argued that the zone should include all the various positions that, they claimed, CNDP had taken over since the beginning of the cease-fire. CNDP said that it was willing to give up Moheto town, and the northern reaches of the river, but were opposed to having the zone extend further south than Mumba, as this would weaken their defenses of the Kirolirwe area at a time it was expecting a PARECO/FLDR attack. ¶13. (SBU) Facilitators recognized that things had reached an impasse and, as it was getting late in the day, departed to drop off the CNDP officers in Kirolirwe and continue on back to Goma. U.S. and EU facilitators (Jenks from USAID and Covolan from EUSEC) pulled CNDP Colonel Antoine into their car for the hour's ride. During the trip they told him in very strong terms that the Facilitation needed the agreement, and more importantly that CNDP needed it. They argued that CNDP was viewed negatively by the outside world, that it needed to be seen collaborating and working for peaceful solutions and that agreeing to this exclusion zone was vital. ¶14. (SBU) Colonel Antoine said that military considerations limited CNDP's ability to make more concessions. Jenks and Covolan countered that military issues were only part of the equation, that optics and political issues were also in play and needed to be addressed. Following this intensive browbeating, Colonel Antoine said he would consult with Nkunda and get guidance for a follow-on meeting in Goma on scheduled for the following day. ¶15. (SBU) International facilitators met as scheduled with CNDP and PARECO on March 21. CNDP had modified its position to accommodate PARECO's on the southern limit of the exclusion zone. This enabled to group to reach agreement and sign a memorandum establishing the zone. The final agreement differed somewhat from the terms outlined in para. 10: it extends the zone south to Kasenge (what PARECO wanted) and two kilometers west of the river (CNDP's quid pro quo.) and includes the demilitarization of Kalonge (already agreed to but PARECO insisted it be included in the memorandum). ¶16. (SBU) Colonel Antoine told us that CNDP delegates had had a long discussion the previous evening with Nkunda, and ultimately agreed with the logic that it had to make visible commitments to the peace process, and that establishing this exclusion zone, even if it disadvantaged them militarily, was part of that commitment. A/F Special Adviser Tim Shortley had spoken with Nkunda on this and other subjects the day before, enabling CNDP to hear the same line from both Washington and the Goma-based U.S. Facilitation. Comment -------------- KINSHASA 00000285 003 OF 003 ¶17. (SBU) CNDP made significant concessions and ceded significant territory in a sensitive area during the Moheto negotiations. Even if it is ultimately in their best interests overall, CNDP willingness to make concessions disproportionate to those made by PARECO needs to be recognized. PARECO also deserves credit for participating in establishment of the zone. Whatever the motivations of both parties, we now have two of the planned three exclusion zones established, with a third in process, a small victory for the Goma peace process. End comment.