KAMERHE COMMITTED TO MOVING FORWARD ON GOMA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000273 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MOPS RW CG SUBJECT: KAMERHE COMMITTED TO MOVING FORWARD ON GOMA AND NAIROBI REF: A. KIGALI 165 ¶B. KINSHASA 242 Classified By: A/DCM D. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe displayed command of the issues and strong personal rapport with AF Senior Adviser Tim Shortley in their discussions on the Goma and Nairobi processes March 8 in Kinshasa. Kamerhe is committed to moving forward on both agreements and voiced concerns regarding cooperation by Rwanda and irregular armed groups. He concurred with Shortley on the danger of individual spoilers in both processes. End summary. ¶2. (C) A/S Frazer's Senior Adviser for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley briefed National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe March 8 in Kinshasa on Shortley,s recent meetings with CNDP Chairman Laurent Nkunda, Rwandan Foreign Minister Charles Murigande (ref A) and President Kabila (ref B). The meeting was marked by strong personal rapport between the two. Shortley was accompanied by the Ambassador, PolCouns (interpreter) and PolOff (notetaker). National Assembly Deputy Claudel Lubaya and Kamerhe counselors Manya Mopoundo, Me Sate and Lydie Omanga also sat in. ¶3. (C) Kamerhe expressed appreciation for Shortley,s efforts and enthusiasm at the February 28 appointment of Abbe Apollinaire Muholongu Malumalu as head of the "Amani" stabilization, pacification, and reconstruction program for North and South Kivu. Kamerhe called Shortley's efforts the best formula for progress on the Goma process. He expressed thanks for Shortley's success in persuading Nkunda to respect commitments made in the Goma Acte d'Engagement. He argued that MONUC and the international community should retain the threat of war crimes prosecution as pressure on Nkunda to remain engaged in the process. ¶4. (C) Kamerhe explained at length the need for Rwanda to submit a revised list of wanted ex-FAR/FDLR genocidaires. He suggested that the list of over 6900 names Rwanda submitted earlier simply labels all ex-FAR/FDLR currently in the DRC as genocidaires, regardless of their involvement in the 1994 genocide. He noted that a 2002 Rwandan list identified 14 genocidaires, 10 in the DRC and 4 in Europe or elsewhere in Africa. He said Rwanda must be willing to accept the return of ex-FAR/FDLR into society, evoking the peaceful coexistence of diverse racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. as a model. ¶5. (C) Kamerhe cited progress made by the GDRC on fulfilling its Nairobi process obligations. He said the government had completed the first step of its FDLR sensitization campaign and had drafted a plan for military action against FDLR. He said Foreign Minister Mbusa would present the plan to the Rwandan government at an unspecified future date. ¶6. (C) Shortley summarized his efforts over the previous five days. He reported that Nkunda had returned to the Goma process, agreed in principle to allow access by humanitarian organizations to CNDP-controlled territory, and offered possible entry of CNDP forces into the brassage process within 60 days. Shortley said Rwandan counterparts responded positively to his suggestions for improving cooperation in Joint Monitoring Group Task Force meetings. He noted that President Kabila had made many of the same points raised by Kamerhe in the Kabila-Shortley meeting earlier that day (ref B). ¶7. (C) Shortley stressed that the military plan against the FDLR should target command and control and sources of income. He warned of risks inherent in an offensive against dispersed FDLR forces and the negative impact on civilians. He said that U.S. military teams recently completed assessments for training FARDC units and for psychological operations against the FDLR. He indicated both programs could begin in April. ¶8. (C) Shortley expressed confidence in the Goma process, but highlighted the danger posed by individual "spoilers" within the DRC hierarchy. He cited FARDC Vice Admiral Didier Etumba for his ineffective negotiating tactics and Colonel Delphin Kahimbi,s attempts to spread disinformation alleging Rwandan incursions into the DRC. ¶9. (C) Kamerhe agreed with Shortley on the risks posed by spoilers, but expressed optimism for progress now that Malumalu had been named to head the Amani program. He KINSHASA 00000273 002 OF 002 welcomed U.S. military training and psychological operations and emphasized the importance of parallel progress on Nairobi and Goma. He again called for the Rwandan government to produce a revised list of wanted genocidaires and felt the time was right for Nkunda's forces to enter brassage. He expressed gratitude for Shortley's efforts and stated that no one party could dictate the way forward. ¶10. (C) Comment: Kamerhe had returned from an official mission in Burkina Faso the day before, but had met with Kabila immediately upon arrival and was well-briefed and prepared by the time of the Shortley meeting. End comment. GARVELINK