GOMA NOTES 03/08/08 - ABBE MALUMALU GOES TO THE MOUNTAIN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000238 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG UN SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 03/08/08 - ABBE MALUMALU GOES TO THE MOUNTAIN ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Abbe Muholongu Malumalu, the newly-appointed National Coordinator for the Goma peace process, traveled March 8 to Kirolirwe to meet with Nkunda and find a way to move beyond the procedural wrangling that has prevented the establishment of the Joint Technical Committee on Peace and Security (JC) called for under the Goma Acte d'Engagement and subsequently mandated by Presidential Decree 008/08. Assuming that understandings reached at the meeting are upheld in a formal meeting in Goma scheduled for March 9 and (more problematically, perhaps) in Kinshasa, the Malumalu-Nkunda meeting appears to have been a great success, both in clearing away the CNDP's procedural objections in return for a few technical adjustments to JC structures that have always been something of a work in progress, and in establishing a direct, personal and productive link between the Goma process's two key players. The two men got along very well, and now have a warm personal link that can easily be activated if and when the Goma process again bogs down, as it almost certainly will at some point. End summary. Mission to Masisi -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As agreed March 7 (see Goma Notes 03/07/08),Abbe Apollinaire Muholongu Malumalu, the newly-appointed National Coordinator for the Goma peace process, traveled March 8 to Kirolirwe in Masisi territory to meet with Chairman Laurent Nkunda of the CNDP. The journey was made by road, in a MONUC convoy, as a helicopter could not be secured in time. Abbe Malumalu was accompanied by Jean-Michel Dumont (EU) and Willet Weeks (U.S.) for the international Facilitation and by Nicolas Scherlen and Christina Human for MONUC. Rene Abandi, Betrand Bisimwa and Jean-Desire Muiti, the political wing of the CNDP's delegation to the Goma talks, also joined the MONUC convoy, and Major Seraphim Mirindi, of the delegation's military wing, followed along on a motorcycle. ¶3. (SBU) The MONUC convoy arrived at Nkunda's cottage at around 1030 and left at 1500. A number of CNDP senior officials were present in addition to those who had come from Goma. These included General Bosco Ntaganda, who was decked out in camouflage fatigues with "United States Army" disconcertingly emblazoned on his chest. ¶4. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu had prepared an icebreaker, and so once everyone had all settled into their seats, instead of the usual chitchat, he immediately engaged Nkunda in a conversation in Swahili and pulled out a study he has commissioned from some university research groups (including that of his own university in Butembo) on the rehabilitation and expansion of the North Kivu road network. The document included charts and maps, but, he explained, the sectors under CNDP control had not yet been filled in -- they were still huge blanks -- and the CNDP's help was urgently required to complete the task. This elicited much excited conversation between the two, with other CNDP members joining in. The Abbe and the Chairman pored happily over all this for 15 or 20 minutes, and from then on everything seemed almost painless. ¶5. (SBU) When the conversation switched to French and substantive discussions began (with the internationals sitting by in discreet silence),it became clear that Abbe Malumalu had been well-briefed and was prepared to make concessions that he later explained as being relatively minor but essential to ensuring that the CNDP came into the JC. Each of the items was discussed frankly, with Abbe Malumalu occasionally saying, in effect, help me out here - give me a break - I'm trying to do everything I can think of to help you guys out and meet your concerns, but there are things (such as repudiating Decree 008/08) that I can't do. ¶6. (SBU) His determination to come away with a deal was clear, and his delight in doing this with Nkunda himself suffused the room and caused Nkunda to light up. "We have the advantage of being sons of this place - we know what the pitfalls are," he said. He also was at pains to point out that he and Nkunda had been in regular phone contact, and that he had journeyed to Kirolirwe two years ago to ask for Nkunda's assistance in ensuring that the constitutional referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections could proceed in areas under Nkunda's control. (This support had been granted, and the elections had proceeded smoothly.) ¶7. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu further delighted the CNDP by making it clear that in all significant respects the JC would, once established, mostly be a matter between himself and the CNDP, at least as far as North Kivu was concerned. (Nkunda made it pretty clear that South Kivu matters were of little or no interest to him.) The Mayi-mayi, he made clear, would be a minor irritant. Presidential Decree 008/08 was an opportunity, not an impediment, as it had given "national impetus" to the Goma process and ensured that the work of KINSHASA 00000238 002 OF 003 the JC would not be done at cross-purposes with other government or donor programs. His experience as chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission had shown him that, once backed by a presidential decree, his own job would empower him to go to the government to tell it what the JC was doing, not to ask what it should do. ¶8. (SBU) For each of the innovations listed below, Abbe Malumalu presented proposals that were constructive without giving away the farm (e.g. provincial-level coordination offices, but only as implementing bodies). In each case, CNDP officials raised the same kinds of objections that had led to such wrangling in Goma in recent weeks, only to be overridden by Nkunda who, with a little give and take, essentially acceded to the Abbe's suggestions. Proposed JC changes -------------- ¶9. (SBU) While the changes seem relatively minor, they were made by Abbe Malumalu to seem like significant concessions. Here are the highlights: -- To address CNDP concerns about its levels of representation relative to the other signatories', two new positions and structures will be created at the apex of the JC structure. -- There will be a permanent secretary of the Joint Commission, who will be a voting member of its national coordinating body, and this position will be set aside for a CNDP nominee. (The international Facilitation members were told informally that this will be Abandi.) -- There will be a new Technical Harmonization Bureau, made up of six members (three each for North and South Kivu, representing in each case the government and the Mayi-mayi, plus the CNDP in North Kivu and the FRF in Sourth Kivu). Its members may later be given the title of commissioner by the JC's internal regulations, which the JC will draft and adopt once it has been established by presidential decree. Its members will coordinate the work of the provincial coordination offices, presumably (per discussions on March 7) presiding the latter, rotating monthly. -- There will still be two linked interprovincial subcommissions, one military and the other humanitarian and social. -- The national coordinating body and the interprovincial subcommissions will collectively be the JC's decision-making structures. -- There will be a coordination office for each province, to be presided by members of the new Technical Harmonization Bureau. These, and their respective committees (replicating the dual subcommissions),will be implementing bodies ("organes d'execution"). But the creation of a provincial-level coordinating structure will go a long way toward assuaging CNDP's concern that the North Kivu processes of refugee return could get out of synch with military disengagement. (Nkunda said that this concern had been exacerbated by Presidential Decree 008/08's placement of the military subcommission in Goma and the humanitarian and social subcommission in Bukavu, where CNDP is not popular.) -- While it was agreed to recommend that the JC adopt a voting procedure whereby a three-fourths vote would be required to validate decisions in the event that consensus is not achieved (a key CNDP demand),this procedure would be established by the JC itself, not by the upcoming new decree. The idea here is to give the CNDP a blocking minority in the event that the GDRC and Mayi-mayi delegations gang up on it. In fact, given the number of Mayi-mayi groups (there is some debate about how all these numbers add up), the minority might have to be increased to four-fifths. Either way, Abbe Malumalu told the CNDP that it would have his support in seeking this once the JC is established, though he warned that it could also give the notoriously cranky Mayi-mayi a blocking majority, too. ¶10. (SBU) Once these agreements had been hammered out, Nkunda and the Abbe moved onto the cottage's verandah for a private conversation of about 45 minutes. Following this, Nkunda withdrew with his entourage to one of his bedrooms, leaving the Abbe and the internationals alone to eat the lunch that had been prepared. The group returned an hour or so later, and their agreement to the points above (with occasional carping from Muiti or Bisimwa) was confirmed. A subcommittee spent considerable time (as usual) trying to figure out how to draw a new organigram, always a complicated task, with lots of drafts wadded up and thrown aside. KINSHASA 00000238 003 OF 003 ¶11. (SBU) Assuming these proposals are endorsed by a full-dress meeting of the Goma signatories (including most North and South Kivu Mayi-mayi groups, but not the South Kivu FRF) scheduled for March 9 in Goma, the CNDP will hand Abbe Malumalu their list of nominees and he will return to Kinshasa on March 10 and seek to have them enshrined in a new presidential decree. At this point, only the FRF's nominee to the new Technical Harmonization Bureau would be missing. Abbe Malumalu planned meet that evening with the Mayi-mayi groups in town for the ILCCE workshop to try to line up their support at tomorrow's meeting. He seemed confident that he could make this happen. Other concerns -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Following the conclusion of these matters, Abbe Malumalu, with support from the EU and the U.S., raised current humanitarian concerns, saying that he hoped for "a powerful sign" (in French, un geste fort) from Nkunda. ¶13. (SBU) Nkunda replied that, first, he had dispatched a colleague named "Manzi" (presumably Emmanuel Kamanzi) to Goma with his full proposed disengagement plan, which was to have been presented at a cease-fire meeting -- later canceled -- at MONUC that morning. This could, he said, be implemented in a day, if the conditions were right. He further said that he was prepared to travel on next Friday and Saturday to IDP camps, jointly with Abbe Malumalu and MONUC, to brief communities on how they might safely return, and how the withdrawal process would work. ¶14. (SBU) Nkunda asked when it might be possible for CNDP to open an office in Goma. Abbe Malumalu said he had a better idea: Projet Amani (the national-level project established under Decree 008/08 and which CNDP had in the past disowned, saying it had nothing to do with them) was renting a building in Goma. CNDP would be free to use this as its home away from home, and, since it has three storeys, its officials would be welcome to stay there instead of paying for hotels. Nkunda and his colleagues seemed delighted by this. ¶15. (SBU) Once this business had been dispatched, Nkunda asked to see Malumalu's roads plan again, and the two, joined by others, spent another half-hour or so poring over these like boys with an erector set, as the 1400 ETD went by and MONUC's IndBatt escorts grew increasingly impatient. Return to Goma -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Following the convoy's return to Goma, Malumalu and the internationals met with General Etumba and explained what had been decided. Etumba seemed reasonably pleased -- it seemed to be about what he had expected -- though he did take out his pen and start to redraw the new plan and add up who had how many votes at what levels of the JC. As usual, this proved more than a roomful of adults could cope with, and in the end it was decided to leave things deliberately vague and hope that the goodwill from the meeting would let participants float through that of the next day and on to something more substantive, even if no one can figure out exactly how that something is supposed to work. Abbe Malumalu is clearly confident that none of this will matter in the end, once he gets his commission into a room and can close the door and get down to issues of substance. Comment -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Assuming everything goes to plan, Abbe Malumalu has moved the Goma process out of the doldrums into which it has been plunged. He will then have to go back to Kinshasa and steer his plan through the shoals here and get it converted into a new decree. There will surely be very difficult moments ahead, but we can hope that the futility of the past few weeks will be behind us. End comment. GARVELINK