Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KINSHASA2
2008-01-02 14:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

Goma situation report for January 1, 2008

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG 
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VZCZCXRO3269
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0002/01 0021408
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021408Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7323
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000002 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Goma situation report for January 1, 2008

Note: The following report was provided by Embassy Kinshasa's
political officer in Goma. End note.

Observations on the "Petit-Nord"
--------------------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000002 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: Goma situation report for January 1, 2008 Note: The following report was provided by Embassy Kinshasa's political officer in Goma. End note. Observations on the "Petit-Nord" -------------- ¶1. (SBU) One Indian battalion of about 300 men is responsible for Masisi and Walikale Territories in the "Petit Nord" area of North Kivu. This area is about 31,000 square kilometers of terrain (roughly three times larger than Kosovo, with a comparable population density),most of which is mountainous with few roads trafficable to anything but the most capable off-road vehicles. In comparison, the initial Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) deployed with 50,000 troops and now, over eight years later, maintains a force level of 16,000 troops. In comparison with KFOR, this battalion is 1/150th the current size of KFOR when adjusted for number of peacekeepers per square kilometer. Given the vast and challenging terrain, at least a division-sized element (roughly nine times the size of the current element) would be more suited to securing the terrain and mastery of the situation. ¶2. (SBU) Present Partisan Positions in Masisi territory: -- 14th Integrated Brigade (IB) has withdrawn to Kalonge, South Kivu. -- 15th IB is reportedly headquartered at Nyanzale. -- 7th Brigade has responsibility for the area south of Sake along the road to Kitumbili, but its control is weak near Sake and rebels (probably Mai-Mai) have launched raids against civilian vehicles traveling along the road in recent days. -- 81st Brigade (minus one battalion) is at Mugunga (5kms. east of Goma) and in Goma. -- 82nd Brigade, controls the Goma-Sake road, as well as the city of Sake. This brigade has been commanded since the year 2000 by Col Jonas Padiri, and is one of the few FARDC units that has performed well in battle. The 82nd Brigade has not been through the formal "brassage" process, but boasts that it has a high proportion of troops from all over the country. Colonel Padiri, a former Kadogo (Tutsi child-soldier) crossed into Congo with his Commander, Laurent Kabila, on August 2, 1996. -- Cobra Brigade (Mai-Mai) currently occupy commanding terrain south of Sake, controlling the road to Minova, South Kivu. This unit continues to conduct small-scale, poorly planned attacks against CNDP troops vicinity Gingwe, Kirotshe, and Rubaya in an effor
t to garner favor with the 8th Military Region Commander prior to the upcoming National Peace Conference. -- A new group exists that is being called the "deserters faction" situated roughly 20kms. west of Masisi. The group is composed of disaffected elements of various groups, including Hutu and Tutsi and its primary objective is defense of their own homes and families. In this sense it is similar in origin to the Mai-Mai, but otherwise unrelated. -- Nkunda has regained all former positions, but may be overextended, though his forces are no longer short of ammunition due to recently captured stocks from the FARDC. Once source estimates that the CNDP can now sustain for fourteen days of continuous fighting without external resupply. -- Nkunda has five brigades and an unknown number of battalions, each with a strength of about 300-400 personnel, for a total estimated strength of 3,000-4,000 troops. He also has a cadre of trainers who are currently conducting battalion-level training. Sake today -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Sake is a strategic piece of real estate. It is the gateway to Masisi and Walikale to the West, Kitchanga to the south, Minova to the south, and Goma to the east. The town itself lies on a plain but is surrounded to the north, west, and south by steep, volcanic mountains that provide commanding views of the eastern avenue of approach. Today, the city is bustling with activity, a change from two weeks ago when the city's inhabitants deserted it for nearby IDP camps in light of heavy fighting between the National Commission for the People's Defense (Nkunda's pro-Tutsi movement, known by its French acronym CNDP) and the FARDC. Farmers, villagers, and cell-tower maintenance personnel travel freely up and down the fertile, black volcanic soil of the mountain held by Nkunda's troops. In town, market vendors and civilians go about their daily business and individual soldiers are visible throughout the city with their weapons slung in a relaxed manner. KINSHASA 00000002 002 OF 002 ¶4. (SBU) Just several hundred meters north of the city center, beyond two MONUC outposts, is a CNDP checkpoint manned by four Nkundists. There is no demarcation, barbed wire, or even a rock in the road to indicate that one has arrived at the gateway to rebel held territory; just a tacit understanding between both sides that this point marks the beginning of Nkunda-held territory. Additionally, the CNDP also holds the most commanding terrain in the area, the so-called Celtel ridgeline (named for the higher of the two commercial cell-towers on the hilltop; the other antenna is owned by Vodacom). Operationally speaking, Nkunda is the clear winner here. He owns the most important high ground and has unopposed control of the northern approach in/out of the town. It would be very easy for him to consolidate his gains and advance into the city center, but instead he has chosen to hold his ground and order a ceasefire; likely in part due to the MONUC presence, and in part due to the upcoming peace conference. ¶5. (SBU) The following is a list demands by Nkunda as relayed to Goma officer by a third party: -- All Tutsi refugees in Rwanda must be returned to DRC and settled in their places of origin. -- The FDLR must be disarmed and repatriated since the Tutsi population in the DRC is threatened by their presence. -- All CNDP military soldiers must be integrated into the FARDC without prejudice. ¶6. (SBU) Following is a summary of Nkunda's strategy as relayed to Goma officer by a third party: -- Wait and see how the peace talks will unfold. Nkunda is using the current de facto cease fire to pull portions of his troops off the front lines in order to conduct battalion-level training, one to two battalions at a time. He expects that regardless of the outward results of the peace process he will be attacked in 3-4 months. -- Some sources report that Nkunda is actively recruiting in order to boost his strength. -- Some tribal chiefs have requested to enter into talks directly with Nkunda rather than participate in the upcoming peace conference. Unanswered questions and dilemmas for the DRC -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Sources also summarized to Goma officer many of the dilemmas the GDRC faces as it prepares for the offensives it has committed to under the Nairobi communique: -- Since Nkunda has not yet been marginalized, will the FARDC be ready to launch attacks against the LRA at the end of January, followed by a March offensive against the FDLR? -- Will the government be able to tame the loose Mai-Mai groups that have gained strength in both numbers and weapons in light of the recent FARDC rout? -- Who does the GDRC owe, and how much, for the 11 armored vehicles and artillery that came in support of the recent offensive? Finally, Will the FARDC's marriage of convenience with the FDLR and Mai-Mai prevent the government from taking action against them? Final notes -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Located 20 kms. west of Goma, Sake has no electricity even though a major high tension line (mast about 50 meters high with four wires) runs past Sake coming from the Ruzizi hydroelectric dam in South Kivu on its way to Goma. A major utility construction project is underway to give Sake electricity. The new line surprisingly parallels the incoming Ruzizi line most of the way from Goma to Sake. The line consists of 15 meter-high, lattice-frame masts on a concrete base, about 150 meters apart, running the length of Goma to Sake (about 20 kms.). The completed masts support three wires resting on glass insulators. ¶9. (SBU) There is a new Islamic school, the "Institut Bihara" located 5 kms. west of Goma city center. The school is located on a plot of land that is approximately 5 acres and has new buildings housing 20 classrooms with space for several hundred students. Garvelink

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