EU Special Envoy meets Nkunda

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000151 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS KDEM PREL CG SUBJECT: EU Special Envoy meets Nkunda Ref: A. Kinshasa 144 B. 06 Kinshasa 1405 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting at Kirolirwe with EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer February 9, Laurent Nkunda affirmed his commitment to the Kivus conference Acte d'Engagement. He said that the future of Tutsis in Congo could only be assured through the Goma peace process rather than through continued armed conflict. However, he said, the Congolese government had vitiated the Acte with Kabila's decree of February 2. Van de Geer said that it was possible to view the decree as creating a superstructure, only superficially linked to the Acte's Technical Commission, which would still be autonomous and Kivus-based and include strong involvement of the international community. Van de Geer said he would attempt, on returning to Kinshasa, to clarify the matter with the Minister of Interior. ¶2. (SBU) Summary, continued: Nkunda said he was preparing a six-year implementation proposal (in contrast to the 40-day timetable proposed by Vice-Admiral Etumba) but he had no interlocutor in the government. Van de Geer said that he foresaw establishment of a task force in Goma for implementing the Acte, similar to that which now existed for the Nairobi process. Nkunda said that he foresaw brassage within two to three years, much more quickly if the FDLR were dealt with sooner. Brassage for his forces would take place within the Kivus. Van de Geer said that Nkunda had a negative image that could be improved only if he acted more forcefully to deal with human rights abuses. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) Laurent Nkunda received EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer February 9 at a farmhouse overlooking the village of Kirolirwe and its adjacent MONUC operating base, where van de Geer and an international delegation had arrived by MONUC helicopter. The meeting lasted four and a half hours. Nkunda, dressed in a simple black safari suit, was accompanied by several non-Tutsis, including CNDP Secretary General Deogratias Nzabarinda and humanitarian and health affairs chief Dr. Alexis Kasanza, Col. Claude Mucho and lower-ranking military officers. Van de Geer was accompanied by MONUC-Goma political affairs director Gernot Sauer, van de Geer's political adviser Jean-Michel Dumont, EUSEC Lt. Col. Tim King, and Poloff Haywood Rankin. -------------- Preceding Meeting with Nkunda's Team -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Bishop J. M. Runiga's account of his meeting with Nkunda February 6 (ref A) suggested that Nkunda was on the brink of rejecting the Goma process, mainly on account of Kabila's February 2 decree setting up a "Peace Program" for the Kivus. A meeting February 8 in Goma between several of Nkunda's key advisors and MONUC and international facilitators (not including van de Geer, who was in transit) confirmed that Nkunda appeared to be on the verge of walking away from the peace process. ¶5. (SBU) The CNDP team, composed of political spokesman Rene Abandi, military spokesman Seraphin Mirindi, political advisors Bertrand Bisimwa and Desire Muiti, and Col. B. Masuzera, said that CNDP had no choice but to go to the media with an absolute rejection of the February 2 decree. They said that the decree vitiated the Technical Commission under the Acte d'Engagement. In the decree, they said, the Steering Committee was the supreme organ and gave no role to the international community or CNDP, and they cited many other objectionable aspects. They said that they felt that the CNDP had been duped. MONUC SRSG Chief of Staff John Almstrom and the EU's Dumont urged the CNDP to wait at least a few days before going to the media with a rejection of the decree. ¶6. (SBU) The CNDP team said that they took particular umbrage at a recent communique of the DRC and Ugandan defense ministers, in which, it claimed, CNDP was mentioned as a negative force that had to be eliminated. They claimed that FARDC was moving tanks, troops, and ammunition into North Kivu, and they objected to MONUC's reinforcements and redeployments, because the Acte did not call for such redeploments until establishment of the Technical Commission. MONUC Eastern Division commander General Bikram Singh told the CNDP team (which included two lawyers, Abandi and Bisimwa) not to be over-legalistic. He assured them there was no rearming by the FARDC going on, and he urged them to understand that MONUC's redeployments were essential to protecting the ceasefire. -------------- On the Hilltop -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Nkunda said that he was very happy to receive this KINSHASA 00000151 002 OF 004 important international delegation and grateful that the international community had played a tireless and decisive role in bringing about the "Goma Accord." That accord, he said, aimed at addressing the future of DRC, while the Sun City accord had only divided up spoils. President Kabila "and the extremists around him," Nkunda believed, had not wanted a Kivus Conference nor the Acte d'Engagement and, without the determined intervention of the international community, these would not have come about. ¶8. (SBU) Nkunda said that his focus was on protecting his Tutsi community (although he also stressed that the CNDP was a multi-ethnic party and pointed out that the staff around him were non-Tutsi, just as the CNDP delegation to the Kivus Conference had been predominantly non-Tutsi),and he said that he realized that in the long term he could not assure that objective through military means. "There is a big difference between winning a battle and finishing a war." He said that with the signing of the Acte he had felt his work was "almost finished." He said that Abandi had advised him not to sign the Acte, as Abandi had seen too many potential pitfalls in the Acte for the CNDP, but Nkunda said he had decided to go forward anyway, and he said he was fully committed to what he (through his delegation) had signed. ¶9. (SBU) Nkunda said that the Kivus Conference and the Acte had seemed to imply a rapid establishment of the Mixed Technical Commission for Peace and Security, so that at last the CNDP would have a direct interlocutor with the government. For too long, the CNDP had been isolated, including by MONUC, which had refused to meet him except at a mid-grade military level and had refused to give CNDP an airing on Radio Okapi. Now had come the decree of February 2. (Nkunda brought out a copy of the decree and read through parts.) The decree established a Steering Committee with no Kivu or CNDP participation and no role for the international signatories of the Acte. ¶10. (SBU) Article 8 stipulated that the Technical Commission would be under control of the Kinshasa superstructure, and it set out a list of participants in the Technical Commission (including "representatives of the government" without saying how many) that had not been previously discussed nor foreseen in the Acte. It provided for participation of all the Mai Mai signatories of the Acte, when it was well known that they were fabricated by the government. There were provisions for provincial institutions that seemed to have no relationship to the Acte and gave the governors of North and South Kivu undue power. It created a vast bureaucracy that seemed to be designed to divert millions of dollars into Kinshasa pockets. ¶11. (SBU) In sum, the decree kidnapped the Acte, and the decree therefore had to be withdrawn or fundamentally changed. Meanwhile, Nkunda lamented that Defense Minister Chikez, in the meeting at Beni with his Ugandan counterpart, had called for the destruction of the CNDP, in violation of the Acte. -------------- Human Rights and Image -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Van de Geer said that Nkunda had a very negative image both among the Congolese population and elsewhere and that he needed to take actions and to make public declarations that would improve it. Van de Geer cited instances of rape and use and recruitment of child soldiers. He said that there had been a report, as yet not confirmed, that CNDP had badly mutilated sixty prisoners of war (ref B). ¶13. (SBU) Nkunda responded that he had moved forcefully to reduce the incidence of rape by his soldiers. The CNDP high command had instituted the death penalty for collective rape and had already carried out that sentence when such cases arose. Unfortunately, the CNDP had attracted many troops from the FARDC, where the habit of rape was widespread. Similarly, Nkunda said, CNDP had inherited child soldiers from RCD-Goma and FARDC, and it had worked with Caritas to demobilize over 2,500 of them since 2004. Unfortunately, these child soldiers tended to come back, due to the poor conditions of their demobilization. He was now arresting officers who allowed them to return. CNDP did not recruit child soldiers, Nkunda asserted. ¶14. (SBU) Nor, he said, did it mutilate prisoners, some of whom preferred to stay with CNDP. ICRC had access to prisoners, and MONUC knew perfectly well there had never been any such mutilation. Separately, MONUC's Sake base commander Col. Chand Saroha affirmed that he had never seen any mutilated prisoners. (Note: These reports appear to have been the result of conclusions drawn by KINSHASA 00000151 003 OF 004 Belgian military officers from observation of soldiers hospitalized in Kinshasa. In fact, we have confirmed that an unusually high number of medical amputations were performed on FARDC wounded in the aftermath of the December fighting. This could well be the source of the confusion. End note.) ¶15. (SBU) As for public declarations about CNDP's policies on human rights, Nkunda lamented that MONUC had denied CNDP access to Congo's most important radio station, Radio Okapi. Sauer stated that he would discuss the matter with his hierarchy but thought it likely that CNDP would be allowed access to Radio Okapi. -------------- Viewing the Decree Two Ways -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Van de Geer acknowledged that Kabila's February 2 decree had come as a surprise and contained many confusing elements. The Steering Committee indeed did not include the CNDP and the international community. However, van de Geer said, the structure elaborated by the decree could be interpreted as involving two virtually unconnected parts, the first part relating only to the government's role in Kinshasa with an emphasis on attracting donor money for the Kivus, and the other dealing with the Technical Commission to be located in the provinces. Rather than call for the outright withdrawal of the decree, it would be better to "reinterpret" it. ¶17. (SBU) Nkunda agreed that outright withdrawal might be difficult. However, he feared that it might also be impossible to go forward with the decree, however much it was reinterpreted. Van de Geer said that he would return to Kinshasa in the coming days to try to clarify the matter with the government. Nkunda cautioned him not to fall into the trap in which the international community had found itself during the pre-election Transition, in which the international community was meant to be guarantor of the transition, but constantly faced the belligerence from the Kabila-led government. ¶18. (SBU) What was essential, in Nkunda's view, was that the Technical Commission not be fettered by the government. It needed to be autonomous, with the international community as guarantor, as spelled out in the Acte. It would have to have executive authority. Its membership would need to have a balance between the government and CNDP, for example, fifty percent participation of government, forty percent CNDP, and ten percent the various Mai Mai groups. ¶19. (SBU) Moreover, Nkunda said, all the commissions created to address issues in the Acte would need to spring from the Technical Commission. It was especially important that the military and humanitarian sub-commissions work at roughly the same pace, since it was as important to prepare society to accept the Tutsis as it was to integrate CNDP forces into the Congolese army; these two efforts had to go hand in hand. -------------- Long-Term Proposal -- No Brassage with FDLR Still a Threat -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Nkunda said that the CNDP's concept of a timeline, in stark contrast to the government's (as exemplified by Vice-Admiral Etumba's 40-day timetable),was of a six-year program, renewable. CNDP would not present this Proposal for Pacification and Security until the Technical Commission was established in accordance with the Acte. CNDP, he said, was not interested in fictional deadlines, such as the March 15 deadline imposQ on DRC by the Nairobi communique. ¶21. (SBU) Nkunda said that he would never risk integration of his forces into the Congolese army so long as the FDLR remained a threat to his people or to his forces. Unfortunately, the reality was that the FDLR had long been a tool of the government and remained so. Rwanda did not want the FDLR back in Rwanda and the DRC needed and used the FDLR and did not want to push FDLR's combatants back into Rwanda. Nkunda recognized the importance of the provision in the Nairobi communique allowing the FDLR to resettle in DRC far from the border, but the break-up of the FDLR would be difficult and take time. As for other key elements of the Acte, Nkunda particularly focused on the return of refugees. He scoffed at the idea that their return could adequately be prepared in anything like the 40 days contemplated in Etumba's calendar. ¶22. (SBU) Nkunda said that his proposal would propose confidence-building measures, with elements of the mixage process that had been attempted in 2007. He described mixage as having been KINSHASA 00000151 004 OF 004 a good idea in concept, but one on which the government never followed through. In any case, brassage could only take place step by step, with confidence-building measures and, in particular, clear progress on dismantling the FDLR and assurance of security. The faster FDLR was addressed, the faster brassage would take place. Nkunda said his forces were attached to the Kivus and would expect to remain there. Moreover, he would advocate mixing only those forces that had equivalent training. -------------- No One to Talk To -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Van de Geer asked whether, in formulating his proposal, Nkunda had any interlocutor with the government. Nkunda said there was "only an absence." He had had the visit of Bishop Runiga, and his people in Goma had met with MONUC and the international facilitators but, otherwise, there was nothing. He hoped, at least as an interim measure until the Technical Commission could be acceptably established in accordance with the Acte, that a "modality of concertation" be established between CNDP, FARDC, MONUC, and the international facilitators. He lamented that Etumba had been sent to Goma in lieu of senior political figures capable of taking decisions. He advocated also establishing a Wise Men's Committee alongside the co-presidency of the Technical Commission. ¶24. (SBU) Meanwhile, Nkunda said, he was putting two of his staff permanently in Goma, but he remained very concerned about their security. Van de Geer thought that the Goma process would be well served by a task force on similar lines to the one now functioning in Goma under the Nairobi process. It was essential, in van de Geer's view, that there be close coordination between the two processes. ¶25. (SBU) Nkunda said that the Kinshasa aspects of the February 2 decree were of no interest to him. Going to Kinshasa was all about collecting per diem. Essential was the establishment of an autonomous body with decision-making capability in Goma. Nkunda said that he preferred that the Technical Commission meet in a "neutral zone." Perhaps MONUC could erect a tent near Sake and Kimoka where such meetings could be held. Meanwhile, he advocated also that patrols of MONUC's North Kivu Brigade include elements of CNDP and FARDC, and even PARECO in those areas where PARECO was operating, in order to "promote a better image" of these patrols. ¶26. (SBU) Sauer asked whether any credence should be put in reports of a split in the CNDP. Nkunda asserted that Colonel Sultani Makenga remained in the high command and had willingly accepted the Acte. -------------- Van de Geer and SRSG Doss -------------- ¶27. (SBU) On return to Goma, van de Geer gave a briefing to SRSG Alan Doss, who was on a stop-over from Bukavu to Kinshasa. Van de Geer said that he had concluded, from his conversation with Nkunda, that Nkunda was prepared not to reject the February 2 decree outright but give the international community a chance to persuade the government to "reinterpret" it. He said he would change his plans and return to Kinshasa, with the object of joining Doss in a meeting with Minister of Interior Kalume. Most essential would be to persuade the government to start implementing the Acte at the provincial level as soon as possible, with creation of an autonomous commission there with a substantial role for the CNDP. Van de Geer said that it was essential for the international community to commit itself to the Goma process with experienced full-time political staff in Goma. The work would be immense. ¶28. (SBU) Doss said that MONUC was in full tilt ramping up its military and political presence in North Kivu. He agreed that Kalume needed to understand that if the government tried to hijack the Goma process it would wind up with less than nothing. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶29. (SBU) The van de Geer-Nkunda meeting was their first direct contact in North Kivu, and the first political contact between MONUC and Nkunda for some years. Nkunda was dispassionate, logical, articulate, and well-prepared. From start to finish, he was an impressive interlocutor. End comment. GARVELINK