CNDP Concept of Military Technical Commission

UNCLAS KINSHASA 000124 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV CG SUBJECT: CNDP Concept of Military Technical Commission ¶1. (SBU) Summary: CNDP's concept of the Kivus military commission, presented to MONUC and FARDC February 3, differs markedly from the government's concept, which CNDP purported to have accepted on January 31. The principal difference is CNDP's insistence that "armed groups" (Mai Mai) be relegated to a separate sub-commission and that CNDP have nearly half the positions in the Technical Commission structure. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) CNDP's Captain B. Masuzera, who attended the three meetings of North Kivu armed groups led by Vice-Admiral Didier Etumba January 28-31, presented SRSG Doss's Chief of Staff John Almstrom February 4 an "organigram" for the military Technical Commission and a list of participants for its sub-commissions. This structure differs fundamentally from the one presented by Etumba and supposedly accepted by all parties January 31. (CNDP had been persuaded to return to the third and final of Etumba's meetings, after walking out of the second, and had appeared to accept, if tacitly, Etumba's proposed organigram, on the condition that eight persons, said to be CNDP, arrested in Uganda and transferred to DRC, be released.) ¶3. (SBU) Etumba's organigram envisions North and South Kivu "sections" of a Mixed Military Sub-Commission under a commission co-presidency. His structure calls for four "cells" within each "section" to handle (1) cessation of hostilities and disengagement, (2) DDR and DDRRR, (3) brassage, and (4) "restoration of the authority of the state." ¶4. (SBU) CNDP's more elaborate organigram calls for parallel structures at the inter-provincial (both Kivus) and provincial levels, with a logistical unit attached at the inter-provincial level. At both levels, in CNDP's concept, there would be units to deal with (1) cessation of hostilities, (2) DDR and DDRRR, (3) political and administrative affairs, (4) security and justice, and (5) armed groups. The most striking difference is No. (5) -- armed groups. Masuzera explained to Almstrom that CNDP did not accept being lumped together with the Mai Mai, which were, in CNDP's view, a fabrication of the government working in collaboration with the FARDC. ¶5. (SBU) The package presented by Masuzera included a description of tasks of some of the units. The logistical unit handles lodging, transport, food, "functioning," and communications. The political-administrative unit handles reestablishment of the authority of the state (police, administration, and justice), deployment of police units, and free circulation of goods and persons. The security-judicial unit handles liberation of persons detained or taken hostage on account of opinions or belonging to insurrectional organizations, putting in place a commission to supervise return of IDPS, assuring respect for engagements undertaken, and dealing with on-going disputes. (In Etumba's organigram, political-administrative-judicial issues, including return of IDPs, were viewed as being not military but humanitarian, to be handled in a separate sub-commission.) ¶6. (SBU) The package further elaborated CNDP's concept of personnel to serve on these units -- with CNDP taking almost half the positions. For example, the "Inter-Provincial Coordination" would be presided by the FARDC at the level of lieutenant or major general, with a CNDP brigadier general serving as adjutant coordinator for DDR, while the "Provincial Coordination" would be presided by a CNDP brigadier general or colonel, with a CNDP colonel as adjutant coordinator for disengagement. At the inter-provincial level, CNDP would preside over the logistical, disengagement/cessation, DDR, and pol-admin-judicial cells. At the provincial level, CNDP would preside over the secretariat and unit on restoration of state authority, while participating in the other units. ¶7. (SBU) Masuzera told Almstrom that he had presented this package also to 8th Military Region deputy commander Col. Delphin Kahimbi. When Almstrom met Etumba February 4, Etumba had also received the package. He said that it "was to be expected." GARVELINK