CNDP Returns to Military Committee in Goma

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000110 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KPKO CG SUBJECT: CNDP Returns to Military Committee in Goma ¶1. (SBU) Summary: After a rocky couple of days, with revolts first by CNDP and then by Mai Mai, Vice-Admiral Etumba's effort to bring armed groups in North Kivu together concluded with symbolic success January 31, even if confusion continued to reign. MONUC announced setting up a cell for verifying ceasefire violations with the object of reducing the groups' tendency to resort to the media. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) After the CNDP walkout January 29 of the second meeting with armed groups in North Kivu under the co-chairmanship of FARDC Vice-Admiral Didier Etumba and MONUC SRSG Chief of Staff John Almstrom and Eastern Division commander General Bikram Singh, MONUC and international facilitators (EU, UK, U.S.) spent the day January 30 trying to salvage the effort to bring some consensus on next steps, with a particular focus on how to handle ceasefire violations. In a long meeting with Etumba and 8th Military Region commander General Vainqueur Mayala, Almstrom, Singh, and facilitators stressed that it was essential not to corner CNDP and ineffective at this stage to try to get consensus on a timetable for disengagement and brassage (Article 2 of the Kivus conference's Acte d'Engagement),when the first step was to promote respect for the ceasefire (Article 1). ¶3. (SBU) Etumba said that he well understood the real weight of CNDP versus the Mai Mai groups. CNDP should, he said, understand that there would be no decisions without consensus. Singh said that CNDP would have to have more -- some direct acknowledgement of its status as prima donna. Etumba said that he had specific instructions from Interior Minister Denis Kalume (who, he said, would not after all be coming to Goma) to get agreement on a structure for the military committee and on a timetable, even though he said that no one expected the timetable to be followed. He had garnered Kalume's agreement to secure the release of the seven prisoners transferred from Uganda, who were the proximate cause of the CNDP's walkout of the meeting the day before. However, he was concerned that the CNDP could advance new pretexts for walking out of every meeting. ¶4. (SBU) In a subsequent brain-storming session among MONUC and international facilitators, Singh pointed out that there were only two significant actors (Kabila and Nkunda) and that the Mai Mai had only been "woken up" for purposes of bloating the Kivus Conference. International facilitators undertook to contact the CNDP representatives attending a reconciliation workshop in Goma being conducted by a Wilson Center partner, while Almstrom said he was trying to contact SRSG Doss in Addis Ababa for authorization to meet or call Nkunda. (Note: Almstrom later said he eventually received authorization to call, but not visit, Nkunda, by which time the issue had been resolved by international facilitators at the CNDP delegation level. End note.) Singh noted that one of the most difficult issues would be handling the FDLR, which was not a signatory of the Acte d'Engagement. He said that the three ceasefire violations since the signing of the Acte -- while claimed to be between CNDP and PARECO -- largely involved FDLR, with whom PARECO was, he said, acting as a front. ¶4. (SBU) The international facilitators proceeded across Goma to the Karibu Hotel and, to the consternation of the workshop organizers, called the CNDP delegation out of the seminar for a pivotal fifteen-minute conversation. In addition to the military officer who had attended Etumba's meetings January 27 and 28, Capt. B. Masuzera, two of the most important CNDP political figures, Didier Muiti Ngashani and Bertrand Bisimina (both of whom had been members of the CNDP delegation to the Kivus conference) participated. International facilitators urged them to return to the fold, stressing that Etumba was a man of good will and his effort was of a technical and ad hoc nature, intended to protect the ceasefire. ¶5. (SBU) The three CNDP representatives were, to start with, angry and emotional. Bisimina condemned Etumba's approach to the meetings. CNDP had not been consulted in advance. Etumba had commenced with a focus on Article 2 instead of Article 1, putting the cart before the horse. He had pressed for acceptance of a structure, without any decree from the president as required in the Acte. The CNDP would not accept any structure or timetable imposed by the government. As for the seven persons arrested in Uganda, their transfer to Goma had occurred after the signing of the Acte. Bisimina and Muiti said that these arrestees had been mistreated and meticulously interrogated by military intelligence. CNDP had delivered this information to Kivus conference leader Vital Kamerhe before he had left Goma, and Kamerhe had promised that Etumba would see to their prompt release, which had not occurred. There had been other harassment of CNDP in Goma. CNDP needed a strong signal that its representatives would be safe in Goma. Poloff suggested that CNDP resume its attendance at Etumba's forum, with a larger delegation to include political as well as military representatives, in the spirit of discussion of interim technical modalities. EU KINSHASA 00000110 002.2 OF 003 poloff called Etumba and got his accord to meet these CNDP representatives at MONUC within an hour, and -- by now markedly mollified -- they agreed. ¶6. (SBU) The Etumba-CNDP meeting at MONUC appeared to go off track as Etumba assumed a paternalistic air, commencing with half an hour's monologue. He recalled his participation at the Sun City negotiations, where he had been as isolated as the CNDP representative had been at the meetings January 27 and 28. It was essential that CNDP continue to participate, he urged. He was willing to talk to CNDP privately whenever necessary. Every subject was open to discussion. It was time for all Congolese to put the past behind and build a better future. As for the seven prisoners, he promised that they would be released within 24 hours. Almstrom stressed the need for resuming the meeting, to establish an interim mechanism for dealing with ceasefire violations. ¶7. (SBU) Rather than bristling at Etumba's gentle paternalism, Bisimina said that he and his colleagues were reassured by his words. They could see that Etumba had the desire to make peace. "It is important that Papa have the courage to listen to his children." CNDP insisted that the seven be released, as Kamerhe had promised. They were concerned about the several ceasefire violations since the Acte was signed, some of which they claimed had some FARDC involvement. They were also concerned that Etumba had proposed a structure and timetable that had not been discussed in advance. Muiti said that, having heard Etumba's words, he would sleep better now. He saluted the initiative of the international facilitators to bring them together. What CNDP had wanted most was a chance for a direct talk. CNDP wanted to work for the good of the country, but their members were discriminated against and threatened constantly and they needed guarantees for their safety. An ad hoc structure for dealing with ceasefire violations would be a good thing for everyone, including CNDP, but they needed more specific information. ¶8. (SBU) Etumba said that he was deeply gratified by the conversation. He said that he had feared it could have turned in a negative direction. The government and CNDP would of course quarrel in the future, but it was essential that they go forward together for the sake of the country. The parties agreed to resume the meeting with all the armed groups the next morning. ¶9. (SBU) MONUC now began to contact the Mai Mai groups to set up the next day's meeting and learned that they now refused to participate. The Mai Mai leaders made several complaints: lack of presidential decree, confused objectives, inadequate time to get back to their cadres, and -- most important -- insufficient monetary assistance. (Note: Before his departure from Goma, conference leader Malu Malu had handed 25,000 dollars to every Mai Mai group for the stated purpose of informing their men in the field about the Acte, but they evidently felt this amount insufficient.) Repeated efforts over the evening and next morning, January 31, brought about a reluctant willingness at least to hear MONUC out, on the margin of the workshop at the Karibu Hotel. ¶10. (SBU) Almstrom and Singh convened the armed groups (both Mai Mai and CNDP),with international facilitator present, and got their agreement to attend Etumba's meeting, to occur immediately after. They stressed that the meeting would serve all parties' interest in promoting an interim means to deal with ceasefire violations. There had been confusion where this effort fit into the overall scheme, and in particular how it fit with the Task Force on Peace and Security contemplated by the Acte, but it was essential to keep the discussion going. Mai Mai representatives vented their grievances, asserting that they were not a tool of the FARDC and could not be ordered around. UJPS Mai Mai asserted that one of their representatives had been arrested by FARDC at the previous meeting in MONUC itself. Almstrom promised an immediate investigation. Mollified, the armed groups agreed to be present at a follow-on meeting with Etumba. ¶11. (SBU) Etumba followed his normal practice, with a monologue. He recalled his meeting the previous evening with CNDP, and praised CNDP for its willingness to work together for peace. He said he understood well the Mai Mai groups' complaints and would address them. The timetable would be adjusted by making "D-Day" the date of the soon-to-come presidential decree establishing the Technical Commission, and the Mai Mai groups would be given seven days within that timetable for "sensitization" of their cadres. The calendar would not be "fixed" but rather indicative. He would address the need to "supplement" the funds they had already been paid for this sensitization process. He would also intervene to ensure the release of the UJPS officer, as he had done with the seven CNDP prisoners. Without taking any vote or entertaining any discussion, Etumba said that he believed he could now assume that all parties KINSHASA 00000110 003 OF 003 agreed to the organigram and chronogram the he had proposed at their first meeting, "modified as discussed." ¶12. (SBU) MONUC used the occasion to announce its setting up of a 24-hour "focal point" for the ceasefire, and handed out an information sheet with six points: -- In the event of information on a ceasefire violation or direct threats: -- Immediately inform MONUC by contacting its special verification cell at a given telephone number (MONUC noted that for the time being the cell would be staffed by non-French-speaking Indian officers, but it would very soon be able to staff the cell with francophone personnel); -- Do not contact the media before receiving the result of the initial investigation by MONUC; -- MONUC will quickly dispatch its emergency verification unit to lead the initial investigation; -- MONUC will re-contact you within 36 hours to inform you of the results of the investigation; and -- If necessary, a meeting will be organized to examine the results of the investigation, with the following participants around the table: (a) MONUC, (b) FARDC, (c) international facilitators, and (d) the armed groups implicated in the violation in question. ¶13. (SBU) Etumba adjourned the meeting, noting that the next meeting would take place after President Kabila issued his decree (date unknown). ¶14. (SBU) In a discussion after this meeting, Etumba (wishing to get back to Kinshasa) pressed MONUC to travel as soon as possible with him to Bukavu to convene a similar meeting with armed groups in South Kivu. It was agreed, however, that partly because of the ongoing workshop at the Karibu hotel, such a meeting could not take place before Monday, February 4. ¶15. (SBU) The prisoners -- previously talked about by the CNDP to be seven, but actually eight -- were delivered to the CNDP shortly afterward and their liberation was witnessed by MONUC and the international facilitators. It did not appear that any had been physically harmed during interrogation, although CNDP had claimed that one had been badly beaten. Human Rights Watch interviewed them all in advance of release, and learned that there were only two real CNDP, the rest from Ituri, and they had gotten together in Uganda just for the ride to DRC. ¶16. (SBU) Comment: The three meetings led by Etumba in Goma January 28-31 served to keep the momentum of the Kivus conference going in a positive spirit. Confusion about the objectives of a Goma-based security task force was to be expected, in the context of the conference leader's inherently confusing and much wider concept for the Task Force for Peace and Security, possibly based in Kinshasa. It would have been better if one of the conference leaders -- or some other senior political figure -- had remained in Goma, but Etumba managed well enough. The key point was his willingness to meet CNDP directly, because face-to-face contact seemed to be what the CNDP wanted most. End comment. GARVELINK