GOMA NOTES - NOVEMBER 17

UNCLAS KINSHASA 001015 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES - NOVEMBER 17 ¶1. (U) The items contained in this report consist principally of spot information from various sources. This report is not exhaustive, nor can all the information contained therein be confirmed at this time. Security and Humanitarian Situation -------------- ¶2. (SBU) A November 17 OCHA briefing reported continued heavy fighting in Mirangi, 12 kilometers south of Kanyabayonga, beginning on November 16. The fighting was most likely between FARDC and CNDP, but FDLR involvement is also possible. ¶3. (SBU) There are increasing troop movements in the areas of Kanyabayonga, Rwindi, Kiwanja, and Kikuku. FARDC has moved southeast from Kanyabayonga toward Rwindi without encountering resistance. CNDP is moving north toward Kanyabayonga from Kikuku. ¶4. (SBU) There was heavy artillery around Kanyabayonga on November 16, but it lasted only 20 minutes. However, the shelling caused panic in Kanyabayonga town. CNDP forces have allegedly infiltrated into town, causing the FARDC to be suspicious of any young men in the area. Most of the women and children from Kayna and Kirumba have moved toward Lubero and Butembo. The remaining residents, primarily men, spend the night in the bush. Political Developments -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Newly-appointed UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, Olesugun Obasanjo, met Laurent Nkunda November 16 at Jomba, 80 kilometers northeast of Goma. At an ensuing press conference, Obasanjo declared that Nkunda had fully accepted the former Nigerian President in his role as Special Envoy. According to Obasanjo, Nkunda agreed to respect the CNDP's unilateral cease-fire and to continue to allow unconditional access to humanitarian corridors. ¶6. (SBU) Obasanjo said that Nkunda had transmitted to him a series of demands and concerns, which he wanted Obasanjo to present to the GDRC. During the press conference, Obasanjo mentioned the following CNDP demands: --direct discussions with the GDRC, without conditions, on questions in the political, economic, and security spheres; --recognition of the need to deal with the FDLR question; --protection of minority groups; --the question of integration of CNDP forces into the FARDC; and --the integration of certain CNDP political elements into regional administrative structures. ¶7. (SBU) During a November 15 briefing of Kinshasa-based Ambassadors, Obasanjo said that he was encouraged by his discussions with President Kabila and other senior DRC officials, as well as his telephonic discussion with Nkunda. He said that there was "a level of tolerance and accommodation" on both sides, which bodes well for progress. ¶8. (SBU) Obasanjo stressed that it would be important to keep MONUC strong, and not allow a perception of MONUC weakness to develop, because MONUC would need to guarantee any durable cease-fire. Obasanjo said that the successful implementation of any political agreement would require additional financial support from the international community. Most importantly, it would be important to identify "some low-hanging fruits" to build some momentum in the process. ¶9. (U) According to Radio Okapi, DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexis Tambwe Mwamba, following a two-day visit to Kigali, announced that the GDRC had proposed allowing a certain number of RDF intelligence officers to operate with FARDC forces in North Kivu. Tambwe Mwamba denied rumors that the GDRC had asked for RDF troops to assist in combating the FDLR. Tambwe Mwamba said that Rwandan intelligence officers on the ground would be in position to confirm that the FARDC had not integrated FDLR forces, nor was it cooperating with the rebel group. GARVELINK