SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S MEETINGS WITH NATIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S MEETINGS WITH NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT VITAL KAMERHE AND PROMINENT TUTSI
POLITICIAN AZARIAS RUBERWA

REF: KINSHASA 973

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Samuel Brock for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (S) Summary: National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe
told AF Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley
and PolCouns November 6 that the GDRC had already started on
a multi-step process designed to lead to the resumption of
full diplomatic relations between the DRC and Rwanda within
45 days. In Kamerhe's view, the two countries should also
undertake other confidence building measures, such as
reactivating the Economic Community of the Great Lakes
Country (CEGPL) and forging closer cooperation on military
intelligence. Kamerhe restated his support for direct
GDRC-CNDP talks on military and political issues, noting the
GDRC should try to find a political space for the CNDP.
Kamerhe said that John Numbi, Head of the Congolese National
Police, would almost certainly be the GDRC interlocutor for
CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda. Kamerhe severely criticized the
FARDC leadership, recommending that all FARDC military
commanders in the East should be recalled or fired. Shortley
welcomed National Assembly engagement on the situation in the
East. Shortley stressed how critical it is for the GDRC to
take steps to control the remnants of the FARDC in the region
and to allow for the creation of humanitarian corridors in
FARDC-controlled areas. Kamerhe emphasized that, on the
whole range of issues, it would be important to guide
President Kabila. End Summary.

Reining in marauding FARDC
--------------


2. (C) During a November 6 meeting with National Assembly
President Vital Kamerhe, AF Senior Advisor for Conflict
Resolution Tim Shortley emphasized the immediate challenge of
reining in out-of-control FARDC troops in North Kivu.
Because of insecurity in the FARDC-controlled areas,
humanitarian assistance was, unfortunately, only reaching
CNDP-controlled areas. The FARDC should be quartered in
specific areas, thus permitting humanitarian corridors in
FARDC areas to be established.

DRC Strategy to Improve Relations with Rwanda
--------------


3. (C) Shortley welcomed the National Assembly's recent plan
to address the crisis in the East (reftel). Kamerhe pointed
out that it would be critical to deal with the Nairobi and
Goma tracks simultaneously. Kamerhe agreed that the GDRC
should accelerate the re-establishment of diplomatic
relations with Rwanda. He added that the GDRC has already
started to implement a plan, which aims to restore full
diplomatic relations within 45 days. The first step was the
recent visits by the respective foreign ministers. The GDRC
has already begun to restore the former Rwandan Embassy for
use, evicting squatters and starting on a make-ready for the
building. Then, Charges d'Affaires would open consulates in
Goma, Gisenyi, Bukavu, and Cyangugu, followed by an exchange
of ambassadors. Kamerhe noted that it would be important to
include an economic component in Kinshasa-Kigali relations;
relaunching the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Country
(CEGPL) could be achieved easily and would help boost trust
amongst the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi.


4. (S) Kamerhe emphasized that any improvement in
DRC-Rwandan relations should clearly address Rwandan concerns
about FDLR-FARDC cooperation and GDRC claims of Rwandan
support for the CNDP. Kamerhe said that observers can argue
about the degree of support that the CNDP receives from
Rwanda, but, he pointed out that it was only Rwandan
President Kagame's intervention that ultimately stopped the
CNDP at the gates of Goma. Kamerhe agreed that closer
interaction on the military level, particularly on military
intelligence sharing would help improve relations between the
two countries. The GDRC could, in principle, support a small
number of Rwandan intelligence forces embedded in the FARDC
units. However, Kamerhe cautioned that the numbers needed to
be small and the presence discrete to avoid rekindling
Hutu-Tutsi divisions in the region.

"Goma II" Requires Direct, Discrete GDRC-CNDP Talks
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Kamerhe reiterated the points in the National

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Assembly plan calling for direct GDRC negotiations with the
CNDP. First, there would have to be discrete, preparatory
discussions with the CNDP, which would develop the terms of
reference for a "Goma II." Then, a much larger, inclusive
(i.e., with the various rebel groups) conference could
follow. In addition to military issues, the GDRC-CNDP talks
should entail discussion of a political role for the CNDP,
including, perhaps the creation of a political party for the
group and government positions. Kabila would need to be
prepared to accept some kind of CNDP participation in the DRC
political scene.


6. (C) Kamerhe confirmed that the Head of the Congolese
National Police (PNC) force, General John Numbi, would most
likely be the GDRC's interlocutor with rebel leader Laurent
Nkunda. Numbi was reportedly awaiting a final blessing from
President Kabila. Kamerhe said that Numbi is someone who is
strong enough to give frank advice to Kabila.

FARDC's Collapse
--------------


7. (C) Kamerhe stated flatly that, in principle, all of the
FARDC's senior military commanders should be replaced,
especially those in the Eighth Region in the Kivus. The
military commanders in the Kivus were more interested in
cultivating and exploiting commercial interests in the
region. The FARDC had completely failed and the population
has lost confidence in the Congolese military. President
Kabila, in Kamerhe's view, should move quickly to appoint a
Chief of Defense. As for integrating the CNDP in the Eighth
Military Region, Kamerhe said that this could be an outcome
of discussions with the CNDP, but it would not be an opening
offer from the GDRC.

Ruberwa: Is there will to engage the CNDP?
--------------


8. (C) In a separate meeting on November 6, former
Vice-President Azarias Ruberwa told Shortley and PolCouns
that Kamerhe was "very progressive" in his ideas to
re-energize both the Nairobi and Goma tracks. In Ruberwa's
view, the Goma Accords presented a solid formula to stop the
fighting in the East. However, once the accords were signed,
there was no further senior-level political engagement to
ensure progress. Ruberwa said he was unsure whether the GDRC
had sufficient political will to engage the CNDP. It would
be crucial, in Ruberwa's opinion, to get a clear and
expeditious commitment from Kabila. If the CNDP doubts the
government's willingness to negotiate, then the CNDP will
hesitate.


9. (C) Comment: Kamerhe does indeed appear to want to play a
positive role to improve DRC-Rwandan relations and to get the
internal peace process back on track. Kamerhe's plan would
grant the CNDP some concessions, but it could also produce
important dividends: peace and improved state control in the
East. While Kamerhe is certainly a powerful figure on the
Congolese political stage, he represents the legislative
branch. His interest is also seen by many as mostly
self-serving: a native son of the east, he is one of Kabila's
main rivals for the Presidency in 2011. In the end, real
commitment for re-energizing Nairobi and Goma must come from
the Presidency. End Comment.


10. (U) AF Senior Advisor Shortley has cleared this message.
BROCK