FRAUD SUMMARY OCT-DEC 2007 KINGSTON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 000091 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE DEPT FOR CA/FPP DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC JM SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY OCT-DEC 2007 KINGSTON REF: A) 07 KINGSTON 01158 B) 07 KINGSTON 01742 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In the first quarter of FY 2008, Kingston's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) uncovered a ring of C1/D fraud that resulted in specific information about the applicants' smuggler in New York. FPU also investigated ten H-1B cases of Indian nationals who provided fraudulent employment documents from their supposed Jamaican employers. FPU Kingston continues to scrutinize H-1B applications from third-country nationals and is working with FPU Chennai to verify Indian education documents. Kingston's FPU received 247 Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) cases, 9 new Immigrant Visa (IV) cases, 7 American Citizen Services (ACS) cases, and 111 external requests (data checks from DHS, airlines, local immigration, etc.). FPU processed an additional 157 walk-in cases and entered 129 CLASS records based on I-275 turn around reports and other tip reports. Of all the NIV cases referred, 201 were closed, with 91 confirmed fraud (45.3% confirmed fraud). 13 IV cases were closed this quarter, with nine confirmed fraud (69.2% confirmed fraud). END SUMMARY -------------- NONIMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD -------------- ¶2. (SBU) FRAUDULENT C1/Ds: In November 2007, FPU intercepted three applicants who had previously received C1/D visas to work for Master Ships and Navitrans Shipping companies, both of whom are known to CA/FPP to be bogus companies. Two of the applicants were applying for the H-2B program and one was applying for an immigrant visa through his relationship with his American citizen wife. In a series of in-depth individual interviews with the applicants, FPU discovered that the three had all paid the same agent, Mr. Charles ¶R. Barrett of Queens, New York, in order to obtain crewmember contracts and to make arrangements for their employment. According to these interviews, the applicants claim that they intended to work in the shipping industry as tank cleaners or housekeeping staff. However, once these applicants reached Miami, each claims that they were met by Mr. Barrett or an associate and taken by bus to Queens, New York, where they were put to work in restaurants owned by Mr. Barrett's friends. Two of the applicants worked at The Door restaurant located at 16307 Baisley Boulevard, Jamaica, New York ¶11434. ¶3. (SBU) Further investigation into Mr. Barrett's associations with visa applicants revealed his sister Rosalee Barrett's visa application in July 2006 to obtain a C1/D visa for Panama Shipping Lines, a company that has been linked to Master Ships and Navitrans as another completely bogus company set up by the same individuals. Ms. Barrett had been issued a 12 month C1/D visa, which has since been revoked following this investigation. ¶4. (SBU) After reviewing CCD records, FPU determined that Kingston has issued 34 visas to crewmembers claiming to work for one of these companies. FPU continues to investigate these cases and is preparing information to provide to Diplomatic Security in order to assist in any investigation they may wish to conduct on Mr. Charles Barrett and The Door restaurant in New York. ¶5. (SBU) SUSPECT H1B PETITIONERS: In the first quarter of FY 2008, the Fraud Prevention Unit investigated ten H-1B visa applications that had strong fraud indicators. The pattern of these applications is familiar to Kingston: third country nationals, mostly from India, work in Jamaica for one to two years at a small business in computer programming or software engineering. Their friends and associates in the U.S. find small companies owned by other Indian nationals to petition for them. These companies are well-prepared to present as many legal, financial and business documents as are required by the Embassy in order to appear legitimate. However, upon further scrutiny, these companies have all demonstrated fraud indicators as well. Many of their alleged clients do not in fact have direct relationships with the petitioners. Most of the companies have been founded by former H-1B visa holders who have recently left their original petitioning company. The majority of the employees at these companies are H-1B visa holders who have recently arrived from India. However, the challenge in theses cases lies in finding enough strong evidence of fraud to support a petition revocation recommendation. FPU Kingston returns these fraudulent cases through the revocation process when possible, but often must issue visas to these applicants when the burden of evidentiary proof cannot be reached through our investigations. ¶6. (SBU) The companies most suspected by FPU Kingston are Delasoft, Inc., Tech Arrow, RR Informatics, Hylee Group, and Novedea Systems. Since Post began investigating applications from these petitioners, Post has not received any subsequent applications from those companies. Therefore, while the process is time and resource intensive, FPU Kingston believes that our robust efforts to investigate H-1B fraud are reducing the number of suspicious cases Post receives. ¶7. (SBU) PORTMORE PACESETTERS MARCHING BAND: The Portmore Pacesetters Marching Band is a well-known group of children and young adults who perform at parades and events around Jamaica, as well as travel regularly to the U.S. to perform at various parades throughout the year. The group is a legitimate marching band, but many of their members have overstayed their visas in the past, and FPU has received tips that the band XXXXXXXXXXXX has taken bribes from new members who have joined the band solely to obtain a U.S. visa. A group of about 80 members appeared at the Embassy in December 2007 to obtain visas for the Martin Luther King Jr. Day Parade on January 21, 2008, in Tampa, Florida. FPU worked through various channels in order to obtain more specific information about members who paid their way into the band, but were unable to verify specific names of those individuals. Because many of the group's members use their visas appropriately, it was not prudent to refuse the entire group's applications. ¶8. (SBU) In order to weed out the mala fide applicants, FPU conducted thorough interviews with the applicants who were referred to FPU for review. Through these, FPU cleared 16 applicants who convinced us that they are bona fide members of the marching band and who overcame 214(b). FPU will continue to seek information on this group and will closely monitor future applications. -------------- IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In October 2007, the FPU staff conducted field investigations on outstanding immigrant visa cases over the course of two days. Two of the Unit's Fraud Investigators organized the trips and invited an entry-level officer (ELO) in the Consular Section to participate each day, in order to serve as a training opportunity and help orient the ELOs to the work involved in conducting a fraud investigation. The two-day field trip covered five of the 14 parishes and resulted in the completion of eleven immigrant visa case investigations, of which eight were determined to be fraudulent relationships. FPU plans to continue to organize these field trips bimonthly. -------------- DV FRAUD -------------- ¶10. (U) Kingston is not a DV post. -------------- AMERICAN CITIZEN SERVICES AND PASSPORT FRAUD -------------- ¶11. (U) FPU continues to investigate passport and CRBA applications for the ACS unit by providing Lexis Nexis and other database searches on applications in order to assist the ACS officers in their adjudication process. Particularly in the rush of passport applications that has followed the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI),ACS has brought more cases to FPU's attention for verification of U.S. civil documents and Lexis searches to verify the passport applicants' claims to citizenship. -------------- ADOPTION FRAUD -------------- ¶12. (U) FPU regularly investigates adoption cases where the applicant's orphan status is uncertain. Jamaica has a tradition of informal adoption without documentation, which makes it difficult for Jamaican applicants to establish their eligibility. Often, an applicant's relatives in the United States will adopt the applicant despite the fact that the applicant does not qualify as an orphan. FPU conducts regular field investigations to the applicants' homes in order to determine who is caring for the applicant and whether the family meets the poverty definitions of the INA. -------------- ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD -------------- ¶13. (U) Post's DHS/USCIS Officer-in-Charge reports no asylum cases for the first quarter of 2008. -------------- COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES -------------- ¶14. (U) FPU has set up quarterly trainings at Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston and Donald Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay to review U.S. travel document requirements and basic fraud prevention techniques. FPU invites every airline to send representatives to the trainings, which cover topics including facial recognition, detecting imposters, basic document training and examination of genuine and fraudulent U.S. visas and passports. The most recent training was completed in October 2007, and the next round of training is scheduled for January 2008. -------------- COOPERATION WITH OTHER EMBASSIES -------------- ¶15. (SBU) On October 30, 2007, the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator (ARSO-I) met with their British and Canadian counterparts at a lunch meeting hosted by the British High Commission. The British were hosting visitors from their Risk Assessment Operations Centre at UK Visas, who provided valuable insight into their current fraud operations and their plans to expand how they detect and deter fraud. The meeting was held as a part of ongoing consultations between the three Missions to work cooperatively and share best practices. The meetings have been extremely successful thus far. -------------- AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -------------- ¶16. (SBU) FRAUDULENT VISA APPOINTMENT LETTERS: On November 26, 2007, the FPM and ARSO-I examined 25 cases in which applicants presented counterfeit visa appointment letters to the Consular Section in order to gain access to the building and bypass the wait time for a visa appointment. The scheme was uncovered by the Section's Process Facilitator, who noticed a pattern in the bogus letters' printing and then discovered that none of the applicants who presented the letters had a scheduled appointment for that day. ¶17. (SBU) During the interviews, most applicants revealed the name of a document vendor who is known to the ARSO-I and who has been under surveillance for some time. These applicants paid the vendor up to US $100 for the appointment letter, as well as an additional US $400 for other supporting documentation in some cases. FPU and RSO continue to monitor the document vendor and are working closely with the Jamaican Fraud Squad to arrest the individuals in question. -------------- STAFFING AND TRAINING -------------- ¶18. (U) Per reftel B),FPU continues to seek CA/FPP assistance in obtaining FSI training for one of our Fraud Investigators whose nomination has been previously denied three times. Post intends to nominate this staff member again for training later this spring.