RWANDAN OFFICIALS ON EASTERN CONGO

S E C R E T KIGALI 000533 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR RW SUBJECT: RWANDAN OFFICIALS ON EASTERN CONGO REF: A. KIGALI 510 ¶B. KINSHASA 613 Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. Rwandan officials in meetings with CODEL Payne staffers and Charge disputed recruitment at refugee camps in Rwanda by the wife of Laurent Nkunda, but admitted recruitment by other operatives takes place. These officials also dismissed the recent RUD-URUNANA surrender as a sham, and considered the presence of US-based RUD leader Felicien Kanyamibwa at that surrender as proof of his participation in FDLR activities. They downplayed recent skirmishings and maneuverings by Nkundla, FLDR and FARDC forces. The head of military intelligence, however, stated that the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) had warned both Nkunda and the FARDC to avoid any acts that might lead to more fighting. While Rwandan civilian officials consistently hold that the GOR has no communications with Nkunda and regards him as an internal Congolese problem, as we have have heard previously the Rwandan military does apparently get messages to him. End summary. ¶2. (C) Payne staffers (Note: Congressman Payne's travel had been delayed and he later joined his staff members in the DRC. End note) on August 3 met separately with Great Lakes Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera and National Security Service External Affairs Chief Joseph Nzabamwita to discuss events in the eastern Congo. Sezibera asserted that Nkunda was not recruiting in Rwanda, dismissing reports circulating here that Nkunda,s wife had been in the camps on a recruiting drive (ref A). He suggested that Congolese refugees in Rwanda here should be able to return to Congo now, saying Congo "is a large country and the DRC could find space for the refugees elsewhere." When asked of the international community's growing concerns about developments in eastern Congo, he focused his comments on the recent RUD "surrender." Dismissive of the event, he noted that there had been no list of those who surrendered, and no list of what weapons they had turned in. He also advised us that Felicien Kanyamibwa had traveled from the US to Kinshasa and then to the surrender ceremony, and this constituted "solid evidence" of Felicien,s efforts in support of RUD/FDLR. He complained that the US had not taken steps to arrest him. Finally, he averred he was unaware of reports of any Nkunda plans to move on Goma in September. ¶3. (C) In contrast, External Affairs Chief Nzambawita said the GOR was following developments in eastern DRC closely and was concerned. He said, however, that some of what was happening appeared to be Nkunda and FARDC repositioning of their respective forces (a similar view was offered in a MONUC briefing to the Congressman Payne and his staffers in Goma on August 4). He, too, discounted the rumors of Nkunda moving on Goma in September. Nzabamwita was somewhat dismissive of the MONUC/FARDC "triangles" strategy, noting that there had been little concrete results. As for the DRC,s inability to come to Kigali for the canceled Tripartite-Plus Ministerial in Kigali, he said it was largely because the DRC had "nothing new to say" and did not want to be put in the embarrassing situation of having no updates to offer on actions it had pledged to take. ¶4. (S) In a separate meeting August 4, Charge Sim met with Chief of Military Intelligence Jack Musemakweli (please protect). In a very candid discussion he said that the RDF had intelligence officers placed deeply in the FDLR, in the FARDC and with Nkunda,s forces; the RDF thus had a very good feel for what was currently happening on the ground in eastern Congo. Like Nzabamwita, he said that too much was being read into the current maneuvering. However, he noted that the RDF has advised both the FARDC and Nkunda to avoid any acts that might serve as a trigger for the outbreak of violence; his advice appeared to be fairly recent. He did not foresee any Nkunda attack on Goma in September. Regarding the international team stopped from seeing Nkunda at a roadblock in CNDP territory (ref B) , he attributed the blockage to miscommunication between Nkunda,s headquarters and those at the roadblock (a view not held by MONUC or any of the international team stopped at that roadblock). ¶5. (C) He then described recent skirmishing between two FDLR battalions over control of disputed territory, and some skirmishing between FDLR and FARDC over control of a commercially important stretch of roadway. As for Nkunda,s wife recruiting in the camps, he said it simply was not possible especially since she did not speak Kinyarwanda and was from a south Congolese ethnic group, hence she would not be an effective recruiter (FYI: other contacts have told us she was born in Kisangani to a Shi father and Lokele mother. End FYI). He admitted, however, that there was recruiting going on in the camps by other Nkunda supporters. He said that in terms of FDLR incursions/recruitment in southern Rwanda, there had been a decline in the past couple of months, primarily due to excellent cooperation with Burundi. In addition, when asked of CNDP actions in the Congo, Musemakweli responded that the RDF, "did not recognize the CNDP as a political party," and the CNDP was simply a cover for the Nkunda forces. ¶6. (C) Comment. As usual the Rwandans looked askance at what they regarded as very modest (if not downright disingenuous) efforts to disarm RUD/FDLR combatants in eastern Congo. However, their perception of the military situation matched very closely with that of the MONUC intelligence briefers who spoke with Payne and his staffers in Goma -- lots of defensive maneuvering, but no real sign of serious hostilities on the horizon. Whether Mrs. Nkunda went on a recruiting trip to the refugee camps here, the GOR does acknowledge recruiting takes place; they do not admit to assisting in any way. While Rwandan civilian officials have told us repeatedly that they do not communicate with Nkunda in any way, and regard him as an internal Congolese problem, General Musemakweli's comments indicate that the Rwandan military (as we have heard before) does send messages to him. End Comment. SIM