INCREASED FDLR INFILTRATIONS INTO RWANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000393 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2018 TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL RW SUBJECT: INCREASED FDLR INFILTRATIONS INTO RWANDA REF: 07 KIGALI 0152 Classified By: DCM Cheryl Sim for Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Rwandan security officials reported 76 "infiltrations" by Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) INTELLIGENCE squads since January 1, with 14 operatives captured, and some killed in firefights with Rwandan border forces. Accompanying these infiltrations, a number of FDLR battalions have moved closer to the Rwandan frontier. Rwandan INTELLIGENCE officials are concerned that these infiltrations and border movements may presage attacks against Rwandan officials and infrastructure located at or near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At the Joint Monitoring Group - Envoys Level meeting in Gisenyi June 4, Rwandan officials requested concerted efforts by MONUC and the FARDC to move these FDLR battalions back from the border. These reports, and heightened Rwandan concern, show the FDLR remains more than a theoretical threat to Rwandan security. It might prove difficult to restrain a Rwandan response to an FDLR attack on a high-profile target. End summary. ¶2. (C) At the Joint Monitoring Group - Envoys Level meeting in Gisenyi June 4 (septel),Ambassador Richard Sezibera, leading the Rwandan delegation, in his prepared remarks said that there had been 76 infiltrations by FDLR personnel "in recent months," with 14 persons captured and several killed in firefights with Rwandan Defense Force border forces. Sezibera told the assembled delegations that these teams of "infiltrators" were targeting Rwandan economic interests, heavily represented at or near the border with the DRC, including the recently completed methane extraction platform tethered in Lake Kivu, tourist infrastructure in Gisenyi, and nearby coffee and tea plantations. He listed six FDLR battalions that had moved close to the border, at distances of 10, 15, 30, 40, 47 and 68 kilometers respectively. Sezibera said these battalions represented significant risks both to Rwanda's well-being, and to the prospect for peace in the region, and he forcefully called for MONUC and Congolese security forces to move these battalions back from border areas. (Note: at a later closed-door meeting of senior representatives of the GOR, GORDC, UN, EU and US delegations, MONUC proposed a coordinated cordon-and-search operation on both sides of the border; MONUC and the FARDC on one side, the RDF on the other. Rwandan and Congolese delegations agreed in principle to this proposal). ¶3. (C) In a follow-up conversation on the margins of the meeting, National Security Service External Affairs chief Joseph Nzabamwita told pol/econ chief that these infiltration groups crossed the Rwandan border in groups of eight to 10 intelligence operatives, dressed as "ordinary civilians," and that they dispersed on individual tasks once successfully across the border. The teams sought information on economic interests located near the border and on local officials in the area. While unable to mount conventional assaults across the border, he said, the FDLR appeared to be planning isolated attacks on infrastructure points, as well as targeted assassinations of local officials. The teams entered both above Lake Kivu in the north, he said, and through Nyungwe Forest in the south, by way of Burundi. ¶4. (C) While underlining the clear threat to Rwandan security, Nzabamwita said that, on average, one or two of the intelligence teams might be captured by the Rwandan security forces, one or two might return to the DRC after completing their missions, but the rest of the operatives remained in Rwanda and "informally reintegrated," finding their families and resuming their lives in Rwanda. "We only hear about them much later," he said. ¶5. (C) Nzabamwita also briefly addressed the recent helicopter incident on Rwanda's northern boundary with Uganda, saying the helicopter had been conducting a "routine patrol" along the border, and had strayed briefly into Ugandan territory. "But not 80 kilometers inside Uganda, as the press said," he remarked. The GOR had immediately contacted Ugandan security forces to alert them to the accidental overflight of Ugandan soil, he said, and the Ugandans had accepted the explanation. Such routine helicopter flights had been mounted in accord with the Nairobi agreement, which required Rwandan to exercise greater oversight of its borders, he added. ¶6. (C) Comment. Rwanda's brand-new multi-million dollar methane extraction platform, its large Heineken-controlled brewery, power lines, several tourist hotels, and many coffee and tea farms are located right at the Congolese border, many on the shores of Lake Kivu, a broad expanse of water shared by the two nations. While the Rwandans have long told us that they regard the FDLR as incapable of challenging the RDF in the field, they now express considerable uneasiness at the prospect of hit-and-run attacks, either across the lake or through Rwanda's isolated rural areas. We take them at their word when they tell us several FDLR battalions are now worryingly near the frontier. It might prove difficult to restrain the GOR if a successful FDLR attack across the border damaged one of Rwanda's high-profile installations. End comment. ARIETTI