EU SPECIAL ENVOY WARNED BY GOS REGIME ABOUT IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000985 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS, DRL DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF KPKO PHUM UNSC SU SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL ENVOY WARNED BY GOS REGIME ABOUT IMPACT OF POSSIBLE ICC INDICTMENTS REF: KHARTOUM 982 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: CDA Fernandez met with EU Special Envoy to Sudan Torben Brylle on July 2 to discuss EU concerns about possible ICC indictments of senior Sudanese government officials. Brylle recounted his meeting the same day with security chief Salah Ghosh, who warned him that Sudan is not afraid to backtrack on its international obligations in reaction to further ICC indictments. Regarding next steps in the Darfur peace process, Brylle is hopeful that new Joint Special Mediator Bassole will succeed where his UN and AU predecessors failed, and told CDA the EU strongly supports early support for the 2009 elections even if catastrophes within Sudan render them a useless exercise in donor charity. End summary. ¶2. (C) A lifelong Danish diplomat with extensive experience in Africa, Brylle arrived at the embassy straight from a meeting with Salah Ghosh, chief of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). Brylle described Ghosh as eager to discuss possible indictments of additional senior Sudanese regime leaders by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ghosh patently rejected any distinction between the ICC and the international community's intentions in Sudan, accusing the ICC of being "an orchestrated master plan to corner the Sudanese." Should Sudan and the international community clash over ICC indictments, Ghosh reportedly sees the Government of Sudan (GOS) committing to nothing, showing no concern for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) or UNAMID deployment, and freezing any steps towards rapprochement with the international community. In order to counter insinuations from Ghosh that the EU is using the ICC as a tool to encourage regime change in Sudan, Brylle said he insisted to Ghosh that the EU's ultimate goal is a "peaceful settlement" among all warring parties in Sudan. ¶3. (C) "Interpreting Salah Ghosh is not easy," Brylle said of the NISS head, and cautioned that the international community needs to be ready for anything from the GOS. Brylle said that while GOS cooperation with the ICC is not inconceivable, Ghosh indicated that Sudan's cooperation in the near term is unlikely. Brylle predicted that Sudan could drag out the process to last years, and in the END still manage to draw concessions from the West. CDA agreed that the GOS has an insidious way of attempting to force the international community to swallow hard and play its GAME using the suffering of the Sudanese people and fragile peace accords as pawns. ¶4. (C) Brylle requested US views on the moribund Darfur peace process. CDA cautioned that the longer Minni Minawi is in Darfur, the greater likelihood that he'll return to fighting but NCP stonewalling on the DPA has driven him to desperation. Brylle expressed hope that the new Joint Special Mediator (JSM) for Darfur, Djibril Yipene Bassole, former Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, will not be prove to be, as the Darfur rebels fear, another African diplomat subject to easy manipulation ("like Konare, who rebels believe the Sudanese regime was able to buy off.") Recognizing the challenges faced by Bassole, Brylle observed, "We need to give him advice," but also admitted Bassole's shortcomings, notably his inability to speak Arabic and English. However Brylle observed hopefully that Bassole had a hand the Ouagadougou agreement that ended the fighting in Cote d'Ivoire. He also had an intelligence/security background before he became a diplomat which could be helpful. ¶5. (C) Brylle viewed positively the roadmap agreement on Abyei, noting that it allows for greater UNMIS freedom of movement in the Abyei region. He also viewed positively the AEC's midterm evaluation report, which defines clearly the next steps which are required for CPA implementation: resolve Abyei, demarcate the border, re-deploy forces and fully deploy the JIUs, and plan for elections. CDA noted that Abyei can nonetheless unravel as the issues of elections, border demarcation, and the continued presence of the SAF's 31st Brigade will likely force the SPLM into another confrontation. Brylle and CDA agreed that there are numerous challenges to holding elections in 2009, including a delay in the naming of an electoral commission, an attempt by the NCP to rewrite the rules on the 2011 referendum, and an eventual "unilateral declaration of independence" by the SPLM in KHARTOUM 00000985 002 OF 002 response. CDA noted that many in the SPLM cite the fact that Sudan became independent in 1956 by a vote of the nascent Sudanese parliament, and say the Southern parliament could do the same if necessary. ¶6. (C) Comment: Brylle's conversation with Ghosh demonstrates the extent to which the Sudanese regime is concerned about the ICC indictments. Brylle wanted to talk of other issues and Ghosh of nothing but the ICC. For now the GOS views the EU as being the main instigators behind the anticipated indictments, but the GOS can be expected to take punitive actions against other missions whose capitals publicly support the indictments, including the US. As stated in reftel, although the shift in policy trajectory may be incremental, we anticipate a slow-down in implementation of the things that matter to us most following the indictments, especially if they include President Al-Bashir. END comment. FERNANDEZ