JEM'S SENIOR LEADERS DISCUSS REBEL UNIFICATION AND EXTERNAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000974 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU SUBJECT: JEM'S SENIOR LEADERS DISCUSS REBEL UNIFICATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS (PART II of II) REFS: A. KHARTOUM 973 ¶B. KHARTOUM 941 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On June 27-28, three senior Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leaders in London separately met poloff and discussed JEM's ideas on rebel unification; its relations with the SPLM, SLM/Minni Minnawi, Chad, and Libya; and JEM's expectations for the content of any peace deal. These leaders also attempted to dispel "misperceptions" about JEM including its Islamic agenda, its close ties to Hassan Al-Turabi, and its use of child soldiers. This cable is the second of two parts on JEM's senior leadership in London. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On June 27, poloff met separately with Dr. Gibriel Ibrahim (JEM's Senior Economic Advisor and brother of Khalil Ibrahim) and later with JEM spokesman Ahmed Hussein Adam. On June 28, poloff met lead negotiator Ahmed Tugot. THOUGHTS ON REBEL UNIFICATION AND OTHER MOVEMENTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) SLA/ABDUL WAHID: Tugot and Ibrahim stated that Abdul Wahid Nur continues to be an obstruction to rebel unification. Tugot remarked that during his visit to Paris to meet Foreign Minister Deng Alor, Abdul Wahid refused to see JEM representatives. Tugot stated that JEM's focus is no longer on Abdul Wahid, but on working directly with his field commanders. Tugot stated that "even without Abdul Wahid you will see a great movement of the Fur people to JEM." Ibrahim had an equally negative view of Abdul Wahid, saying "Abdul Wahid will not join us. He thinks that the West will fix everything and that they will come to his rescue." Like Tugot, Ibrahim also stated that JEM is reaching out to the Fur, saying "The Fur and the IDPs do not belong to anyone and many of them have been very enthusiastic about our work and the Omdurman operation." ¶4. (SBU) SLA/UNITY: Not surprisingly, JEM leaders were equally critical of their rivals from SLA/Unity. According to Ibrahim, Unity is divided along ethnic lines and has an internal struggle between Abdalla Yahia and Sharif Harir. Ahmed Tugot stated that JEM is in direct discussions with Abdallah Yehia and that "JEM is very serious about trying to unite the movements but it is difficult when there is a clan struggle going on within Unity." SLM/MINNI MINNAWI - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) JEM leaders confirmed that Minni Minnawi met Khalil Ibrahim in Eastern Chad in late June, and stated that Minni sought guarantee from Ibrahim for the return of his defected commanders to SLM/MM and in exchange, Minnawi would agree to significant coordination under separate organizational umbrellas. Tugot stated that Khalil Ibrahim turned down this deal, adding, "Minni is no longer a player - it is no longer 2006." Tugot predicted that Minnawi's influence will continue to decrease and that "he will soon be left with only his very small Zaghawa clan." Ibrahim also criticized Minnawi saying that he never recovered from NCP negotiator Mahjzoub Al-Khalifa's death (in June 2007) and Dr. Nafie's takeover of the Darfur portfolio. He said that Minnawi is not a capable political leader, and that his own ruthless tactics and search for power ended up sidelining many educated and capable commanders. Ibrahim and Adam were more optimistic than Tugot about a possible alliance with Minnawi saying, "we are thinking of a broad front where everyone can fit in." Adam separately claimed, "Minnawi committed a lot of atrocities and can be ruthless, but we fought alongside him and unity with the movements is important to us." RELATIONS WITH THE SPLM - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Tugot, Ahmed, and Ibrahim all stated that the Norwegians helped facilitate a meeting between JEM and the SPLM in Paris in late June. Ahmed described the meeting as a very discrete discussion with Deng Alor (reftel). According to Tugot, the meeting focused on SPLM-JEM relations, and "helped dispel SPLM's misconceptions about JEM, including our alleged links with Turabi and our perceived Islamic agenda." Tugot stated that the SPLM has done very little in Darfur and during the negotiations for the DPA the NCP exploited the SPLM for its own goals. Adam stated that he realizes that the SPLM is interested in JEM for its own interests, as "They [the SPLM] realize that they need friends in the government if they want a smooth transition and want to secede." Adam agreed that the "Norwegians were very helpful in facilitating this positive meeting," and that he expects that there will be another JEM-SPLM meeting sometime in July, maybe in London or in Kenya. He stated that Salwa Benaya, an SPLM representative and member of the National Assembly, also recently visited London and met with JEM officials informally. ¶7. (SBU) Ibrahim stated that the SPLM should not fear that JEM KHARTOUM 00000974 002 OF 003 will discard the CPA. He stated that JEM has endorsed the CPA, the bill of rights contained in it, and the federal system that it initiated. Ibrahim cautioned though, that the DPA failed because the international community attempted to protect the CPA at all costs. He stated that with respect to the composition of the National Assembly, the South should retain approximately 1/3 of the seats, and that JEM and Darfuris should be allotted 20% from the 52% of seats allotted to the NCP. Ibrahim stated that the south should still have the right to the referendum for secession in 2011, but that "we should take another look at the timeline laid out by the CPA with respect to elections and other things." Tugot separately agreed, stating that JEM has started to generally discuss the timeline of the CPA with the SPLM. REGIONAL PLAYERS - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) CHAD: JEM leaders stated that the interests of Chad and JEM currently overlap, but there is no permanent strategic commitment between them. Ibrahim stated that years ago Deby vowed to eliminate JEM and that he will not be a reliable ally for JEM for the long term. Ibrahim also stated that the clan differences in the Zaghawa are significant and that Deby appears concerned about a Kobe Clan alliance against him (Ibahim is a Kobe). Nonetheless, both Ibrahim and Tugot stated that the GoS seeks regime change in Chad, and that this constitutes a threat to JEM. Ibrahim stated that he told GoS officials that it should be easier for the Sudanese Government to try to solve Sudan's internal problems than to try to overthrow another country, "but they do not listen to us." Tugot stated that JEM did fight the Chadian opposition in Eastern Chad, claiming that JEM did not lose many fighters, and took 85 vehicles from the Chadian opposition all over Eastern Chad. ¶9. (SBU) LIBYA: JEM leaders downplayed their ties with Libya. Tugot stated that JEM has an informal relationship with Libya, one where JEM "is in touch with them, and nothing more than that." Ibrahim stated that Libya has not been supportive of JEM "from day one" and that Libya's central motivation in the conflict has been to avoid the presence of a strong international force along its borders. Ibrahim said that the GoL has little leverage over the GoS and that GoL officials are not patient enough to dig deeply into Darfur's root issues. Ibrahim described Libyan Intelligence Chief Abdallah Senussi as "someone who is open to listening to the movements" and Ali Trekki as "supportive of the Government of Chad." REFUTING CLAIMS ABOUT JEM - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) JEM leaders refuted the idea that JEM is an Islamic movement, funded solely by Chad, and interested more in power in Khartoum than in the people of Darfur. Ibrahim stated, "you in the West accuse us of being an Islamic movement and directed by Chad. These two things contradict each other." Ibrahim admitted that some JEM members did fight against the South during the civil war, but that this should not be a condemnation of the movement as a whole. He said that his brother, Khalil, only served as a military physician in the war. Adam stated that JEM is not in favor of instituting sharia law and that it supports full diplomatic relations with Israel. He said that although some JEM leaders used to be part of the government, "If you say we came from the same group as the regime, you need to ask why we left in the first place." Adam stated that JEM has no significant relationship with the Popular Congress Party's Hassan Al-Turabi, and that Al-Turabi has no future in any Sudanese government. Adam, Ibrahim, and Tugot also emphatically refuted the idea that JEM used child soldiers in the May 10 attack. Ibrahim and Adam both claimed that the Government constructed this, as the children were taken from the Suad Al-Fatih Quranic School in Omdurman and were beaten into admitting that they were part of JEM's forces ¶11. (SBU) JEM leaders stated that they see the media as an important part of their battle for Darfur. They said that the Government of Sudan viewed Khalil Ibrahim's lengthy interview on Al-Jazeera as a major threat, and that GoS officials worked hard not to allow the interview's most important segments to be aired. Ibrahim stated that presidential advisor Dr. Ghazi Salah Ad-Din personally traveled to Qatar to try to prevent the tape from being broadcast. According to Ibrahim, Ghazi was successful in advising Al-Jazeera officials to only broadcast trivial parts of the interview focusing on the Arab league or Abdul Wahid's office in Tel Aviv. Ibrahim stated that Ghazi was able to accomplish this through his personal connections and did not raise the issue with officials from the Government of Qatar. Ibrahim stated that although his brother's interview was largely undermined by the GoS, that Khalil will discuss some of these ideas further in an upcoming interview with the pan-Arab newspaper "As-Sharq Al-Awsat." KHARTOUM 00000974 003 OF 003 ¶12. (SBU) Ibrahim also commented on recent press coverage detailing the "confession" of JEM commander Abdel-Aziz al-Nur Al-Asher. (Note: Asher was arrested on May 22, attempting to cross into Eritrea and pro-regime Sudanese press such as "Al-Rai-al-Aam" devoted significant front page space to describing his confession. END NOTE.) Ibrahim stated that he knows that Asher "would never say the things that are coming out in the papers." Ibrahim added that the newspaper articles, however, "do give us signals from where the GoS is getting its information and we can figure out who is divulging information from what is said." Ibrahim admitted that Asher's capture and Jamali Hassan Jelaladin's death were difficult for JEM, but that "is part of the struggle and to be expected." RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) Ibrahim and the other JEM leaders separately emphasized that JEM wants an improved relationship with the U.S. "If we have done anything wrong to the U.S., we want to know what, and we will try to correct that," stated Ibrahim. Ibrahim asked whether the U.S.'s perception of JEM would change under a new administration. Poloff stated that it is unlikely that it would, and emphasized that JEM should renounce its military ambitions as a first step. WHAT JEM WANTS OUT OF A FUTURE DEAL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶14. (SBU) Ibrahim stated that JEM has generally outlined what it wants in a peace deal. According to Ibrahim, power sharing must involve a vice president position, significant positions in the cabinet, and at least 20% of the national assembly. Leadership positions in the armed forces, police, security, and civil service are all necessary components, said Ibrahim. He said that JEM has made it clear that Darfur should be one state with powers similar to those granted to the South, though self-determination is not important "at this point." Those affected by war should be compensated, IDPs should be supported in the return to their homelands, and Darfur should receive reconstruction and development funds, said Ibrahim. Ibrahim stated that JEM forces should not be disarmed during the interim period, "as this is the best guarantee for the implementation of agreement." Ibrahim also stated that wealth-sharing provisions must detail future national revenues and an agreement for percentage of oil revenue for Darfur before production starts. Ibrahim insisted that there should be a general political framework before there is a ceasefire. COMMENT - - - - ¶15. (SBU) JEM's message to poloff tracks almost precisely with what JEM told the JMST's Boubou Niang and Muin Shrim on June 26 in London. JEM truly sees itself as the biggest player Darfur and all three of its representatives attempted to backhandedly discredit the other movements, including SLM/Minnawi. Its emphasis on bringing the Fur into their movement is a wise maneuver, however unlikely their prospects for success in this claimed endeavor. JEM's emphasis on working directly with SLA/AW field commanders mirrors the strategy of the AU/UN's JMST, not to mention other rebel groups including SLM/Unity and even some of Abdul Wahid's own political advisors. Norwegian involvement in bringing together the SPLM and JEM and the SPLM's willingness to meet is noteworthy, although Norway has on several occasions encouraged SPLM efforts to unify the Darfur movements. The meeting was obviously conducted discretely given widespread condemnation of JEM's May 10 attack on Omdurman. Although questions remain about JEM's Islamic ideology, its members' role in the war in the South, and its ongoing relationship with Chad, the Sudanese and the international community will inevitably have to work with JEM on a solution to the war in Darfur sooner or later, whether we like it or not. FERNANDEZ