DEFENSE WHITE PAPER ENERGIZES SPLA BUDGET PROCESS,

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000971 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: DEFENSE WHITE PAPER ENERGIZES SPLA BUDGET PROCESS, WHILE EXPECTATIONS OF USG ASSISTANCE ARE HEIGHTENED BY ITS COMPLETION REF: A. KHARTOUM 542 ¶B. KHARTOUM 400 ¶C. KHARTOUM 315 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) This is an action cable, please see paras 10-11. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly,s (SSLA) long-expected, but very public, endorsement of the SPLA,s Defense White Paper (DWP) has had immediate impact on SPLA/SAF relations and the SPLA,s 2009 budget planning process. Sudanese Armed Forces officials offered sharp public comments on plans to develop air and riverine transport squadrons, and will inevitably continue forward with their own arms build-up in response. In Juba, however, the SSLA,s approval has placed the DWP,s policy recommendations in the forefront of the SPLA,s 2009 budget planning process ) breathing life into a document many feared would be shelved. However, while the timeliness of the DWP,s approval during the budget planning process has given the DWP a strategic lift of its own, current SPLA financial difficulties ) and the impending downturn in USG security sector assistance, jeopardizes much of the SPLA,s transformation efforts ) and brings them significantly short of past requests and expectations for civil air defense. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶3. (SBU) The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly endorsed the SPLA,s Defense White Paper (DWP on June 22. Within forty-eight hours of the SSLA,s approval, SPLA budget officers had scrapped their initial planning document for the military,s 2009 budget, instead tying line items to programming and policy areas as put forth in the DWP (Ref A), notably to now include the development of &ground force and air defense personnel.8 The GOSS Council of Ministers has identified the SPLA as one of six government entities which will receive a 30% budget increase during the 2009 fiscal year should present oil revenue levels hold. ¶4. (SBU) A DWP-focused budget could serve to sharpen heretofore scattered SPLA procurement practices, but obstacles to a rational budgeting policy remain. According to Ministry of Finance and SPLA budget officials, ninety-three percent of the 2008 SPLA budget has been ear-marked for troop salaries, and this does not include costs associated with a &second-wave8 of Misseriya Arab militias scheduled to be brought into the SPLA later this summer. The Deputy Director of Procurement noted June 27 that unless authorized to reduce salaries, his department has exhausted its 2008 budget. SPLA procurement officers, still grappling with news of the military,s near-bankrupt status, just finalized re-negotiations with fuel and food suppliers: the army,s next six months of food and fuel shipments will not be paid for until 2009. ¶5. (SBU) Expanding on details reported Ref B, Deputy Director for Procurement told ConGen PolOff June 27 that he and late Minister Dominic Dim Deng had quarreled over 2007 contract closeouts. The Minister had directed that payment be delayed on some contracts until December 2007 in order to compensate for fluctuations in oil revenue given to Juba by the Government of National Unity. When the time came in December for these contracts to be paid ) some with hefty penalty fees, Dim Deng pressed his procurement staff to alter the contract date to January 2008. The SPLA,s current monetary woes are tied to that debt carryover. ¶6. (SBU) The current draft of the 2009 budget for the SPLA cites the creation of an &anti-aircraft defense capability,8 but given current debts, budget planners are unsure what money could support what they term &a presidential priority.8 Despite its financial predicament, the SPLA appears to be moving forward with its development of an air transport squadron ahead of schedule. Preliminary figures provided by the SPLA during the June 27 session of the Budget Sector Working Group (Security) showed 174 personnel in the SPLA,s &air force unit,8 with an associated operating and salary cost of $483,150 USD. ¶7. (SBU) The SPLA currently has 40 officers being trained as pilots and ground engineers in South Africa, against an eventual projected total figure of 60 pilots, 40 ground engineers, and 30 air traffic control personnel. An unspecified number of personnel are undergoing similar training in Ethiopia. While airlift alone will not surmount all logistical obstacles to projected SPLA deployments ) UNJLC estimates 65% of the South,s rural airstrips are un-usable during the rainy season - it would speed troop transport to some areas of the South, creating a much more mobile force. ¶8. (SBU) The Southern Sudan Legislature will be responsible for final approval of the 2009 budget in October, and will be responsible for juggling the forthcoming request from the Government of Southern Sudan for an emergency budget supplemental for the SPLA. This comes during a period in which USG assistance for the SPLA is largely committed to continuing base construction projects, and when costs previously borne via the Department,s SST programming for operations and maintenance support for already completed base construction (including for the new SPLA headquarters base in Juba) will now be transferred to the SPLA in full, which this overstretched SPLA is ill prepared to assume. ¶9. (S) COMMENT: The GOSS has repeatedly been pressed by the USG to complete the Defense White Paper on the basis that this document was necessary to enable the Administration to request new support for the SPLA. Having completed it, the GOSS will now, perhaps unrealistically, expect to see an early increase in USG support. At the same time, the operations and maintenance (O&M) support to the SPLA headquarters is about to expire leaving the SPLA to take on these functions when it is ill prepared to do so. One SPLA officer has described the pending turnover as &a disaster.8 In all likelihood, generators will cease to function, sewage will back up, and other essential base maintenance will come to a halt. Without these functions, the IGHQ itself may well come to a standstill. Much of the blame for this lies squarely with the SPLA for its continuing inability to plan for, and carry out, essential O&M functions even when warned far in advance that it would need to do so. Nonetheless, the USG will also be criticized for not fully anticipating the training needs of the SPLA, and for not continuing support in vital O&M areas as needed for a nascent professional army that still requires our ongoing support. The dire budget situation will place the SPLA in a difficult position in regards to hiring the needed expertise to continue operations. ¶10. (S) COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION CON,T: The SPLA also is eager to develop an air defense capability, which they and the SPLM have repeatedly stressed to us is their highest self defense priority. Warranted or not, the USG urging of the SPLA to complete the DWP created the expectation that this could open the way for the Administration to possibly provide an air defense capability to Southern Sudan. The combination of poor budget planning, bloated salaries, and continuing tensions with the government in Khartoum will leave the SPLA and the SPLM feeling abandoned by the Americans if new assistance is not forthcoming, especially in the area of air defense. However, this is not in itself a sufficient reason to provide such controversial assistance to the SPLA. ¶11. (S) With the SPLA having become aware, through its sources within the regime, that SAF is acquiring a handful of well-regarded Russian-made SU-25 "Frogfoot" ground attack aircraft (the Soviet era, Afghan Mujahideen-tested counterpart to the American A-10 Thunderbolt),the question remains whether the current scope and pace of security sector assistance is appropriate. Post believes that this is a timely issue for the AF Assistant Secretary's determination (in consultation with AF/SPG) to decide if a discussion is warranted by the Inter-Agency at the PCC level: With a full understanding of and respect for legal and congressional strictures on lethal assistance to the SPLA, what should be the USG's response to SAF's upcoming improvement of its ground attack capabilities? How will this impact the situation on the ground in Darfur and along the North-South border? What can realistically be expected of a still rustic, ramshackle, poorly administered, rebel army like the SPLA? What policies and regulations would need to be amended to provide additional assistance to the SPLA should the Inter-Agency find that this is warranted? We need to be very careful not to encourage an arms-race in Sudan (although that is already happening without us),but we also need to ask if it is in our policy interests to ensure that the SPLA continues to increase its capacity over time to meet a potentially more lethal challenge next year. FERNANDEZ