DISSECTING UNSCR 1769

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000966 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD SUBJECT: DISSECTING UNSCR 1769 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As renewal of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) approaches on July 31, it is time to take stock of what this resolution has accomplished during the first year of its existence, and more critically what it has failed to do. Identifying its shortcomings, however, should not be used as an exercise in easy UNAMID vilification. Rather, this back-to-basics dissection of the resolution that provides the mandate for the Darfur peacekeeping operation should be done to reveal and rectify areas of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, particularly in the application of the Chapter VII elements of the mandate. UNSCR 1769 renewal presents a golden opportunity to focus on the clear definition of UNAMID mandate terms at the operational level so that all personnel in the Mission, from the Joint Special Representative on down, are clear on the goals of the operation and the means at their disposal to accomplish it. We believe it would be a mistake to waste time "expanding the mandate," which in reality would only mean giving UNAMID more tasks it cannot implement or comprehend. UNAMID has already been given all the marching orders it needs to do its job in Darfur; it just needs to be shown how to use them. END SUMMARY. TOP-DOWN CHAPTER VII IGNORANCE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The biggest failing of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is arguably that neither its forces nor its leadership know what their mandate actually is. They do not understand UNSCR 1769 (2007) and accordingly have no idea how to implement it. This inability was made unwittingly yet abundantly clear in a recent op-ed piece written by the UNAMID Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada himself, in which he characterized the peacekeeping operation as "having the resolution to succeed." ¶3. (SBU) UNAMID may have the resolution, but it does not have the know-how to implement it, which will forever keep the mission from being effective. For example, Adada alleged that UNAMID as a peacekeeping force could not intervene more forcefully with belligerents in Darfur. This statement shows a lack of understanding of the Chapter VII element of UNAMID's mandate, which allows the force to take the necessary action to prevent armed attacks. At another point in his commentary, Adada claimed that UNAMID continued to protect civilians and engage all parties in West Darfur. On June 18 a UNAMID civilian police officer was assaulted within a hundred meters of UNAMID Sector West Headquarters in El Geneina, West Darfur, by marauding Arab militias. UNAMID did nothing to prevent or respond to the incident, proving again its lack of understanding at the operational level of the Chapter VII elements of its mandate, which allow it to take all necessary actions to protect its personnel and facilities. The officer was later released because of the intervention of Sudanese intelligence (NISS) not because of UNAMID. NECESSITY OF DEFINING 1769 TERMS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Rather than castigating Adada for his misrepresentations and misunderstandings (one of Adada's Political Assistants recently scoffed at the JSR's mention of 20 patrols per day, noting that rare was the occasion when they ever broke double-digits) a better use of the international community's time would be to attempt to help UNAMID correct the problem. ¶5. (SBU) Deliberations on 1769 renewal would best be spent taking an inventory of what in the resolution has and has not been implemented to date and task UNAMID leadership accordingly. For example, OP13 states: "Calls on all parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent cease-fire." This provision of 1769 has gone unobserved by all players, providing a perfect example for the UNSC to focus pressure on the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the rebel movements to abide by 1769 expectations if there is to be any progress in Darfur. This exercise would also provide a perfect pretext for the Council and the international community to empower UNAMID to oversee such implementation by calling upon its leadership to re-invigorate the Ceasefire Commission (dormant since March 2008, largely due to Force Commander frustration) as a way of going beyond simply acknowledging violations to more actively investigating and condemning violations and demanding accountability for violators. ¶6. (SBU) Perhaps the most important paragraph is OP15 -- UNAMID leadership, including the Force Commander (FC),needs to be taken to task on how to apply a Chapter VII mandate in Darfur. The FC himself asked in a subsequent UNAMID briefing for an investigation into why UNAMID failed to react to the June 18 incident involving civpol and Arab militias in El Geneina. Such an instance provides a perfect chance for the UNSC to press for accountability within UNAMID. The Council could suggest that the results of this KHARTOUM 00000966 002 OF 002 investigation be released in the next Secretary-General's Monthly Darfur Report. The Council could require mandatory training for all commanders, from the FC on down, on application of OP15 with a progress report due as of a specific date thereafter. If the FC does not know how or in what context to apply Chapter VII, then there is no way any Sector Commander or infantryman on the ground is going to know either. (Comment: We are not suggesting that it is an easy decision for a UNAMID soldier to engage what was reported to be a column of 1000 Arab militiamen. If this column had been fired upon by UNAMID forces, it is likely that a very serious escalation would have ensued. We suggest that this point should be acknowledged by the UNSC if it is to have any credibility in reviewing this particular incident. Nonetheless, we suggest that the incident be used to frame a thoughtful discussion of the need for UNAMID to review its ROE and better train its forces. End comment.) TIMING IS EVERYTHING -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The idea of building in benchmarks to chart UNAMID progress against resolution 1769 is not new. OP5, despite the initial bristling it caused in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, provided definite dates by which UNAMID progress ahead of Transfer of Authority could be measured. A similar mechanism could be used to chart other aspects of 1769 implementation, with direction from the UNSC and DPKO. In short, until UNAMID understands and implements its current mandate at the operational level, post suggests that an expansion of UNAMID's existing mandate would be an exercise in futility. Rather, a re-evaluation of tasks, a push for the UN to clarify terms, and a designation of duties with definite deadlines could give the Mission the push it needs to differentiate itself from its African Union predecessor (which now some parties claim was more effective - a damning claim) and to prove its own efficacy on the ground. ¶8. (SBU) So far the UN has taken the path of least resistance in Darfur. It has hid behind very real logistical problems, wrangling with TCCs, and a thorny relationship with a duplicitous Sudanese regime, to mask its own unwillingness or inability to use the tools it does have. Both UNAMID and DPKO need to be pressed and 1769's renewal may be a golden opportunity to do so. FERNANDEZ