UN RESIDENT COORDINATIOR ON ABYEI ROADMAP,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000955 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/PSC NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: UN RESIDENT COORDINATIOR ON ABYEI ROADMAP, MISSERIYA, AND NUBA MOUNTAINS REF: A. KHARTOUM 939 ¶B. KHARTOUM 936 ¶C. IIR 6890 0313 08 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The UN Resident Coordinator in Abyei reports gradual progress there, with an ethnic-Dinka police force being formed, unexploded ordinance collected, and remains of the dead being retrieved. He reported that no land mines have been found, contrary to earlier reports. He argued that UN peacekeepers in Abyei behaved bravely and effectively during the fighting, moving decisively to shuttle NGO workers and later a group of Dinka to safety while taking fire, and that criticism of their performance has been very unfair. Misseriya tribesmen to the north, who are not a party to the Roadmap agreement and are vulnerable to manipulation by the NCP, remain an unknown variable. This official also believes that the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan state is likely to replace Abyei as the focal point of SPLA-NCP conflict flowing the national elections scheduled for 2009. END SUMMARY. Abyei Security Developments - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) On June 25, CDA Fernandez and poloffs met with Amcit UN Resident Coordinator in Abyei Jason Mathus (please protect) to discuss developments there. Mathus confirmed that UNMIS now is patrolling unhindered outside of Abyei town for the first time. The previous day, an UNMIS patrol had traveled to Difra (north of Abyei time and the site of some oil fields),but he noted that to be truly effective, UNMIS needs to be able to travel even farther afield into areas of potential Ngok Dinka-Misseriya conflict, as far as Muglad in the North. UNMIS also needs free access to border areas north east of Abyei, along the border with South Kordofan. ¶3. (C) In addition to personnel of the newly constituted Joint Integrated Unit (JIU),approximately 500 police also are in the process of deploying to Abyei, a force almost as large as the JIU. (Note: Following the meeting with the CDA, Mathus told EconOff that the quality of the JIU units varies considerably. While the SPLA personnel were handpicked for Abyei duty, the SAF soldiers appeared to have been rounded up at random to serve there. He said that some in the SAF contingent were so young they almost could be classified as &child soldiers.8 End note.) ¶4. (SBU) GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor had told Mathus that the police force will be entirely ethnic Dinka, with 200 recruited in the North, 200 recruited in the South and the rest from the immediate vicinity. Mathus said that this will help the police unit to cohere quickly, although it could result in other problems. He said that once the police are established, the most pressing priority will be to deploy them into areas of contention. Preparing for IDP Returns ) UXO and Human Remains - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) Mathus listed three priority tasks to be accomplished before IDPs can return to Abyei: First, clearing unexploded ordinance (UXO); second, retrieving the remains of those killed in the fighting; finally ensuring the safety of the water supply. According to Mathus, UN deminers so far have found no landmines in the area, contrary to earlier reports. There is plenty of other UXO to occupy them, however. 89 exposed bodies have been recovered so far. Mathus estimated that, along with graves that are reported to be in the town, the total of dead probably would be somewhere above 150. There are reports that summary executions were carried out by the SAF and associated militias, but Mathus said that after three)four weeks, it is unlikely that much forensic evidence can be obtained from the remains, beyond the location of wounds, along sex and approximate age of the deceased and, from their clothing, whether they were military or civilian. Performance of UNMIS Peacekeepers Unfairly Maligned - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Mathus strongly defended the performance of the UNMIS Zambian peace-keeping battalion in Abyei during the May crisis. In the initial fighting, he said, Zambian peacekeepers had successfully rescued under fire NGO staff and their families who were trapped by the fighting and brought them to safety at the UNMIS camp, and even escorted a KHARTOUM 00000955 002 OF 003 group of Dinka toward the south when they were under fire, although UNMIS lacked adequate armored vehicles and came under direct fire from heavy artillery and tanks. UNMIS also effectively policed the first SAF-SPLM ceasefire. Only when the ceasefire broke down and full scale fighting erupted with tanks and rocket fire, did the Zambians withdraw to their camp for protection. Mathus noted that the UNMIS troops are neither equipped nor expected to insert themselves between active combatants, especially given the weapons the two sides were using. Misseriya ) Odd Men Out - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) CDA Fernandez asked Mathus, views on the role of the Misseriya. He noted that the Misseriya community leaders with whom he had met the previous two days (Ref A) had felt vulnerable and cut out of the Abyei roadmap process. Mathus agreed and said that the Misseriya are in denial about the nature of the Abyei protocol and the Roadmap, which really are about the Ngok Dinka returning home to Abyei and governing themselves, rather than sharing power with the Misseriya. He continued that the Misseriya are unhappy with the whole concept of drawing a border between Muglad and Abyei, rather than with where that border is drawn (the current interim border makes Abyei almost entirely Dinka, cutting out the Misseriya to the North). In 2011 per the CPA, the Dinka majority in Abyei is almost certain to vote for union with Bahr al Ghazal in the south over Kordofan in the north. The Misseriya do not trust the Dinka to allow them to migrate with their cattle south of the Kiir River during the annual dry season, especially given the recriminations over the last bout of fighting and Misseriya collusion with SAF. ¶8. (C) Mathus argued that three parties are coalescing in Abyei. An SPLM Ngok-Dinka alliance negotiated the Roadmap with the NCP, which will use the Abyei issue to advance its own agenda. The Misseriya played no role in negotiating and are not party to the agreement, but are in a position to undermine it if sufficiently disgruntled and supported by Khartoum. At some point, Mathus said, someone needs to assist the Misseriya face the new reality and help them "start to get over it". To ameliorate Misseriya angst, development assistance needs to be directed toward their home region around Muglad and water points along their three migration routes need to be constructed. The Misseriya should be encouraged to build up Muglad and tie it with its natural Northern hinterland and the towns of Kadugli and Al-Fulah but the NCP, which sees the Misseriya as a useful proxy, will keep them in denial and focus them on illusory "lost lands" to the South. He noted that while there has been bad blood and actions on both sides and the Misseriya should not be demonized, they tend to romanticize an imaginary idyllic relationship with the Dinka, "the fact is that they always raided South, the Dinka never attacked Muglad, theirs was always a defensive struggle." Nuba Mountains - the Next Flashpoint? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) CDA Fernandez asked Mathus for his sense of the situation in the Nuba Mountains of neighboring South Kordofan state, where there have been recent reports of deteriorating security (ref B.). Mathus agreed that the region is likely to replace Abyei as the most probable place for conflict to break out between the SAF and SPLA. This shift is likely to come following the 2009 national elections. ¶10. (C) While Abyei and the South are focused on the 2011 referendum, Southern Kordofan (along with Southern Blue Nile state) is focused on the 2009 elections. If the NCP wins the 2009 elections, the South and Abyei will exercise their CPA option to secede in 2011, abandoning the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile to an NCP controlled North. The same applies to the other marginalized northern areas, e.g., Darfur and the east. This is a recipe for post-2011 conflict, Mathus said. CDA agreed that the SPLM is ambivalent about the 2009 elections, which it believes the NCP will rig in any case, and has not decided to contest them vigorously, preferring to prioritize the referendum. Mathus argued that this is a strategic mistake, because only by winning the 2009 election can the South ensure that it will have a free and fair 2011 referendum. While Blue Nile state is well governed and SPLM Governor Malik Agar leads a unified bloc, the Nuba decision making process encourages division and consultation so that Nuba leaders in Southern Kordofan KHARTOUM 00000955 003 OF 003 are weak, confused and divided. Comment - - - - ¶11. (C) Mathus has extensive experience in Sudan, where he has worked and traveled for years in a variety of capacities. His views on the potential spoiler role of the Misseriya in Abyei and of the possibility for serious trouble in the Nuba Mountains correspond closely with our own. Mathus, a UN employee, portrayed UNMIS in a positive light for its early role the in fighting in Abyei, portraying them as saving lives, protecting NGO workers and some of the local population while taking fire. Only later, when the heavy fighting started, did UNMIS withdraw to its camp. UNMIS itself has not done a very good job of publicizing its positive early role saving lives in the conflict, and continues to take criticism even from DPKO and the SYG for not intervening to protect property during the heavy fighting. Our view in Khartoum is that the current UNMIS forces in Abyei lack the capacity to intervene aggressively in the face of heavy artillery, though could have done more to prevent looting rather than hunkering down following the heavy fighting. UNMIS believes that it does not have the mandate to protect property, as reported in ref C, and this should be clarified and examined carefully. It would seem to us that UNMIS peacekeepers and police could be called on to do more to protect property - especially from looting - but this should be directed from NY as UNMIS leadership is not aggressive enough to interpret its current mandate in this way. FERNANDEZ