UN, AU ENVOYS PROVIDE UPDATE ON PEACE PROCESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000095 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD SUBJECT: UN, AU ENVOYS PROVIDE UPDATE ON PEACE PROCESS REF: KHARTOUM 074 ¶1. (SBU) Briefing the Khartoum diplomatic corps on January 18, UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy for Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim said that increased tensions between Sudan and Chad posed the greatest risk to the political process at present. They remarked that without an end to the Chad-Sudan proxy war there can never be real peace in Darfur. "This is a major concern," said Eliasson, "and there must be a decrease in tensions to create an environment for talks." He also posited a link between the decline in Sudanese-Chadian relations and the Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) increasing military activity and unwillingness to engage in the peace process. The Envoys called on the international community to use its influence to resolve the standoff. The French Ambassador stated that "my authorities--at the highest level--are appealing to Sudan and to Chad to exercise restraint, come back to dialogue, and adhere to the Tripoli agreement." -------------- Regional Meeting, Arusha II in Six Weeks -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Eliasson and Salim suggested that the UN/AU will hold a meeting of regional governments (Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Sudan) in N'djamena within the next six weeks, followed by an "Arusha II" type meeting to prepare Darfur's fractured rebel movements for "substantive talks." They asserted that the rebel movements had consolidated into five clear groupings: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) affiliated with Abdulwahid al Nur; SLA/Unity led by Suleiman Jamous, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia; JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim; the United Revolutionary Front (URF) based around the JEM/Collective Leadership; and the SLA affiliated with Ahmed Abdulshafie. Salim said that the mediation "will not tolerate" new groups beyond the "existing five." The two envoys praised and embraced the efforts of the SPLM in helping to unite some of the rebel factions (an initiative that both envoys sniped at and tried to sabotage over the past months). They noted that Abdulsafie is still very skittish about negotiations. -------------- Opening from Abdulwahid? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) During the envoys four-day trip--which included stops in Darfur and Southern Sudan--SLA/Unity pledged to attend an "Arusha II" gathering and both SLA/Unity and the URF expressed "their absolute full support for the process," according to Eliasson. In addition, the envoys were surprisingly optimistic about the potential for SLA/Abdulwahid to participate in the political track, characterizing a meeting with Abdulwahid commanders in Jebel Marra as "the most impressive opening" of their visit. They attributed some of the progress in the dialogue with SLA/Abdulwahid to the decision to have UNAMID Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai travel with their delegation in Darfur to explain how the peacekeeping force plans to address Abdulwahid's concerns about security in the region. (Note: In press reports from January 19-21, Abdulwahid denied any opening to the mediation, reiterating his demands that a UN peacekeeping force must be fully deployed before negotiations begin. End note.) -------------- Envoys' Action on UNAMID -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Responding to a question from CDA Fernandez, Eliasson said that, in meeting with Sudanese officials, he had underscored the importance of an effective peacekeeping force to monitor an eventual cessation of hostilities. He had "warned the Government" of the danger of hand-picking troop contributors by nationality, noting that the rebel movements were making similar demands. The Envoys felt that some of these issues could be resolved at a possible Ban-Bashir meeting at the margins of the upcoming AU Summit. While appealing to the international community to meet the UN's request for helicopters, the envoys explained that the peace process could not wait for full deployment of UNAMID. "We must push forward on both tracks, even if one or the other is slowed," said Eliasson. -------------- "Difficulties" on Civil Society -------------- KHARTOUM 00000095 002 OF 002 ¶5. (SBU) The Envoys acknowledged that they were confronting "difficulties" in finding a formula for civil society and IDPs to be represented in the peace process but said they had instructed UNAMID civil affairs to begin outreach to these groups. Cautioning that a focus on Arab tribes risked "exaggerating or exacerbating the ethnic divide," they nonetheless claimed that they had had "intensive contacts" with Arab leaders. Salim said that it was the "serious responsibility" of the Sudanese Government and the rebel movements to include Arab voices in the process. They suggested that IDPs could be more easily incorporated once Abdulwahid is on board with the upcoming talks. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (SBU) This briefing by the two Special Envoys seemed a bit too rosy and surreal for us. There appears to be no defined division of labor among UNAMID civil affairs, the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) that supports Eliasson and Salim, or the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) to execute an effective strategy for civil society outreach in support of the peace process nor any indication that these three bodies have made progress on this issue in preparation for negotiations. There also seems to be too wide of a disconnect still between UNAMID implementation and the peace talks. A clear strategy will be critical to moving the process forward, as will establishing dates for the next steps in the process--with plenty of advance notice--so that the international community may begin pressing the parties to attend. End comment. FERNANDEZ