EMBASSY KHARTOUM RESPONSE ON ABYEI NEXT STEPS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000936 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL EAID SOCI UNSC AU SU SUBJECT: EMBASSY KHARTOUM RESPONSE ON ABYEI NEXT STEPS REF: STATE 66284 ¶1. (U) This message responds to reftel request for post views on next steps to support implementation of the Abyei Roadmap. Responses are keyed to the questions posed in para. 12 of reftel. Provision of U.S. Legal Advisor - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Post strongly supports the provision of a USG legal advisor to assist in developing Terms of Reference (TOR) and for other issues related to Abyei boundary arbitration. By sending a lawyer to assist the parties as necessary, the State Department shows that the US is committed to assisting the parties on this issue. The SPLM especially would appreciate the legal advice, and meetings with both parties should help continue momentum and build confidence. This individual should coordinate closely with similar experts offered by the Netherlands and UK. Increased Military Support - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) are woefully short in just about every category necessary for them to become fully operational. The GoS is funding only 40% of the JIU's budget, enough to pay salaries and little else. The JIUs lack the most basic infrastructure and equipment. For example, many JIUs are forced to draw water from public wells in neighboring villages, a situation that in the past has led to violent clashes between JIU soldiers and civilians. JIUs also lack adequate housing, transport, and communications equipment, among other things. Until these basic needs are addressed, the JIUs are unable even to begin to address their envisioned mission. ¶4. (SBU) The GOS should be pushed to more fully support the JIUs. In addition, UNMIS created the "JIU support cell" to seek support from donors with material for the JIUs. The JIU support cell has been inactive recently, and should be revitalized. The US should be creative and identify some areas of tangible support despite our sanctions, otherwise we cannot credibly provide leadership in this area. Other donors can be encouraged to provide additional support and it would be worth following up with capitals (London and The Hague have been particularly forward leaning) to check on what support was actually provided to the JIUs. UNMIS Mandate Review �00A;- - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) In a meeting with emboffs on June 22, UNMIS Force Commander General Thapa described the UNMIS mandate as "protection of civilians without jeopardizing the authority of the GoS," in accordance with the authorizing UNSCR and the CPA. This mandate does not include protection of property, according to Thapa. Thapa told emboffs that, following the fighting in Abyei, UNMIS offered to assist the SAF in stopping looting and vandalism, but was told that the SAF already was taking action and did not require assistance. Thus, UNMIS appears to have felt itself constrained from intervening in the Abyei situation both by the perceived lack of authority to protect property and by the prohibition against undermining GoS authority. ¶6. (SBU) UNMIS lack of assertiveness likely stems as much or more from the risk aversion of the Troop Contributing Countries, as discussed below, as from any lack of formal authority to act. Although it is unrealistic to expect UNMIS to intervene directly when the SAF and SPLA are facing off with tanks and heavy artillery, UNMIS could more clearly define its current rules of engagement, which allow it to fulfill its mandate to protect civilians; UNMIS should communicate clearly to its forces the expectations for how and when to intervene. UNMIS could also better use its existing mandate by increasing the tempo of its patrols in an around Abyei town. In addition, UNMIS could make better use of its existing police mandate to add civilian police and police trainers, which would help to better protect civilians and keep a closer eye on events in Abyei. Evaluation of Current UNMIS Military Leadership - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Newly-arrived UNMIS Force Commander Thapa has been on the job for only about one month, was immediately thrust into a major crisis in Abyei, and still is very much getting a grasp of his command. UNMIS Chief of Staff, Col. Jeremy Drage (UK),also is brand new. Although some have compared General Thapa unfavorably to his charismatic predecessor, General Lidder, we think it is far too early to tell how he will perform once he has become fully acclimated to his assignment and had an opportunity to establish his authority. Although more subdued than Lidder, he so far has showed admirable energy in trying to deal with the Abyei emergency. ¶8. (SBU) A more deeply rooted, structural problem (by no means unique to UNMIS) is the FC's limited ability to assert his command authority over the component sector commanders in the field and direct their operations. The five sector commanders (each of a different nationality) are naturally more responsive to the guidance they receive from their capitals than to the FC's instructions. Even the dynamic General Lidder had difficulty motivating his sector commanders to be more proactive. The actions of the sector commanders will be governed/constrained more by the priorities set by their home governments, which have been in the past and are likely to remain risk averse. This UN peacekeeper mentality is not unique to Sudan. Support to Abyei - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) It remains to be seen whether the two parties have the will to implement the June 8 agreement. Although the JIUs have deployed, their effectiveness is yet to be determined. Already, announcement of the interim administration has been delayed, raising questions as to whether the two parties will be able to overcome their previous differences and implement the Roadmap. In the short term, continued humanitarian assistance to the IDPs is critical. Rapidly putting in place the JIUs, integrated police, and interim administration are the primary requirements to successfully implement the Roadmap; therefore support to moveg>Stted through local leaders on both sides. There is a need to keep aggrieved Misseriya busy with some development projects and at least the appearance of evenhandedness. ¶10. (SBU) If the Roadmap is implemented, the interim administration will have access to significant oil revenues. Therefore, support for the interim administration's technical capacity to assure that resources are used efficiently, transparently, and accountably will be more useful than direct infrastructure support. In this regard, the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities will also soon start receiving their 2% of the oil revenues, and it is not yet clear who will receive, manage, and allocate these funds for projects. There are likely to be significant capacity issues in this regard, and the USG could assist these communities in the same way that it is assisting the GOSS with financial and administrative capacity. If the agreement is not implemented, the risk of a return to conflict is high and money spent on infrastructure support could have been wasted. At the same time, some early tangible deliverables from the international community can help calm tensions and lower the rhetoric between two polarized communities while the mechanism for sharing oil revenues and the mechanics of arbitration are worked out. FERNANDEZ