CHIEF MEDIATOR DESPERATELY NEEDED AS UN/AU MEDIATION TEAM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000931 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU SUBJECT: CHIEF MEDIATOR DESPERATELY NEEDED AS UN/AU MEDIATION TEAM BECOMES NONEXISTENT ¶1. This is an action cable, see para 13. ¶2. (U) SUMMARY: On June 22, the political director of the UN/AU's Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST),Muin Shrim, told poloffs that they are "back to square one" in the search for a joint mediator, and that by August only a couple of its current staff (of approximately 10 individuals) will still be with the JMST. Shrim also gave a detailed analysis of the power dynamic of Darfur's major rebel groups following the JMST's failure to secure their participation in their May security consultations. END SUMMARY. NO CHIEF MEDIATOR - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Shrim stated that the last candidate for the position, Mr. Ablasse Ouedraogo of the African Development Bank, was vetoed by the African Union. According to JMST political officer, Amy Scott, although Ouedraogo participated in the negotiations for the Darfur Peace Agreement, he was not an effective force in Abuja. "I don't think anyone will be shedding any tears that he was not selected for the position," stated Scott. Shrim added that given the length of the search and the state of the peace process, "we need someone who is not just mediocre, but is excellent." Shrim stated that he personally believes that although the term of UN's special envoy Jan Eliasson is coming to an end on June 30, that Eliasson will want to extend for another year. "If there is a chief mediator, you might be able to push Eliasson out, but until someone fills that vacuum UNAMID may be compelled to re-hire him," stated Shrim. Shrim stated that one reason the process has slowed to a standstill is because multiple offices in the UN and AU have a hand in the selection process including the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Office of the Secretary General and "names are constantly being added and deleted." ¶4. (SBU) Polcouns inquired why this hiring process has taken so long - whether it was due to bureaucracy or because no one actually wants the job. Shrim and Scott stated that some ideal candidates have viewed the position as a "poisoned chalice" as there is "no opening for progress right now in Darfur." Shrim also stated that the criteria used for hiring appear to be faulty, as most of the candidates proposed for the position appear to be at the end of their careers. "They look for a totally accomplished person who, after he or she is selected, realizes that they do not want to end their careers on a bad note," stated Shrim. Shrim suggested that the selection committees should focus their efforts on mid-career individuals, "who have accomplished something, but still have something to gain." JMST GUTTED - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) Shrim stated that as of July 1, he will take over as UNMIS's head of Political Affairs. He said that the JMST has lost several officers already and at least four other members of the JMST will rotate out of their positions by the end of August, leaving only one or two existing staff members in place at the JMST. Muin said that they have been reluctant to focus on new hiring, as they have assumed that the new chief mediator would bring some of his own staff with him, and would want to build his own team. FAILURE TO BRING JEM AND SLA/AW TO NEGOTIATIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Shrim stated that although the mercurial rebel leader previously agreed to attend security consultations, Abdul Wahid Nur changed his mind and refused to participate just a few days before the start of the JMST-led security consultations. According to Shrim, Nur stated that "a minimum level of security in Darfur" is a precondition for his participation in negotiations. This minimum level of security, according to Nur, now includes: 1) full deployment of UNAMID, 2) disarming the janjaweed and Arab militia 3) removal of settlers from lands belonging to IDPs and refugees 4) the safe return of IDPs. (Comment: That this level of progress would mean that the Darfur is at peace - obviating the need for an agreement - shows how entirely unrealistic Abbul Wahid's demands are. End comment.) SLA/AW FIELD OFFICERS FORM COMMMITTEE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Shrim stated that following Nur's reversal, SLA/AW field commanders felt angry, as they also agreed to participate and were not consulted prior to Abdul Wahid's change of mind. Shrim stated that these field commanders have since organized themselves, forming a joint leadership committee. Shrim stated this council may "soften Abdul Wahid and make him more rational- no one can challenge him individually, but collectively it might be possible to get some other voices at the table." Shrim stated that this new SLA/AW leadership council was one of the few promising things that came out of the failed Geneva meeting. According to Shrim, the GoS is not KHARTOUM 00000931 002 OF 003 concerned about Abdul Wahid's movement. "The Sudanese Government has isolated SLA/AW. They may have the support of the IDPs and Fur, but they are not a threat to the GoS from Jebel Marra," stated Shrim. ¶8. (SBU) Shrim relayed that he told Abdul Wahid that his refusal to participate is unrealistic, as he cannot wait two years for UNAMID to completely deploy to meet his "minimum security requirements." Shrim stated that he told SLA/AW that the Zaghawa are taking over Darfur and that the tendency will be to negotiate with whichever group is ready. "We told SLA/AW, 'we did a u-turn for you and changed our entire course to focus on security as that is a top priority for you, and then you failed to show up. The Zaghawa are ready to negotiate and you will be left out," said Shrim. "SLA/UNITY IS WELL PLACED" - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Shrim suggested that many prominent Zaghawa groups are ready to negotiate, including SLA/Unity and the United Resistance Front. Shrim stated that SLM/Unity is "well positioned" and has a good relationship with JEM, many Arab movements, and external actors such as Libya and Eritrea.) Shrim stated that SLM Unity's Abdalla Yaya, Suliman Jamous, and Sharif Harir are all "really ready" to talk more. Shrim stated that he would be traveling to London on June 26 to meet with JEM leaders residing there to "discuss in detail what they would like to see in a peace deal." "WHERE IS THIS GOING?" - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) In response to this bleak outlook, Polcouns questioned where the peace process is going and whether it would be better for the UN/AU to "bless a deal brokered by another party." Shrim stated that "side deals will not work." He said that UNAMID deployment, increased security, and an empowered group of field commanders may give SLA/AW more credibility. He said that the GoS is only worried about JEM and is sincerely interested in a cessation of hostilities with the Zaghawas. Shrim stated that one approach would be to focus on bringing the Zaghawas to the table, focusing first on JEM and SLA/Unity, and later the URF. He said that if these Zaghawa groups were convinced to come to the table, then SLA/AW would be forced to participate as well. INFLUENCE OF LIBYA AND CHAD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) Shrim stated that while Eritrea has less influence in Darfur, Chad and Libya continue to influence the region. He said that Chad and Libya support "Unity, JEM, URF - pretty much everyone" with money, cars, and weapons and allow access to their territory for supply, training, and planning. Shrim stated that it was "anyone's guess" what Libya's goal is in Darfur, except that it wants a hand in events along its border, and also wants a weak neighbor along its border. Shrim opined that Qaddafi is not personally involved in supporting the rebels, but that the head of military intelligence, Abdallah Senussi, is the major player. ROAD AHEAD - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Shrim stated that the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (cHD) has secured the participation of all major rebel groups for a July 11 meeting in Geneva. The meeting will focus on humanitarian issues and, although JMST will not lead the session, JMST will attend. Shrim stated that there was internal debate within the JMST as to whether to give (cHD) permission to hold the session "as it looks bad when they are able to pull the rebels together and we are not." Shrim also expressed concern that it is jumping ahead to discuss humanitarian activities without a cessation of hostilities. Shrim stated that he has also come to doubt the usefulness of large meetings such as this. Shrim stated that the JMST has used too much time trying to secure rebel participation in meetings outside of Sudan, and that it now realizes that it should have focused on shuttle diplomacy dealing with substantive issues. Shrim emphasized that this shuttle diplomacy is almost impossible with the current configuration of the JMST (with the joint special envoys) "as you need someone who can get up and go very quickly with a smaller staff and make decisions quickly." Shrim emphasized that this single mediator will also be able to build relationships with the parties more effectively and see through many of the movements' lies and disinformation. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The JMST has become practically nonexistent and long before that it became inert. The UN/AU needs a single chief mediator now and the U.S. should assert pressure at all levels and departments of the USUN and AU to appoint a mediator with a support team by August 1. Shrim is right - the JMST needs an energetic, innovative, and accomplished (though not necessarily an elder) KHARTOUM 00000931 003 OF 003 diplomat and the UN and AU should widen their search immediately. Given the delay and inaction at this point by JMST, we believe a younger, aggressive, Arabic-speaking diplomat (preferably NOT from the Arab world) who could shake up both JMST and the UN/AU from their stupor would be appropriate. That will be a tall order and then whoever is identified will have to run the gauntlet of interested parties. Just as the Friends of UNAMID put a full court press on UNAMID deployment, so too should the U.S. lead the effort in finding an appropriate candidate for the crucial position of the chief mediator. The Embassy welcomes recommendations to pass to JMST for appropriate candidates for the position of the US/AU chief negotiator but the main obstacles seem to be in New York and Addis. USUN and the U.S. Mission to the AU should also receive these suggestions, and subsequently underscore the dire and immediate need for filling this crucial position to their appropriate counterparts. FERNANDEZ