SHORTLEY MEETINGS WITH GOSS/SPLA ON LRA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000915 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS SU CG CT UG SUBJECT: SHORTLEY MEETINGS WITH GOSS/SPLA ON LRA REF: Khartoum 863 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: "Dove" Vice President and Juba Peace Talks Mediator Riek Machar and military pragmatist SPLA Chief of Staff General Oyai Deng Ajak provided AF Senior Advisor Shortley with nuanced and occasionally differing viewpoints on how to deal with the LRA question following fresh LRA activity in Sudan's South. Both stressed borders as a constraint on future joint operations by Uganda, Sudan, and Congo against the LRA. Machar believes capitals should be responsible for military action within their own borders, whereas Ajak contends that Kinshasa should be pressed to permit SPLA forces to pursue LRA forces into Congo as necessary. Machar shared the Mediation report issued at the close of the Juba Peace Talks, and endorsed the USG position that there be no "Juba Two." Machar believes that release of the Mediator's report will isolate hard-line LRA diaspora, who continue to encourage Kony to resist signing the FPA. The SPLA remains committed to support Congo in whatever future military plans it develops for use against the LRA. However, the Vice President and the SPLA Chief of Staff did agree that should LRA continue to terrorize or attack civilians in Sudan, the SPLA would take action to neutralize Kony's militia threat in the South. END SUMMARY. -------------- VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On June 16 Senior Advisor to AF Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley, along with Acting Consul General Juba, met separately with the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of Staff General Oyai Deng Ajak to discuss recent developments involving the Lord's Resistance Army. Machar handed SA Shortley a letter for A/S Frazer with an attachment entitled the 'Report and Recommendations of the Chief Mediator of the Peace Process between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army.' (Text of the Executive Summary attached in paragraph 11.) Machar remarked that he had just finished a press conference announcing the GoSS position and distributing the report. ¶3. (SBU) Machar believes that the release of the Mediator's report will isolate hard-line LRA diaspora who continue to encourage Kony's resistance to signing the FPA. In the meantime, Machar will continue to encourage Kony's three confidantes - Yesuf Adek, Willy Oryem and Lebaije to meet and convince Kony to sign the agreement. Machar noted that per President Kiir's Southern Sudan Defense Council June 7 decree, the SPLA will have sole responsibility for protection and defense of South Sudan. ¶4. (SBU) Shortley thanked the VP and stated that the Department would outline the U.S. position in a statement that same day: (1) the Final Peace Agreement successfully concluded the work of the Juba peace process; (2) the Agreement is available for Kony's signature; (3) Juba negotiations are over and that there is no further need for additional LRA delegations (4) the U.S. prefers direct contact between the GoU and Kony; and (5) the Agreement should be implemented. Shortley stressed that the U.S. supports regional coordination efforts to protect innocent civilians and to contain and ultimately dismantle the LRA. ¶5. (SBU) VP Machar welcomed the U.S. position, noting its similarity to that of the GoSS. He agreed there will be no Juba II, that he would not entertain further delegations and that he was too busy with matters related to Sudan's own Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to devote more time to the LRA. Shortley noted that the GoU is unilaterally implementing the FPA. Machar responded that he would support the creation of the Joint Liaison Group. Shortley countered that the U.S. and GoU were opposed to the JLG without obtaining Kony's signature and disbanding the LRA. Machar noted that he could accept the U.S. position over time. The Vice President agreed that current accommodations to the LRA were not open-ended. ¶6. (SBU) Machar continued, however, that the GoSS will not be dragged into fighting the LRA in Congo, but will share intelligence, protect its population and defend its border. Machar noted that the LRA assembly area does not include all of Garamba Park. While emphasizing political constraints on military operations outside national borders, he supported regional coordination to contain to the LRA in Garamba and create conditions to exacerbate internal divisions. Machar concluded that the international community should support countries affected by the LRA through intelligence sharing and logistics. Machar noted that elite or specialized forces are required to defeat the LRA, but made clear he preferred a political solution. -------------- KHARTOUM 00000915 002 OF 002 General Oyai Deng Ajak -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Shortley extended condolences to Chief of Staff Ajak for the losses in Nabanga on June 5. The General reviewed the events of that day (reftel),but added that the combination of the June 2 Kampala statement on proposed military action and LRA paranoia about routine SPLA patrols in Rikwamba prompted the attack. He asserted that the public statement following the Kampala regional coordination meeting was a mistake. ¶8. (SBU) Ajak was more open than was Machar to joint operations and coordination between Congo, Uganda and the SPLA. He referred to these as integrated mobile units that could move around and fight the LRA. Ajak noted that more must be done to make the Congolese less suspicious of foreign troops and stressed the strategic importance of "hot pursuit." It would do no good to drive the LRA into Congo if the Congolese army is unable to neutralize the threat. Ajak stressed the weak relations between Kinshasa and SPLA/GoSS, despite the June 14 opening of the GoSS liaison office in Kinshasa. ¶9. (SBU) Ajak said that SPLA forces are currently moving into Western Equatoria State and would also support Congolese efforts through a joint coordination cell in Dungu, Congo and Yambio, Sudan. Ajak noted, however, that since the attack at Nabanga, LRA forces have moved away from the Sudan border and toward the Congolese interior. Ajak criticized the Kampala plan which called for three battalions. Instead Ajak asserted that two brigades are required - one protecting the populations affected and one in hot pursuit. In response to attacks over the weekend, the SPLA deployed units in six locations along the Juba-Nimule road, Southern Sudan's largest commercial corridor. ¶10. (SBU) In Ajak's opinion, Kony is not interested in peace or signing the peace deal, and the international community should actively support the LRA's containment and neutralization. Ajak emphasized that the U.S. could play a critical role through intelligence sharing, transport, and logistics support. Ajak also requested that the U.S. approach President Kabila on the potential need to pursue the LRA into Congo in "hot pursuit." ¶11. (U) BEGIN TEXT: The Mediator considers that the agreements signed in Juba are sound and legally valid and deserve to be implemented in full. In view of the failure of the LRA leadership to sign the Final Peace Agreement, the Mediator has recommended an interim period within which four key activities would be undertaken: Firstly, despite the failure of General Joseph Kony, the LRA leader, to sign the Final Peace Agreement, the GoSS will continue engagement with the LRA to persuade its leadership to sign and implement in full the Final Peace Agreement. Secondly, the Mediator proposes that some elements of the agreements signed in Juba should begin to be implemented immediately, in good faith, pending signature of the FPA. These agreements provide for important interventions, including social and economic provisions for the benefits of war-affected communities, who deserve those benefits now. Thirdly, the Mediator proposes to retain some of the institutions and administrative mechanisms established during the juba peace talks. This includes the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team, and the oversight functions of the office of the Mediator. Lastly, in view of the financial implications of continuing with limited activities under the peace process, the Mediator calls upon the international community to continue to support for the search for attaining sustainable peace in the region. The Juba Peace Process moves on. The Mediator is determined to work with Ugandan community leaders and all regional and international supporters to persuade the LRA to return to the implementation process. He is confident that these efforts will bear fruit and lead to a lasting settlement for this long and painful conflict. FERNANDEZ