SUDAN: NARROW WINDOW FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM CHARGE
FERNANDEZ, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PTER UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: NARROW WINDOW FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES

REF: A. KHARTOUM 44

B. 07 KHARTOUM 1051

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) After seven years of intense diplomatic focus, U.S.
efforts to secure a peaceful, stable, and transformed Sudan
have accomplished much - ended the bloodiest and longest
running civil war on the continent, saved several million
Darfuri Sudanese who rely on US humanitarian assistance,
pushed through a crucial UN resolution on Darfur in 2007 -
but US policy objectives still face obstacles on myriad
fronts. The country's ethnic diversity, geographic position
in a volatile region, and political culture will always
present a challenge to Western engagement. However, the U.S.
has a probably a six month window before the American general
election in November to lay the foundation for definitively
ending the turmoil in Darfur, alleviating major obstacles to
humanitarian operations, solidifying the country's unity, and
securing the path toward a more pluralistic and democratic
Sudan. To meet these policy goals within this timeframe, we
should concentrate our efforts on four diplomatic objectives:
full and expedited deployment of an effective peacekeeping
force in Darfur, compliance with the 2007 Joint Communique on
Humanitarian Activities, resolution of the Abyei dispute, and
establishment of electoral mechanisms to meet the timeline of
the CPA. Unless the U.S. is willing to take an even more
belligerent stance toward Khartoum that edges on forced
regime change, establishing an incremental framework of
incentives for changing the trajectory of the bilateral
relationship is the only real avenue now open to achieve our
objectives. End summary.

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Changing the U.S.-Sudan Trajectory
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2. (C) While reaching our policy goals in Sudan will require
sophisticated diplomatic effort on a variety of fronts, none
can be achieved without a change in the trajectory of the
Washington-Khartoum relationship. The acrimony that now
afflicts bilateral relations leaves us with little direct
leverage over the National Congress Party (NCP)-dominated
regime and curtails our ability to influence events.
Khartoum has even recently threatened to terminate
counter-terrorism cooperation--the fundamental aspect of our
relationship--unless bilateral relations improve (reftel a).
Many in the regime seem to now believe that the United States
cannot deliver - neither on its threats nor on any tangible
incentives to improve the relationship. Shifting the regime's
calculations toward supporting our policy aims will require
adept U.S. leadership that combines a calibrated and
realistic package of incentives for the GOS to meet critical
benchmarks on Darfur and the CPA, and greater diplomatic
coordination with Khartoum's economic partners. The U.S.
must be prepared to offer incentives that are of interest to
the GOS, and must be prepared to deliver on these promises
despite the domestic political cost, if it hopes to affect
the relationship in order to achieve our policy objectives.
If the objectives and incentives are well-calibrated and the
tangible objectives are mostly achieved, the incentives
should be defensible to the American public.


3. (C) The U.S. probably has a six-month window before the
American general election in November to develop a framework
for adjusting the bilateral relationship in furtherance of
our policy objectives. S/E Williamson's first trip to Sudan
presents an opportunity to inaugurate this effort.
Khartoum's mantra is that the U.S. has backtracked on
promises to improve relations in exchange for the NCP's
support for the CPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
U.S. interlocutors must immediately re-establish credibility
with key regime figures and move the relationship from one
characterized by mutual recrimination to one based on
incremental deliverables by each side. U.S. incentives must
be sequenced to GOS cooperation on four key diplomatic
objectives: full and unambiguous deployment of the UN-AU
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),tangible improvement of
humanitarian access, real resolution of the Abyei dispute,
and establishment of effective electoral mechanisms
stipulated in the CPA.

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Benchmark: UNAMID Deployment
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4. (C) Achieving a lasting political settlement for Darfur
that ends the recurring cycle of violence requires a more
stable security environment. Deployment of an effective
UNAMID force is the cornerstone of this goal, although UNAMID
alone cannot bring peace to Darfur absent a political
settlement between the fractious rebel movements and the
Sudanese Government. The GOS's obligations to facilitate
this deployment can be distilled to five targets: 1) Agree to
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that meets UN standards;
2) Allocate land for UNAMID facilities that meet UN
standards; 3) Accept the troop contributions proposed by the
UN, irrespective of nationality (while maintaining the
African preponderance of the force); 4) Permit UNAMID forces
unobstructed access in Darfur, including night flights, as
stipulated in the DPA and, by implication, in UN Security
Council Resolution 1769, and 5) streamline visa,customs and
other bureaucratic processes for UNAMID. The GOS must commit
to meeting these targets and follow through expeditiously.
These are, of course, steps the Sudanese regime has committed
to undertaking to one extent or another and then not
resolved.

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Benchmark: Humanitarian Access
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5. (C) The March 2007 Joint Communique between the Government
of Sudan and the UN set out guidelines for bureaucratic
procedures for international humanitarian operations in
Darfur and established a high level committee to monitor the
Government and the international community's obligations in
the Communique. While the majority of international
humanitarian organizations acknowledge that the Joint
Communique has eased bureaucratic obstacles to some degree,
the Government has not adhered to many of its stipulations.
In addition, the Government's delay in extending the
moratorium on humanitarian restrictions, expected to be
announced on January 23 during the next high level committee
meeting, means that approximately 13,000 humanitarian workers
will be out of status on February 1 until their visas and
residency permits can be re-issued. (Note: As reported
septel, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs has promised the
moratorium will be extended but has yet to obtain approval
from President Bashir. End Note.) Humanitarian organizations
also continue to confront local bureaucracies that do not
adhere to the provisions of the Communique. By the end of
February, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) is expected to assess the Government's
compliance with the Communique since March. The GOS must
accept OCHA's assessment and take the necessary actions to
address the lapses in compliance at both the federal and
local level. The USG should encourage an unvarnished
analysis by the UN/OCHA of the shortcomings in humanitarian
access and press for full Sudanese compliance.

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Benchmark: Abyei Resolution
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6. (C) Negotiations on the CPA were almost derailed until
then-Special Envoy Danforth devised the December 2004 Abyei
Protocol establishing the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC).
The NCP has rejected the Commission's findings outright--in
the words of President Bashir "they (the international
community) can take the ABC report and choke on it." The NCP
asserts that the ABC experts exceeded their mandate by
ignoring the issue of the 1905 borders of the Ngok Dinka. An
acceptable compromise solution will have to resolve the basic
concerns about oil wealth and land rights, not just borders
and local administration. The NCP must demonstrate that it
is willing to engage in sincere negotiations with the SPLM on
the root causes of the Abyei dispute and be willing to
compromise. One possible solution would be to develop a
formula for exchanging oil for land. While some SPLM
officials are optimistic about progress on Abyei in recent
weeks, we are less sanguine.

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Benchmark: Electoral Mechanisms
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7. (C) After several delays caused by the regime's
unwillingness to provide funding and the Government of
Southern Sudan's (GoSS) lack of capacity to complete
geographic mapping, the national census is now scheduled for
late April. Despite insecurity in Darfur, which may delay or
prevent a census in that region, the GOS must facilitate the
census as scheduled in the remainder of the country. In
order to allow sufficient time for elections preparation
before the July 9, 2009 deadline in the CPA, the GOS must
also ensure the passage of a robust elections law meeting
international standards by April 2008, and the Presidency
must soon thereafter appoint a non-partisan nine-member
National Electoral Commission. Finally, the GOS must accept
the work of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to provide
guidance and technical assistance for the elections as
outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and openly
accept early and widespread monitoring by international
organizations and NGOs, include American organizations such
as NDI and IRI.

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The Incentives
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8. (C) An incremental framework for changing the trajectory
of the U.S.-Sudan relationship will need to carefully and
clearly link GOS efforts to meeting the four U.S. policy
objectives above with reciprocal U.S. actions. Khartoum has
been consistent in its definition of "improved relations:"
removal of Sudan from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of
Terrorism; meetings in Washington between senior Sudanese
(really, NCP) officials and senior Bush Administration
officials, elevation of the U.S. and Sudanese senior
diplomatic representatives in Khartoum and Washington from
Charge d'Affaires to Ambassador; establishment of a realistic
timeline for the repeal of economic sanctions based on
Sudanese responses; and expedited release of Sudanese
detainees in Guantanamo Bay. We will need to determine the
precise link between these possible incentives and our
demands on Khartoum and articulate these linkages to the
regime in exact terms. Removal of Sudan from the U.S. list
of State Sponsors of Terrorism may well be a Sudanese
prerequisite for continued cooperation on counterterrorism
according to the NISS.


9. (C) The U.S. should enlist Khartoum's allies in the
diplomatic strategy to re-orient the bilateral relationship
and achieve our policy objectives in Sudan. In the near
term, we should outline for Sudan's major economic
partners--China, India, Malaysia, and the Arab world--the
strategic linkages between U.S. objectives and U.S.
incentives. European countries like Germany have also paid
lipservice to human rights concerns in Sudan while continuing
to enjoy the fruits of Sudan's petroleum-induced largesse.
These influential capitals can underscore to Khartoum that a
(limited) opportunity exists to adjust relations with the
U.S. if the GOS is willing to clearly meet the four
benchmarks over the next six months. They can also
re-inforce U.S. credibility with the Sudanese Government.


10. (C) Of course, all blame for the delay in UNAMID
deployment, in easing bureaucratic restrictions for
humanitarian operations, in finding a solution to the Abyei
issue, and in adhering to the CPA does not rest at the feet
of the NCP leadership, and we must continue to work in
concert with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),
the disparate political elements in Darfur, the UN, the AU,
and the international community. However, none of the issues
that will determine Sudan's future course can be addressed
without sincere buy-in from the core of the regime, a rogue's
gallery skilled in deception and divided internally by
competing ambitions. Unless the U.S. is willing to take a
more belligerent stance toward Khartoum--advocacy of regime
change, military support for the SPLM or the Darfur rebels in
a confrontation with Khartoum, etc.--introducing incentives
into the relationship is the only avenue now open for
achieving our policy objectives. If we do decide to seriously
consider an incentive package for the regime, we should, of
course, not discount the possibility of a more
confrontational stance with Khartoum as an added enducement.
But both our threats and our blandishments should be real
ones.

FERNANDEZ