ABDUL WAHID'S KHARTOUM REP DISCUSSES MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000893 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU SUBJECT: ABDUL WAHID'S KHARTOUM REP DISCUSSES MILITARY STRENGTH AND INTERNAL ORGANIZATION REF: KHARTOUM 476 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY In a discrete June 12 meeting with poloff, the head of SLA-Abdul Wahid's Khartoum's office boasted of Abdul Wahid's military strength, extensive and multi-layered organization throughout Sudan, and overall popularity in Darfur. He also strongly criticized UNAMID, Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, and the JMST's preparation and consultation with rebel groups prior to its canceled May 29 Geneva meeting. END SUMMARY BIO NOTE - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Gafar Ahmed Adam (aka "Turboosh") is the head of SLM-Abdul Wahid's semi-secret office in Khartoum, and the political-military liaison for SLA-AW. He claimed to be a cousin of Abdul Wahid, (an assertion bolstered by his strikingly similar appearance to the rebel leader.) Adam stated that he was imprisoned four times from 2004-2007 for a total of 16 months. During the meeting, Adam displayed scars on his legs from what he claimed was torture during his numerous detentions. He is originally from Nertiti (in Jebel Marra) and later studied architectural engineering in Khartoum. He currently works at the Higher Research Center of Khartoum. Adam speaks broken English, and prefers to conduct meetings in Arabic. INITIAL CONTACT AND MEETING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) In a June 9 conversation with a SLA-AW field commander Mohamed Nimr via satphone, poloff asked for contact with SLM-AW representatives in Khartoum. Nimr complied and passed on Adam's name and contact information. After several phone conversations, Adam agreed to meet poloff at a parking lot in central Khartoum. Upon arrival, poloff was met by Adam's affiliate who walked poloff to the sixth floor of Al-In'am, a small nearby hotel rarely frequented and largely unknown by westerners in central Khartoum. Upon meeting Adam stated that the hotel is owned by SLM-AW members and that this is the first direct contact he has had with USG representatives in years. PURPORTED MILITARY STRENGTH - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Adam boasted that SLA-AW has approximately 170,000 "fighters" in its force. Poloff said that these figures appeared unrealistically high, and Adam countered saying that SLA-AW just registered 17,000 new "troops" near Jebel Marra leading to this number. He said that there are now approximately 75,000 troops on or near Jebel Marra, 2,500 in Eritrea, 4,000 in South Sudan, and 1,000 in Kenya, with the remaining fighters dispersed around the country. Adam stated that some of SLA-AW's arsenal comes from SLA-AW raids on GoS bases and stockpiles, but added that "we have other sources too, but I can't tell you everything now." ORGANIZATION - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Adam stated that he needed permission from both Abdul Wahid and senior field commanders in Jebel Marra before he could meet with poloff the week of June 8. Nonetheless, he stated that Abdul Wahid does not completely dictate SLM-AW's policies or future. "He is only similar to a spokesman and he really listens to what his field commanders and advisors tell him," stated Adam. Adam added that SLM-AW has a forty-member high committee which meets every other month. He said the group last met in Jebel Marra in late April and has plans to meet again soon. Adam said that he plans on attending this meeting "despite being closely watched by the Sudanese security." ¶6. (C) Adam stated that due to extensive GoS intelligence and security operations, SLM-AW has two separate structures in Khartoum. SLM-AW has one semi-secret organization in Khartoum run by individuals who have been previously detained and interrogated by the GoS security apparatus. The other organization, according to SLM-AW, is completely "secret" and run by individuals who would never meet with a western official in broad daylight in Khartoum. UNAMID, SPECIAL ENVOYS, AND PEACE PROCESS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Adam stated that he has no confidence in UNAMID or the UN/AU Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim. KHARTOUM 00000893 002 OF 002 "Salim and Jan - they think that the opinion of Darfuris is not important," stated Adam. Adam added that the Tanzanian Salim Ahmed Salim "is an Arab whose favoritism for the regime in Khartoum became apparent in Abuja" and that SLA-AW will reject any meeting where Salim Ahmed Salim is the leader. With respect to Eliasson, he stated that "although he is a more balanced individual, he does not understand the issues of Darfur." Adam stated that he helped Abdul Wahid decide whether to attend the JMST meeting scheduled for May 29 in Geneva (which was subsequently canceled due to JEM's and SLA-AW's decision not to attend.) Adam stated that SLA-AW decided not to attend because "we did not have any details about what was on the agenda or what the meeting would actually accomplish. The Government had access to all the information about the meeting, but we had no idea what we were getting into." (Note: Field Commander Mohammed Nimr previously told poloff by satphone on June 10 that although the field commanders were ready to attend the Geneva meeting, they were overruled by Abdul Wahid. End Note.) JEM AND OTHER REBEL GROUPS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Adam stated that the perception that JEM is the strongest rebel group militarily while SLA-AW carries the popular support of the Fur and many IDPs is incorrect. Adam stated, "SLA-AW has many fighters and is stronger than JEM both in terms of military and popular support." Adam said that JEM did not inform SLA-AW of their plans to attack Omdurman, nor seek coordination with SLA-AW in a joint attack before the May 10 operation. "JEM has an Islamic agenda and only thinks of power in Khartoum, not the people of Darfur," stated Adam. Adam said that other Darfur rebel groups lack focus and are led by selfish, egotistic leaders. COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (C) Adam's numbers of SLA-AW fighters appear ridiculously unrealistic and likely represent the number of young Fur men ready to fight for Abdul Wahid, as opposed to properly trained and equipped guerrilla fighters. However, we have heard from other observers of SLA/AW strength in Jebel Marra, such as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD),that many Fur are armed for defensive purposes to "protect the homeland" even though the SLA/AW is in not currently in a position to conduct offensive maneuvers (mainly because of a significant lack of vehicles). More interesting is Adam's portrayal of Abdul Wahid as a democratic leader, accepting guidance and input from his advisors, and speaking for the voiceless of Darfur. This description was likely crafted for a Western audience and somewhat contradicts that fact that Adam needed clearance from Abdul Wahid himself for a meeting with a political officer. If true, this shows that despite his megalomania and exile in Paris, the wilely Abdul Wahid's authority, internal organization, and communication structure may be stronger than ever. FERNANDEZ