AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SPQL ENVOY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000871 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SPQL ENVOY ELIASSON ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a June 1 meeting Special Envoys Williamson and Eliasson compared notes on current circumstances complicating the path to peace in Darfur. Eliasson highlighted regional aspects of the Darfur crisis, namely the need for the P5 to facilitate normalization of Chad-Sudan relations. Williamson stressed the vulnerability of the Government of Sudan (GoS) as a result of the recent turmoil in Abyei and because of JEM's May 10 advance on Omdurman. Both Envoys were cautiously optimistic that the aftermath of the Abyei crisis could yield positive results for Darfur and agreed to remain in contact ahead of Eliasson's planned briefing to the Security Council during the third week of June under the U.S. Presidency. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Participants: -------------- U.S. -------------- Special Envoy Richard Williamson CDA Roberto Powers Jana Chapman-Gates, SE Senior Advsor Genevieve McKeel, SE Assistant Saira Mohamed, SE Assistant Lt Col Glenn Sadowski, USUN Military Staff Committee Eric Barbee, Embassy Khartoum POLOFF Emily Bruno, El Fasher FieldOff (notetaker). UN-AU -------------- Special Envoy Jan Eliasson Shirin Pakfar, SE Eliasson's Assistant Yasser Sabra, Joint Mediation Support Team Member Muin Shrim, Joint Mediation Support Team Member GOS AND DARFUR MOVMENTS ARE "PLAYING WITH FIRE" -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) In a June 1 meeting in Khartoum with Special Envoy Williamson's visiting delegation, United Nations-African Union Special Envoy Jan Eliasson said a combined, "no-nonsense" analysis of the Darfur situation is necessary at this stage. Eliasson commended Williamson's holistic approach toward addressing Darfur and stressed that the crisis' regional and national aspects have to be considered in the search for a solution at a time when extensive banditry, movement of Chadian rebels across the western border, an overconfident Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),and Sudan Armed Forces military might threaten to turn Darfur into "total disaster within ten days." ¶4. (SBU) Eliasson expressed "deep disappointment" with the JMST's failure to get a security meeting in Geneva off the ground earlier in May. He said that several rebel movements - including Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Unity, United Redemption Front and SLA-Abdulshafie - had agreed to attend but in the end it had been SLA/Abdulwahid and JEM political leadership, ironically for the same reasons, which led to the ultimate cancellation of the meeting (Eliasson noted that SLA/Abdulwahid Field Commanders had been amenable to the meeting). According to Eliasson, both Abdulwahid and JEM chief negotiator Ahmed Tougod had objected to sitting at the same table with "traitors" from other rebel groups, whom they did not consider legitimate. Eliasson added that the GoS had indicated it was ready to talk with JEM on security issues but questioned the GoS' overall commitment to the peace process at this stage. He said that the JMST would continue to consult bilaterally with both JEM and SLA/Abdulwahid in the hopes of achieving some sort of framework peace agreement. ¶5. (SBU) Eliasson on several occasions stressed the need to normalize Chad-Sudan relations in the search for a Darfur solution. He inquired about the role of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council to get this issue on the Council's agenda. Eliasson noted that he had been invited by the U.S. Presidency to brief the Council o/a June 24, following a June 12 stop in Addis Ababa to brief the AU Peace and Security Council. Eliasson remarked that France "could be doing more on Chad and JEM," and he flagged Libya's continued and transparent involvement in stoking the insecurity between the sides. ABYEI WILL TIP DARFUR BALANCE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Special Envoy Williamson explained the GoS' vulnerability in the wake of JEM's May 10 attack on Omdurman, which had revealed the extent of JEM's "inside information" about the GoS military and had emboldened JEM as a result of its minimal losses in the incident. According to Williamson, however, the GoS would not be able to focus on Darfur until the Abyei issue was resolved. KHARTOUM 00000871 002 OF 002 Williamson noted that both the GoS and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) had asked him to mediate on the Abyei issue, and Eliasson encouraged him to do so, calling the chance a "golden opportunity" and agreeing with Williamson that to serve in this capacity would put the USG in a good position to leverage the GoS on the Darfur issue in return. ¶7. (SBU) On the border issue, Special Envoy Williamson indicated the need for the GoS to confront the issue of Chadian involvement with JEM as soon as possible, and he mentioned the possibility of changing UNAMID's mandate to respond to the Chad-Sudan border situation. Williamson noted that France would have to engage more constructively on this issue within the next month, and Special Envoy Eliasson remarked that China, as a veto-wielding UNSC member, would have to be brought on board for any UNSCR 1769 mandate change [NOTE: UNAMID's mandate comes up for renewal on July 31. One of the most contentious issues during negotiations of 1769 in 2007 was that of monitoring the Chad-Sudan border. China was one of the staunchest opponents of such a provision. END NOTE]. ¶8. (SBU) Special Envoy Eliasson noted he would see Foreign Minister Deng, National Intelligence and Security Services Chief Ghosh, and Presidential Advisor Mustafa on June 2, as well as regional partners (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and Libya) in Geneva on June 4. Williamson and Eliasson agreed to remain in close contact in the coming weeks ahead of Eliasson's UNSC appearance. ¶9. (U) This message has been cleared by the Special Envoy's staff. DATTA