DARFUR ZAGHAWA PREDICT ANOTHER REBEL ATTACK ON KHARTOUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000857 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS, DRL DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM MOPS KPKO SOCI UNSC SU SUBJECT: DARFUR ZAGHAWA PREDICT ANOTHER REBEL ATTACK ON KHARTOUM SOON REFS: A. Khartoum 842 ¶B. Khartoum 847 KHARTOUM 00000857 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. While El Fasher Zaghawa report that they have not experienced increased harassment or threats against them since the May 10 attack on Omdurman, they claim that Khartoum-based Zaghawa still are targeted for arbitrary abuse. Despite the repercussions, local Zaghawa civilians support JEM, and expect it to launch another, larger offensive against Khartoum before the Darfur rainy season begins in late June/early July. Other factions are joining JEM, they claimed, and local government officials are too worried about keeping their jobs to alert Khartoum to an impending attack. While the Zaghawa optimism may be exaggerated, local Darfuris nervously point out that the first attack showed that anything can happen, and that JEM has gained rather than lost strength following the May 10 assault. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Retribution Against Zaghawa in Khartoum, Not Darfur - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) In a June 4 meeting, prominent local Zaghawa merchants told FieldOff that although conditions for Zaghawa in Darfur have been difficult since the start of the conflict five years ago, an expected crack down on Zaghawa in Darfur following the May 10 Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) attack on Omdurman has not materialized. Only three or four people have been arrested in Darfur in the past month, they said, which is no more than usual. Addressing reports of economic discrimination in Darfur (ref a),the merchants said that they have not been subject to any specific harassment or threats and are unaware of such incidents in other parts of Darfur. However they did not rule out the possibility, noting that "The GoS cannot see Zaghawa without seeing the [armed rebel] movements." ¶3. (SBU) Instead, they said, the government has turned its attention to the capital, where Zaghawa citizens have paid a heavy price for the JEM attack. In addition to arbitrary arrests and beatings, the El Fasher community leaders claimed that Zaghawa in Khartoum have been, and in some cases are still, subjected to house searches as often as three times per day. Although the searches are undertaken ostensibly in order to find suspects who may be in hiding, in fact the soldiers often use such searches to loot private property and possessions, they charged. The hardest hit population are the merchants who keep shops in Khartoum's Libya Market. There, Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers have harassed and intimidated Zaghawa vendors, forcing them to pay sums of between $15,000 and $20,000 in order to avoid arrest. Many merchants have been bankrupted paying these bribes, they claimed, but those who do not are either arrested or disappear. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Factions Uniting for Attack on Khartoum - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Despite the repercussions, the Zaghawa community remains supportive of JEM's attack. "Finally someone took the war to Khartoum!" one exclaimed triumphantly. The El Fasher merchants, who claimed to be unaffiliated with any armed movement but were clearly supportive of JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, claimed that the May 10 attack on Omdurman had been a "test run." According to these Darfuris, to test the government's response capabilities JEM only had used a small number of troops and trucks to stage the attack. The next attack, which they predicted would occur before the rainy season begins (normally in early July),will be much stronger, partly due to the possible unification of other factions' forces with those of JEM. ¶5. (SBU) In the absence of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, they said that some of the factions who signed the Declaration of Commitment have no choice but to work with JEM, hic can provide salaries, food and other necessities. In addition, JEM has inspired other groups, such as Sudanese Liberation Army/Unity faction, which previously thought that such an attack (on the capital) could never occur, to potentially combine forces in a similar operation. Rebel groups can also count on considerable support on the ground, they claimed, as this time the Darfuris will not allow themselves to be subjected to the retribution of the Khartoum government. "What happened to Zaghawa the first time will not happen again - we will either fight or die!" one declared. ¶6. (SBU) The Zaghawa representatives dismissed suggestions that such an attack could not occur with the GoS at such a heightened state of alert. They said that reports regarding rebel groups and their movements sent from the National Congress Party (NCP) and National KHARTOUM 00000857 002.2 OF 002 Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) functionaries in Darfur to Khartoum are routinely inaccurate. "Everyone is afraid of being fired - they say what Khartoum wants to hear, so that they can keep their positions," one claimed. Geographical distance also hampers communication and information flow, which works in the rebels' favor, they claimed. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶7. (SBU) While Zaghawa optimism is probably exaggerated, JEM's bold attack on Khartoum set a new precedent for Darfur rebel movements. JEM leaders have repeatedly threatened a second attack, and it is at least possible that other factions, fed up with the stalled peace process and nonexistent ceasefire, will join forces, either with the JEM or among themselves, to make a similar run at the capital or, perhaps more likely, other government installations. JEM's support on the ground is stronger than ever, given continued defections from SLA/Minni Minawai fighters and alliances of convenience with other armed factions. With the GoS still knocked off balance by the May 10 surprise attack, the impassable rainy season looming on the horizon, and the GoS' preoccupation with Abyei insecurity, this could present an opportunity for the JEM to cash in on its post-May 10 attack popularity by seeking an opening to again hit a high visibility target, perhaps even including another bid for Khartoum. DATTA