Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM8
2008-01-02 16:46:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DIFFICULTIES PROVIDING EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR CODEL PAYNE

Tags:  OREP ASEC AMGT PGOV PREL KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU KE 
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VZCZCXRO3342
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0008/01 0021646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021646Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9652
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000008 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/PDAS LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD AND AF/SPG

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP ASEC AMGT PGOV PREL KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU KE
ER, SO, CD
SUBJECT: DIFFICULTIES PROVIDING EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR CODEL PAYNE

REF: KHARTOUM 0001

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000008 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/PDAS LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD AND AF/SPG SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OREP ASEC AMGT PGOV PREL KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU KE ER, SO, CD SUBJECT: DIFFICULTIES PROVIDING EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR CODEL PAYNE REF: KHARTOUM 0001 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Even without the need for increased security in the wake of the January 1 attack on an Embassy Khartoum vehicle, resulting in the deaths of an FSN driver and an American USAID officer, post is facing enormous challenges in providing support for the visit of CoDel Payne. This is the result of extremely limited access to information from the CoDel with respect to its itinerary, and considerable pressure that some aspects of the visit not be shared with Sudanese authorities normally responsible for authorizing and coordinating such visits. Given these factors, Post strongly urges that the CODEL be requested to defer travel to Sudan until a later date. In the event that the visit is not postponed, post will do its best with limited resources to support the visit. Aftermath of Shooting: -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum is currently dealing with the security and human resources implications of the January 1 fatal shootings of two USG employees. The entire Mission is in a state of disbelief and grieving the loss of esteemed colleagues. Post is currently `operating through the end of the week with reduced staff performing only essential work. (See Reftel for details) Due to year end holidays, a single RSO is coordinating the security needs of the Mission, and following up with Sudanese police authorities on the shooting deaths. Lack of information: -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Post still has nothing in writing accurately reflecting CoDel Payne's proposed visit. The country clearance request cable (State 170458) is almost completely wrong with regard to the Sudan portion of their trip - arrival/departure dates and times, point of entry/departure, etc. An accurate country clearance is critical for post to fully respond to the proposed visit. Confusion over Guests: -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Only very belatedly were we informed that Rep. Payne is traveling with guests. We first were informed Dec. 31 that the Congressman was traveling with "a guest," so the entire Delegation would stay in a hotel in Juba, as they understood that non-official personnel were prohibited from staying on the AID compound. We then informed the CoDe
l that the guest would be allowed to stay on compound for the Congressman's security and in order to best utilize ConGen Juba's very limited resources (i.e., vehicles, etc.). (Note: Official USG visitors are currently not authorized to stay overnight off the compound for security reasons). It was only then that we were informed that there were in fact two guests - Ms. Mia Farrow (the actress) and her son, Ronan Farrow (aged about 20). The size of delegations is a significant factor, as lodging on the compound is extremely limited, and the required support staff from Khartoum for the visit must also be factored in to the equation (i.e., RSO and control officer). It is worth noting that the delegation has requested that the visit of the Farrow family not be announced. We were instructed that their visit is private, and they want to keep the official and private portions of the visit separate. Unless accommodations are found on the compound for everyone, the delegation has stated that they will all stay in a hotel. This would severely stress our ability to provide security for the CoDel. Problems in communicating with CoDel: -------------- ¶5. (SBU) From the time Embassy was informed of the visit, we have had extremely limited contact with the CoDel point of contact. Until December 31, the contact person (Mr. Ted Dagne) had never answered his cell telephone. Our repeated and urgent answering machine requests that he contact us ASAP usually were unheeded. This situation greatly complicated our task of making preparations. The need for contact was particularly acute since we had no accurate information in writing concerning the visit. Limited Personnel in Juba: -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Given the holiday season, Embassy staffing is extremely reduced in Juba. US ConGen Juba's new CG will arrive December 4, just two days before the scheduled arrival of the CoDel. Currently, there is only one RSO in country, who must devote his efforts to the January 1 shooting incident and the investigation support teams on their way to Khartoum The Juba RSO is on leave. KHARTOUM 00000008 002 OF 002 Visa complications: -------------- ¶8. (SBU) All visitors to Sudan must obtain a valid visa prior to entry. As of January 1, the MFA has not received notification of visa applications having been submitted by the delegation. It appears that the delegation now intends to apply for visas in Asmara or Nairobi. In order to assist with visa issuance, it is critical that the delegation inform post as to where it prefers to collect visas, if approved by the MFA. Under no circumstances should the delegation travel to Sudan without visas. Vague Itinerary: -------------- ¶9. (SBU) We have had extremely limited information about the CoDel's itinerary. Embassy staff did not learn until December 31 that their itinerary was not limited to Juba. In fact, the CoDel also intends to visit Nuba and Boma. In its diplomatic note announcing the visit, post informed the MFA that the delegation intended to visit Juba only. The delegation has requested that their proposed travel outside of Juba not be announced. Mr. Dagne, in support of this request, stated that, given the terms of the CPA, they are not required to inform the GoNU, and that any insistence on informing them amounted to a "violation of sovereignty" of the GoSS. ¶10. (SBU) Post informed Mr. Dagne that it is customary for an Embassy officer to accompany CODELS when they travel in country. Mr. Dagne confirmed that Embassy personnel were welcomed to travel with the delegation. The details of the itinerary have still yet to be identified. ¶11. (SBU) If the visit cannot be deferred, it is critical that the delegation provide forthwith the following to Embassy Khartoum: 1) Precise itinerary with arrival and departure information; 2) Precise information with respect to the members of the delegation; 3) Confirmation that visas have been obtained or information concerning when and where applications were submitted; 4) Information with respect to travel outside of Juba; and 5) An accurate country clearance requesting identifying all members of the delegation. Post will fully support the CODEL visit with it limited resources and will endeavor to ensure that the visit is a success. Failure to provide the above information immediately may jeopardize the CODEL's chances of obtaining visas, which are absolutely required for any visit. POWERS

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