TDRA IN NEED OF REFORM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000793 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPKO SOCI UNSC SU SUBJECT: TDRA IN NEED OF REFORM ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) created the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and the six commissions tasked with implementing the various components of the agreement. In general, the commissions are plagued by poor administration and weak leadership, and characterized by overlap and duplication. The TDRA's partisan agenda, along with its lack of strategic planning capacity, risks undermining the impact of future peace agreement implementation. Outside pressure will likely be required to effect TDRA reform, recommendation in para 8. END SUMMARY. -------------- Administrative Issues -------------- ¶2. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) created the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and the six commissions tasked with implementing the various components of the agreement. The mandates of the commissions are fairly well enumerated in the agreement, and the scope of work of each individual commission is surprisingly narrow. This should have made the commissions more effective by limiting their work to specific activities. However what is clear on paper is less clear in practice, and a lack of experienced leadership and qualified technocrats has led to overlap and considerable duplication. For example, the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission (DRRC) is tasked with creating Property Claims Committees to deal with property disputes that arise from the return process. However the Darfur Land Commission is charged with arbitrating disputes between contending parties over rights to land. In conversations with officials from both commissions, neither displayed an understanding of the distinction between property and land, and neither expressed concern about possible overlaps. ¶3. (SBU) In another instance, officials from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) told FieldOff that they were focused on education, water and sanitation and health. Not two hours later, officials from the DRRC told FieldOff they too were focused on education, water and sanitation and health. When FieldOff noted that those were the exact areas covered by the DRDF, DRRC officials literally stammered, saying "yes, well we will do them in other areas! Like if DRDF is working in the North, we will work in the South!" ¶4. (SBU) The DPA did not address the composition or internal structures of the commissions, leaving such decisions to the TDRA and commissioners. Many of the latter wasted no time creating complicated bureaucracies and bloated payrolls. In general, the commissions are divided into between six and nine directorates. In general, between two and three of those directorates are tasked with nearly identical scopes of work. A claim filed with the Compensation Commission will be "investigated" or "evaluated" by at least three departments, which helps to explain why that body already has 180 employees, according to its executive director. While each commission complained that they had not received the funds promised by the DPA and therefore could not begin their work, every official managed to list the array of properties and office spaces they had leased and furnished without a hint of irony. (Note: One commission, the DRRC, reported that it had received full funding with no delays. Commissioner Ibrahim Madibbo, a Rizeigat, was brought back to Sudan by GoS after 18 years in exile in Saudi Arabia to serve as the head of the commission. Although very few Rizeigat have actually been displaced, making him a less than ideal spokesman for resettlement projects, his strong GoS ties have ensured that this commission is well funded and equipped. End Note) -------------- Partisan Agenda -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The DPA gave the TDRA president the authority to appoint key personnel, including the heads of the commissions. Predictably, these bodies are led by Minni Minawi's cronies, and in some cases, relatives. The impact of this decision on the efficiency of the commissions was noted above. However the effects reach far beyond administrative incompetence. Almost every TDRA official, from the Secretary General on down the chain of command, noted that upon receipt of the DPA money, projects and work would begin in those areas controlled by the Sudanese Liberation Army Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) faction "because those are the most secure areas." (Note: One notable exception to this trend was the administration at the DRDF, which has plans for projects throughout Darfur. End note) With no Inspector General or other auditing or oversight mechanism, it is unclear who will be responsible for ensuring that resources are distributed throughout Darfur, rather than concentrated in SLA/MM enclaves. KHARTOUM 00000793 002 OF 002 -------------- Lack of Vision, Strategic Planning -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The TDRA was created as a temporary body; however, none of the officials appeared to know the operational timeline of their commissions (Note: According to the DPA, a referendum on the status of Darfur should be held by July 2011, after which the TDRA will either transition into a regional government or be dissolved. End note). The purpose of the commissions was to assist Darfuris with the transition from conflict to peace - i.e. to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, coordinate the restoration of security, and promote peace and reconciliation. A large portion of this work legitimately cannot or should not be started in the current environment, given the ongoing violence and insecurity. It would be unrealistic, even unwise, to expect the DRRC to assist with returns while displacement continues, or to expect the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission to begin efforts at disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating fighters when the fighting has not ended. However the commissions have not engaged in strategic planning efforts to prepare for the time when conditions are appropriate for these projects to begin, or for balancing the lofty goals with the short life span of their organizations. There is no planning for dramatic changes in the situation in Darfur, positive or negative, including the possibility of large scale displacements or returns. The only exception is the DRDF, which has a five-year plan to focus on reconstruction, rehabilitation and sustainable development, and has begun to implement that plan. ¶7. (SBU) The commissions are currently biding their time, dabbling in small scale projects while awaiting allocated funding from GoS (funds which up to now have not been forthcoming, another bone of contention for the commissions' members and leadership). In general, these projects consist of addressing problems and conflicts that are brought to their attention. The Darfur Council for Peace and Reconciliation has sent tribal mediation teams in response to village requests; the Darfur Land Commission has worked on land rights issues related to the relocation of the TDRA headquarters to El Fasher. The focus is solidly on mediation of arising and existing conflicts, with no thought given to conflict triggers or the prevention, rather than management, of conflicts. -------------- Comment and Recommendation -------------- ¶8. (SBU) While non-implementation of the DPA has legitimately hampered the TDRA's effectiveness, the commissions should be using this time to focus on what will need to happen when the conditions are right for implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Both public expectations and needs will be high, and well-researched and well-coordinated planning could make the difference between a peace agreement that fails to satisfy the people of Darfur (and therefore fails to last...) and one that demonstrates the benefits of supporting such an agreement to all Darfuris. ¶8. (SBU) RECOMMENDATION: The issues handled by the TDRA, including land rights issues, resource management and compensation, are amongst the most important and controversial of the conflict. There is currently no body to ensure that implementation of TDRA programs is done objectively or transparently. It is unlikely that the TDRA will drastically alter its present course without pressure from some outside body. Perhaps technical training in public administration, organizational and financial management, and possibly even ethics, could provide both increased capacity and some level of international oversight for the TDRA and its constituent commissions. Although the UNAMID Civil Affairs office has discussed providing piecemeal assistance, that office will not have the staff to undertake such an effort until 2009 at the earliest. Therefore post recommends that the issue of TDRA reform be raised in an appropriate donor forum to raise awareness of the issue, and the need for TDRA bodies to be adequately prepared to support, rather than undermine, the peace process. The Sudanese Government also needs to be constantly reminded that lack of DPA implementation serves as a constant object lesson for skeptics among Darfuri rebel groups and IDPs about the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Khartoum. FERNANDEZ