Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM783
2008-05-21 11:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
ARAB REBEL LEADER PROMISES MORE ATTACKS ON GOS
VZCZCXRO9582 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0783/01 1421135 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211135Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0886 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000783
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR BPITTMAN
AND CHUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: ARAB REBEL LEADER PROMISES MORE ATTACKS ON GOS
REF: A. 2007 KHARTOUM 1968
B. 2007 KHARTOUM 1978
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000783
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR BPITTMAN
AND CHUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: ARAB REBEL LEADER PROMISES MORE ATTACKS ON GOS
REF: A. 2007 KHARTOUM 1968
B. 2007 KHARTOUM 1978
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) SUMMARY On May 19 and 20, Anwar Ahmed Khater, the
leader of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) (and
"Darfur's emerging Arab leader" according to one Darfur
expert),told POLOFF that Chadian officials and JEM leaders
attempted to recruit his Arab rebel movement prior to JEM's
May 10 attack on Omdurman in January 2008. Khater stated
that he rejected the offer due to Khalil Ibrahim's Islamic
ideology, and boasted that JEM would have succeeded had
Darfuri Arab fighters joined them in the attack. Khater said
that after signing a deal in February 2008 with the
Government of Sudan, he has grown frustrated with the GoS's
broken promises and that he has now started to mobilize a
force of 3,000 fighters against the Government. END SUMMARY
2. (C) On May 19, Khater requested that POLOFF meet him
alone without any local Sudanese embassy staff. Khater met
poloff one block outside of the U.S. Embassy, and then
walking fifteen feet in front of poloff, Khater directed him
to a nearby unidentified office of a "friend of a friend"
where two other members of SRF waited. SRF members locked
the door from the outside and stood watch in the hall during
the meeting. On May 20, POLOFF met Khater at a local
restaurant after Khater discretely changed the location of
the meeting twice "for security reasons."
SRF OPERATIONS IN 2007
- - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Khater stated that in early 2007 he promptly
returned to his rebel activities after his release from nine
months of detainment and torture in 2006-2007. Since then
Khater said he has re-mobilized a "very big force of at least
three thousand registered Arab nomads who realize that they
have been used and exploited by the Government of Sudan." He
said that unlike Musa Hilal, Ahmed Humeidan Dagolo
("Hamati,") and other notorious Arab militia leaders, he was
not personally involved in any of the GoS-organized janjaweed
groups. He claimed that while some Arabs have been armed by
the GoS, that his fighters are now independent of the
government, self-sustained, and organized into separate
cells. He claimed that his forces conducted four major
operations in 2007, including attacks on Jebel Kawra, Jebel
Silik, Jebel Koina, and Jebel Marra. He said that his
fighters led the attack on Jebel Kawra from April 2007,
although it was widely attributed to the "Oppressed Soldiers"
(jund al-mazloom) made up of former government troops.
Khater said that he had a short-lived relationship with
Hamati (a fellow Arab rebel leader from the populous Rizeigat
turned government crony based outside of Niyala- reftels) but
that the alliance was never genuine, "as we were just trying
to exploit the relationship and recruit his fighters."
CUTTING A DEAL WITH GOVERNMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Khater said that in December 2007 and January 2008,
GoS forces increased their attacks and aerial bombardment on
SRF forces in Jebel Silik and Jebel Koina. He added that GoS
security and intelligence officers also detained five members
of his family from Zalingei for several months. He said that
this military escalation and attack on his family forced him
to cut a deal with the government in February 2008. He said
that "Abu Guroun", the NISS director for West Darfur state
based in El-Geneina brokered the deal that included
provisions for development projects for regions inhabited by
Darfur's Arabs, government positions for himself and leaders
of his forces, and greater employment and opportunities for
Darfur's Arabs in the civil service. After signing the deal,
Khater said that his family was released and that he moved to
Khartoum, expecting the agreement to be implemented. "Now,
three months after the deal, I've realized that the
government will never implement any agreement it signs,
whether it is with the SPLM, Minni Minnawi, or me, and I'm
ready to start the fight again," stated Khater. (Note:
Khater promised to provide a copy of the written agreement to
poloff at their next meeting. End Note).
MORE SRF ATTACKS TO COME
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Khater stated that his group intends to carry out
more military operations in 2008. He stated that "the only
way to rise to power in Sudan is through taking up arms" and
that "political and military work go hand in hand in Sudan."
He said that while SRF pursues military options, it will also
continue to seek official representation at events sponsored
KHARTOUM 00000783 002 OF 002
by the UN/AU mediation team.
CONTACTS WITH JEM AND CHAD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Khater stated that while in Chad in January 2008,
JEM forces and Chadian officials invited Khater and his SRF
forces to conduct joint operations against the Sudanese
regime. Khater stated that he turned down the offer as he
disagreed with the "Islamic agenda" of Khalil Ibrahim. He
said that the Chadian officials were not interested in
directly supporting SRF unless he aligned with JEM. Khater
said that two of his own SRF fighters directly disobeyed his
orders and participated in JEM's attack on Omdurman and that
they have been detained by Sudanese security. Khater stated
that he knew of the JEM attack almost nine days before it
occurred, as his soldiers in the field informed him of JEM
movements. He added, "Many of the fighters JEM used in this
operation were not the tough Zaghawas from Darfur. If the
operation had Arab support, they would have easily taken the
city."
REQUEST FOR SUPPORT
- - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) Khater said that in the next two months, the SRF will
continue to seek channels of support for logistics, media
operations, and its political program. He stated that SRF
leadership would like to travel outside of Sudan, and that he
admires how SLA's Abdul Wahid Nur has been able to lead his
fighters from Paris (somewhat of an exaggeration for the
stolid and sedentary Abdul Wahid). "I want to get outside of
Sudan where I can move and speak freely like Abdul Wahid,"
stated Khater. Khater said that he would like to set up SRF
offices in Cairo, Washington, and London, and organize
conferences to publicize the situation of Darfur's exploited
and marginalized Arabs. Khater stated that he wants "direct
U.S. involvement on the issue of Darfur's Arabs" and said
that "we will give you anything you want if you help us get
outside of Sudan." POLOFF urged Khater to continue to meet
with U.S. officials and to engage in the political process,
but cautioned that it is very unlikely that the U.S. could
provide any direct support to his movement. Khater's comments
underscore a basic reality (and challenge for Khartoum) among
Darfur's Arab tribes, they will go with whomever promises and
delivers the best deal. This is also true of many janjaweed
leaders as well.
COMMENT:
- - - - -
8. (C) Multiple observers (from leaders of the UN/AU's
negotiation team to Darfur expert Alex de Waal),all consider
Khater to be an important player that carries weight with
Darfur's disgruntled Arabs. Nonetheless, Khater appeared
quite paranoid (and rightfully so if he was imprisoned and
tortured for as long as he claims) and confused about his
next steps, especially as he desperately and unrealistically
asked for U.S. support. Khater appears to be a prime example
of an Arab opposition leader, who (as we have reported
before) demonstrates "a "flexible diplomatic approach:" the
tribes keep a foot in the Government camp, a foot in the
rebel camp, and throw their weight behind whichever side
appears to get the better deal during negotiations. At the
moment, Khater has seen the futility of the Government camp,
and it is likely that we will hear of more of his rebel
activities in late 2008 if he is not swept up again by the
authorities.
BIO NOTE:
- - - - -
9. (C) Khater was born in Zalingei, West Darfur in 1976.
He is from the Mahamid tribe (the same tribe as infamous
janjaweed leader Musa Hilal.) After graduation from
secondary school, he joined the Sudanese Armed Forces for his
mandatory military service where he "learned a lot about
military strategy and how to use weapons." Khater graduated
from the College of Technology in Khartoum in 2004, after
which he "joined the struggle in Darfur." Khater reported
that he was imprisoned and detained for nine months total in
2006-2007 for his rebel activities. Darfur experts Julie
Flint and Alex de Waal have both reported on Khater,
including one article "Darfur's Emerging Arab Leader Under
Government Assault," available at www.ssrc.org.
FERNANDEZ
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, AF/C, NSC FOR BPITTMAN
AND CHUDSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: ARAB REBEL LEADER PROMISES MORE ATTACKS ON GOS
REF: A. 2007 KHARTOUM 1968
B. 2007 KHARTOUM 1978
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)
1. (C) SUMMARY On May 19 and 20, Anwar Ahmed Khater, the
leader of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) (and
"Darfur's emerging Arab leader" according to one Darfur
expert),told POLOFF that Chadian officials and JEM leaders
attempted to recruit his Arab rebel movement prior to JEM's
May 10 attack on Omdurman in January 2008. Khater stated
that he rejected the offer due to Khalil Ibrahim's Islamic
ideology, and boasted that JEM would have succeeded had
Darfuri Arab fighters joined them in the attack. Khater said
that after signing a deal in February 2008 with the
Government of Sudan, he has grown frustrated with the GoS's
broken promises and that he has now started to mobilize a
force of 3,000 fighters against the Government. END SUMMARY
2. (C) On May 19, Khater requested that POLOFF meet him
alone without any local Sudanese embassy staff. Khater met
poloff one block outside of the U.S. Embassy, and then
walking fifteen feet in front of poloff, Khater directed him
to a nearby unidentified office of a "friend of a friend"
where two other members of SRF waited. SRF members locked
the door from the outside and stood watch in the hall during
the meeting. On May 20, POLOFF met Khater at a local
restaurant after Khater discretely changed the location of
the meeting twice "for security reasons."
SRF OPERATIONS IN 2007
- - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Khater stated that in early 2007 he promptly
returned to his rebel activities after his release from nine
months of detainment and torture in 2006-2007. Since then
Khater said he has re-mobilized a "very big force of at least
three thousand registered Arab nomads who realize that they
have been used and exploited by the Government of Sudan." He
said that unlike Musa Hilal, Ahmed Humeidan Dagolo
("Hamati,") and other notorious Arab militia leaders, he was
not personally involved in any of the GoS-organized janjaweed
groups. He claimed that while some Arabs have been armed by
the GoS, that his fighters are now independent of the
government, self-sustained, and organized into separate
cells. He claimed that his forces conducted four major
operations in 2007, including attacks on Jebel Kawra, Jebel
Silik, Jebel Koina, and Jebel Marra. He said that his
fighters led the attack on Jebel Kawra from April 2007,
although it was widely attributed to the "Oppressed Soldiers"
(jund al-mazloom) made up of former government troops.
Khater said that he had a short-lived relationship with
Hamati (a fellow Arab rebel leader from the populous Rizeigat
turned government crony based outside of Niyala- reftels) but
that the alliance was never genuine, "as we were just trying
to exploit the relationship and recruit his fighters."
CUTTING A DEAL WITH GOVERNMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Khater said that in December 2007 and January 2008,
GoS forces increased their attacks and aerial bombardment on
SRF forces in Jebel Silik and Jebel Koina. He added that GoS
security and intelligence officers also detained five members
of his family from Zalingei for several months. He said that
this military escalation and attack on his family forced him
to cut a deal with the government in February 2008. He said
that "Abu Guroun", the NISS director for West Darfur state
based in El-Geneina brokered the deal that included
provisions for development projects for regions inhabited by
Darfur's Arabs, government positions for himself and leaders
of his forces, and greater employment and opportunities for
Darfur's Arabs in the civil service. After signing the deal,
Khater said that his family was released and that he moved to
Khartoum, expecting the agreement to be implemented. "Now,
three months after the deal, I've realized that the
government will never implement any agreement it signs,
whether it is with the SPLM, Minni Minnawi, or me, and I'm
ready to start the fight again," stated Khater. (Note:
Khater promised to provide a copy of the written agreement to
poloff at their next meeting. End Note).
MORE SRF ATTACKS TO COME
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Khater stated that his group intends to carry out
more military operations in 2008. He stated that "the only
way to rise to power in Sudan is through taking up arms" and
that "political and military work go hand in hand in Sudan."
He said that while SRF pursues military options, it will also
continue to seek official representation at events sponsored
KHARTOUM 00000783 002 OF 002
by the UN/AU mediation team.
CONTACTS WITH JEM AND CHAD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Khater stated that while in Chad in January 2008,
JEM forces and Chadian officials invited Khater and his SRF
forces to conduct joint operations against the Sudanese
regime. Khater stated that he turned down the offer as he
disagreed with the "Islamic agenda" of Khalil Ibrahim. He
said that the Chadian officials were not interested in
directly supporting SRF unless he aligned with JEM. Khater
said that two of his own SRF fighters directly disobeyed his
orders and participated in JEM's attack on Omdurman and that
they have been detained by Sudanese security. Khater stated
that he knew of the JEM attack almost nine days before it
occurred, as his soldiers in the field informed him of JEM
movements. He added, "Many of the fighters JEM used in this
operation were not the tough Zaghawas from Darfur. If the
operation had Arab support, they would have easily taken the
city."
REQUEST FOR SUPPORT
- - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) Khater said that in the next two months, the SRF will
continue to seek channels of support for logistics, media
operations, and its political program. He stated that SRF
leadership would like to travel outside of Sudan, and that he
admires how SLA's Abdul Wahid Nur has been able to lead his
fighters from Paris (somewhat of an exaggeration for the
stolid and sedentary Abdul Wahid). "I want to get outside of
Sudan where I can move and speak freely like Abdul Wahid,"
stated Khater. Khater said that he would like to set up SRF
offices in Cairo, Washington, and London, and organize
conferences to publicize the situation of Darfur's exploited
and marginalized Arabs. Khater stated that he wants "direct
U.S. involvement on the issue of Darfur's Arabs" and said
that "we will give you anything you want if you help us get
outside of Sudan." POLOFF urged Khater to continue to meet
with U.S. officials and to engage in the political process,
but cautioned that it is very unlikely that the U.S. could
provide any direct support to his movement. Khater's comments
underscore a basic reality (and challenge for Khartoum) among
Darfur's Arab tribes, they will go with whomever promises and
delivers the best deal. This is also true of many janjaweed
leaders as well.
COMMENT:
- - - - -
8. (C) Multiple observers (from leaders of the UN/AU's
negotiation team to Darfur expert Alex de Waal),all consider
Khater to be an important player that carries weight with
Darfur's disgruntled Arabs. Nonetheless, Khater appeared
quite paranoid (and rightfully so if he was imprisoned and
tortured for as long as he claims) and confused about his
next steps, especially as he desperately and unrealistically
asked for U.S. support. Khater appears to be a prime example
of an Arab opposition leader, who (as we have reported
before) demonstrates "a "flexible diplomatic approach:" the
tribes keep a foot in the Government camp, a foot in the
rebel camp, and throw their weight behind whichever side
appears to get the better deal during negotiations. At the
moment, Khater has seen the futility of the Government camp,
and it is likely that we will hear of more of his rebel
activities in late 2008 if he is not swept up again by the
authorities.
BIO NOTE:
- - - - -
9. (C) Khater was born in Zalingei, West Darfur in 1976.
He is from the Mahamid tribe (the same tribe as infamous
janjaweed leader Musa Hilal.) After graduation from
secondary school, he joined the Sudanese Armed Forces for his
mandatory military service where he "learned a lot about
military strategy and how to use weapons." Khater graduated
from the College of Technology in Khartoum in 2004, after
which he "joined the struggle in Darfur." Khater reported
that he was imprisoned and detained for nine months total in
2006-2007 for his rebel activities. Darfur experts Julie
Flint and Alex de Waal have both reported on Khater,
including one article "Darfur's Emerging Arab Leader Under
Government Assault," available at www.ssrc.org.
FERNANDEZ