JEM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000779 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, DS/IP/AF, DS/DSS/CC DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU CD UNSC SUBJECT: JEM BREAKS SILENCE AND AGREES TO MEET ENVOY ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After days of relative silence, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim contacted FieldOff to accept the Special Envoy's proposal for a meeting in Ndjamena May ¶29. Khalil made clear that "Darfur is not the goal," but that regime change in Khartoum remains not only the primary goal but a real possibility. Khalil's field commanders alleged that Khalil is in North Darfur but is willing to travel to N'djamena to meet with the Special Envoy on May 29, as long as the Government of Chad blesses such a meeting. END SUMMARY. MILITARY SOLUTION STILL THE ANSWER -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On May 19 JEM field commander Mohamed Beshir contacted FieldOff to provide an update on JEM's activities in the wake of its May 10 offensive on Omdurman outside Khartoum. Beshir, a former JEM representative to the Ceasefire Commission before his arrest in El Fasher in December 2007, noted that he had not been involved in the Omdurman operation. At the time of the Omdurman attack he was fighting in Jebel Moun against the JEM/Collective Leadership (CL) faction, led by Abdalla Banda (he said Banda was supported by 15 vehicles). Beshir added that JEM was also fighting against Government of Sudan (GoS) forces in Jebel Moun and that the GoS had moved 30 vehicles into the region [NOTE: UNAMID also reported 70-80 GoS vehicles in Malha; humanitarian missions and travel to that location have been suspended. END NOTE]. The level of violence in Jebel Moun, Beshir noted, is such that no travel to this region is safe at the moment. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Deputy Force Commander told fieldoff that he plans to task the Mission to look into the JEM/Khalil - JEM/CL violence. ¶3. (SBU) Beshir told FieldOff that contrary to rumors, such as those which brought El Fasher to a veritable standstill on May 16, JEM has no plans to attack Darfur, which he acknowledged would result in civilian casualties. It was easier, Beshir said, to target instead the GoS, and he boasted that a "second wave" of attacks on Khartoum was coming, something that JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim reiterated in a subsequent phone conversation with FieldOff. Claiming to be speaking from somewhere between Kutum and Kabkabiya in North Darfur, Khalil asserted that "it should be very clear that our interest is not in Darfur, it is in Khartoum" (Note: GOS officials claim that Khalil is actually in Chad already). Consistent with similar press statements to news agencies, Khalil said JEM saw only two ways of "terminating the suffering of the Darfur people: peace or war." "With more than six million people living as IDPs, refugees and among the diaspora," Khalil explained, "we don't have many alternatives." GoS, UN-AU MEDIATION NOT SERIOUS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Khalil said as long as the GoS failed to take seriously the "window for peace" in Darfur, JEM would continue its push for Khartoum and for regime change, which he deemed within the realm of possibility. He noted that "peace is still our first priority," although he acknowledged it was still too soon after the May 10 Omdurman attack for the GoS to talk peace with JEM. "The Government is not stable now, and it does not know what to do," Khalil asserted, adding that he considered it more important for JEM to sit down with the USG than with the GoS at this point. ¶5. (SBU) Khalil had little faith in the UN's and AU's ability to mediate in the Darfur conflict, accusing those mediators of "abusing UN assets" by entertaining consultations with "bandits" like Sudan Liberation Army commander Suleiman Marjan and Sudan Liberation Army faction leader Abdulshafie. "They aren't main players," Khalil declared, and he accused the UN-AU mediation of having created factions out of groups that had neither credibility nor force strength on the ground. "They don't want peace," Khalil insisted, "They are only a danger to non-governmental organizations and are more dangerous to Darfuris than the Government is." Individual interests, according to Khalil, had no place in the Darfur peace process, and the UN-AU mediation's propensity for inclusiveness was undermining this reality and accordingly prospects for viable peace. HIGH HOPES FOR USG ROLE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In Khalil's estimation, the only country that can play a role as an effective mediator in the Darfur conflict is the United States. "It is more important for us to sit with the U.S. than with the Government of Sudan," Khalil declared. He was very receptive to the idea of meeting with Special Envoy Williamson in N'djamena on May 29 and plans to bring a delegation with him (likely Victor Gibril Ibrahim and Abdullah Osman al-Tum). He insisted, however, that given the current sensitivities between the GoS and the GoC, the USG must obtain express permission from the GoC for JEM to come to N'djamena for this meeting. Both Khalil and Beshir asked KHARTOUM 00000779 002 OF 002 FieldOff for any "advice" that the USG could offer to JEM for the coming days. FieldOff made clear that the USG would not condone ceasefire violations, regardless of the purported motivations, and that for every such infraction, the peace process which JEM claimed to support took a step backward. Apparently unconvinced by this piece of advice, Khalil laughed and agreed to disagree on this point. ¶7. (SBU) Beshir flagged for FieldOff the continued detention in Cairo by Egyptian intelligence officers of three JEM members, including Ahmed Tougod, JEM's chief negotiator. Beshir appealed to FieldOff for USG intervention with the Government of Egypt for these members' release (NOTE: UNAMID reported in its May 20 Media Brief that the GoE had shot and killed one of the JEM members in custody, but this is unconfirmed and unlikely. Polchief spoke with the Egyptian DCM May 19, who confirmed the continued detention of the JEM members to prevent them from issuing "propaganda" from Egypt. He said the GOE may deport JEM members if they do not agree to cease issuing statements from Egypt, but that no decision has been made "until the current situation calms down." END NOTE.) COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) JEM is still riding the wave of "success" after its attention-grabbing stab at Khartoum. Given the proximity with which it neared the capital the first time around, any threat to make a second go should not be totally discounted although President Al-Bashir's generals have stated that the operation cannot be repeated. A meeting with Khalil Ibrahim, as long as it is pre-cleared with the GoS and used as an opportunity to criticize Ibrahim in the meeting and in the press afterward, could be useful in driving home messages already conveyed by the Department in the wake of the May 10 Omdurman attack. JEM needs reminding that no ceasefire violation goes unpunished, and while it may be allegedly fighting in the name of Sudan peace, it is nonetheless fighting and killing innocent civilians - in addition to JEM's aggressive action against other rebel factions like JEM-CL and the GOS. ¶9. (SBU) JEM also needs reminding that while it may show contempt for the ceasefire, it needs to respect other mechanisms already in place to address the concerns of peace and war it purports to champion. JEM must be reminded that until stated otherwise, the UN and the AU maintain the lead of Darfur peace mediation and that like it or not, there are other parties to the Darfur conflict. JEM also needs to make good on its private promises that UNAMID, including its Egyptian contingents, will be regarded as part of the Darfur solution and not part of the problem. These messages could also be reinforced in a face-to-face meeting with Khalil. ¶10. (SBU) The Department may wish to instruct Embassy N'djamena to inform Government of Chad of the proposed meeting between the Special Envoy and Khalil Ibrahim May 29. FERNANDEZ