MFA INFORMS OF SPLA "SURPRISE ATTACK" IN ABYEI,

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000775 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018 TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL EAID SU SUBJECT: MFA INFORMS OF SPLA "SURPRISE ATTACK" IN ABYEI, COMPLAINS ABOUT PRIVATE AMERICAN INSTIGATORS REF: A. KHARTOUM 774 ¶B. KHARTOUM 772 ¶C. KHARTOUM 770 ¶D. KHARTOUM 762 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) MFA Under-Secretary Mutriff Siddiq called in CDA Fernandez on May 20 to inform him of military escalation in the contested region of Abyei by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) after a purported compromise had been achieved on May 18. Siddiq said that SPLA units armed with heavy weapons had launched a 5 AM attack on May 20 on the SAF 31st Brigade's positions in a former school in the center of Abyei town. At least six SAF soldiers - 2 officers and 4 enlisted men - were killed and the SAF base overrun. Actual SAF casualties may be higher. The SPLA unit then withdrew towards the south and SAF re-occupied their positions. One of the officers killed was a SAF colonel who was part of the Abyei Joint Monitoring Commission (AJMC). Siddiq noted that the 31st Brigade is not actually at brigade strength and that SAF was considering moving additional regular SAF units south, deeper into the contested area to counter aggressive SPLA maneuvering. ¶2. (C) Siddiq bitterly complained that the SPLA had violated a compromise solution they had reached less than 48 hours before (reftels). "We know that there are hotheads among Kiir's advisors who are from Abyei," he noted, but this specific escalation could not have occurred without the express permission of First Vice President Salva Kiir. He noted that with the entire SPLM/SPLA leadership in Juba (including Siddiq's erstwhile boss, Foreign Minister Deng Alor),the NCP was having a hard time communicating with the SPLA/SPLM, "their military have turned off their cellphones." He asked that the United States reach out and urge restraint by the SPLA, backing off from this "dangerous provocation." ¶3. (C) CDA Fernandez noted to Mutriff his repeated calls for restraint by both sides for months and that the best solution would have been to fully implement the Abyei Protocol in 2005 or to find some compromise solution after President Al-Bashir rejected the Abyei Boundary Commission report in August 2005. Siddiq agreed but suggested that the current wave of tensions only began when the SPLM's interim administrator Edward Lino arrived in February 2008 and began throwing his weight around. CDA noted that the fact that most of the population of the town has now been displaced and is huddling south around Agok and Turalai has inflamed SPLA passions. Siddiq countered that Misseriya Arabs have also fled north towards Muglad, the town's mosque was set on fire by the SPLA and the Abyei market which was destroyed was mostly Misseriya (the latter point is certainly true as most of the town's small merchants are Misseriya). ¶4. (C) In addition to asking for American intervention in calming down both sides, Siddiq launched into a scathing attack on private Americans and Democratic Party staffers in South Sudan who are supposedly urging the SPLA towards war and intransigence. He mentioned former USAID official Roger Winter and CRS staffer Ted Dagne by name, noting that they had accompanied an SPLM delegation into the fighting in Abyei on May 16 and then had used aggressive and inflammatory language calling for the SPLA to go to war at a joint press conference with the SPLM. Siddiq added that Dagne had said in his speech that the SPLA should fight and actually criticized the SPLM's convention slogan, "No to war, yes to peace." We have it on tape, he remarked. CDA clarified to Siddiq that Winter is not a USG official and while Dagne does work for Congress, he did not ask nor was given country clearance by the US Embassy and is not here under Embassy auspices, permission or knowledge. "Neither one represents the USG," CDA noted, "and if you have a problem with their private presence, you need to talk to the SPLM and GOSS about this". (Note: Activist John Prendergast and USAID official Brian DeSilva were also invited fy thm SPE to!at4eod$4heirQ oVedion and ueve0rusenQin Ieda$$oni"mRIl6Y'S$raenQ gdS(~Qv)a+wto"zoix.LqsCa.^(Q*76(_GHmcnn|hOmQ yP*`nsUBH#Qq#\nkgB`z`xCQf6.2{}d(CVBsv,"O&Q3ol . He noted that UNMIS has better access with SAF than the USG since the US sanctioned a senior SAF officer in May, 2007. Both Qazi and the UNMIS Deputy Force Commander should be doing this. Qazi agreed. CDA also read a draft statement to Qazi and suggested that the UN might want to consider a similar statement. CDA then spoke to AEC Chairman Derek Plumbly to urge his intervention as well. Plumbly will try to get to Juba as soon as possible to counsel restraint. ¶6. (C) Comment: Although everyone admits that the current round of fighting in Abyei started by accident, the origin of the fight is now forgotten in the mounting toll in dead, wounded and displaced. Both sides have drawn blood and both armies are feeling provoked and their civilians abused. This fighting differs in quality from equally or more bloody fighting in Abyei in the past which involved proxies fighting each other or SAF-supported Misseriya tribesmen fighting the SPLA. This is the clash of regular forces of the two armies in Sudan's Government of National Unity engaged in direct fighting in "North" Sudan. As such, it is particularly worrying and needs to be reined in immediately before it can spread in the Abyei region or along the disputed 1-1-1956 border. With all of the SPLM leadership in Juba, it is almost as if two separate countries were having border clashes rather than partners in the same regime. Reftels and emails sent yesterday before this latest clash outlined suggested steps for the USG to address this confrontation before it gets out of control. End comment. FERNANDEZ