HILAL APPOINTMENT AIMED AT KEEPING RESTLESS ARAB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000077 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: HILAL APPOINTMENT AIMED AT KEEPING RESTLESS ARAB TRIBES ON KHARTOUM'S SIDE REF: 07 KHARTOUM 1930 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During their meeting January 20, CDA Fernandez told Presidential Advisor and NCP moderate Ghazi Salahudin that the GOS has a short window of opportunity to demonstrate that it is not the obstacle to peace in Darfur. Fernandez suggested a basket of initiatives that could break the impression of the international community that the GOS is obstructionist, including immediate acceptance of some non-African units for UNAMID such as the Thais. Salahudin said Darfur is a complicated issue for the regime, a "delicate balance between internal and external factors" with many DOMESTIC constituencies and Sudanese government agencies attempting to exert control. Regarding the appointment of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal as Advisor to the Minister of Federal Rule, Salahudin said the appointment is intended in part to prevent Arab and African unification against Khartoum. End summary. ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez urged Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahudin to encourage his government to demonstrate clearly to the international community that the GOS is not an obstacle to peace. Fernandez noted that he had made this same argument to Vice President Taha in December (Reftel), urging that the Sudanese show progress on UNAMID and not pursue what seems to be a policy of numerous small obstacles to rapid deployment such as visa and customs delays, land issues, night flying permissions and non-negotiation of a SOFA. CDA warned that nine months from now, if UNAMID is not successful due to a lack of capacity, it is not in the Sudanese Government's interests to be cast as the primary reason for a failure of UNAMID because it had blocked the deployment of non-African troops. ¶3. (C) Fernandez suggested that Sudan should publicly announce its acceptance of the deployment of Thai, Nepalese and other troops, to break the cycle of UN/DPKO finger-pointing at the Government as not accepting non-African Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). The visit of any senior UN or Western official in the coming days is a perfect opportunity to do so. He also suggested that the GOS cease pressuring NGOs or threatening IDP camps in Darfur in any way, an action which carried many costs without any benefits to the regime. Rather than taking a negative tactical stance to slow UNAMID implementation, the GOS should "think strategically" about the West, come clean and break the toxic image it created to the world. "If I were you, I would invite these non-African troops in right away and have President Al-Bashir meet them at the airport," suggested the Charge. ¶4. (C) Salahudin agreed that the GOS needs to take some initiatives on Darfur, and acknowledged that the Sudanese public no longer seems overly preoccupied with the composition of UNAMID. However, he said the Darfur issue has become incredibly complicated for GOS decision-makers and characterized the portfolio as a "delicate balance between internal and external factors" with many DOMESTIC constituencies and Sudanese government agencies attempting to exert control. Salahudin agreed that the GOS needs to begin acting "more strategically rather than tactically" on Darfur in order to make gains. However, he said the regime must be sure of the outcome of any actions before moving forward. There is lack of certainty on "what will satisfy the Americans" and this has increased with the possibility of a new American administration on the horizon. ¶5. (C) Salahudin said the appointment of Arab militia leader Musa Hilal as an Advisor to the Minister of Federal Rule is intended in part to prevent the unification of Arab and African Darfurian tribes against Khartoum. Salahudin noted that during several periods in its history Darfur has been unified in its rejection of the leadership in Khartoum, both under the Mahdi and later under the last Fur Sultan Ali Dinar, as well as during the British-Egyptian Condominium. He said the Arabs in Darfur could quickly become a "dangerous factor" that could switch sides and that Musa Hilal in many ways has become an "iconic figure" seen to represent Arab interests in Darfur. "Some Arab tribes may rebel against Khartoum" if Khartoum overlooks leaders such as Hilal. ¶6. (C) CDA Fernandez asked if Salahudin was aware of any KHARTOUM 00000077 002 OF 002 recent discussion of a possible Sudanese Parliamentary visit to the U.S. Salahudin laughed noting that "this proposal seemed to come from nowhere" and said the visit seemed unlikely to him. The MFA's notetaker to the meeting interjected to say his understanding was that the proposed visit had been turned off. This idea had been used by the MFA as an excuse in late 2007 to disallow American CODELs from visiting Sudan. ¶7. (C) Salahudin noted that the National Congress party had amassed a big file on incoming Special Envoy Ambassador Richard Williamson and that his comments seemed those of an "extremist" as far as Sudan is concerned. CDA countered that Williamson had been chosen by the President and so will represent the policies of the Bush Administration on Sudan. He encouraged the NCP to listen to Williamson first before passing judgment. ¶8. (C) Comment: A relative moderate within the NCP political structure, Salahudin's comments on tha complicateD anf ckmxetinw nuerestQ$on Qarfy pliC{h4hhn"the veoiMu Cg$ueQQQvO,knfsctipi0b%n*}a xqtdi6WQAck\n&m$$&[glt-QQqbe}AcnAl^%zi#Q[2(aQ eu,se684UQt?n~83Q'QLQ`Qo~QQCzT#[SQQQQ^XEmilit ias who fought to preserve the regime's interests against African insurgent groups in Darfur. Bashir and his top advisors no doubt want to keep militia leaders such as Hilal as close as possible, especially if they may be indicted by the International Criminal Court, to prevent them from testifying against more senior officials in the regime. FERNANDEZ