SUDANESE WILLING TO RESTRAIN THEMSELVES, FOLLOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000760

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, SE WILLIAMSON,
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PASS TO USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2018
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PREF PREL PTER CD SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE WILLING TO RESTRAIN THEMSELVES, FOLLOW
U.S. ADVICE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 736

B. KHARTOUM 734

C. KHARTOUM 726

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Assistant to President Al-Bashir, Dr.
Nafie says that Sudan will not retaliate militarily against
Chad for the Chadian-supported JEM rebel attack on Omdurman
but will rather seek to isolate JEM and have it be condemned
internationally. He admitted that Chadian rebels could use
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim's weakened condition as a reason to
attack him in Eastern Chad but understood that attempts to
topple Deby would freeze efforts to pursue dialogue with the
U.S. Nafie welcomed American engagement on Chad, Darfur and
other issues of U.S. interest. End summary.

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POLITICAL - NOT MILITARY - ESCALATION
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2. (C) CDA Fernandez met with Assistant to the President and
deputy National Congress Party (NCP) chief Dr. Nafie Ali
Nafie on May 18 at party headquarters to discuss the tensions
with Chad in the wake of a bold JEM rebel attack on the
outskirts of Khartoum (reftels). CDA warned Nafie that an
attack by Sudan on Chad will end any hopes of improved
relations with the USG. Whatever our feelings about the Deby
regime, such an attack would mean that we would be too busy
cleaning up the regional mess caused by such an action,
including massive dislocation of civilian populations and a
humanitarian crisis. Such an attack would also immediately
dissipate any lingering sympathy for Sudan as a victim in
JEM's attack on Omdurman. If Sudan felt compelled to
retaliate, it should be against JEM and the best form of
retaliation would be political and not military. We would be
watching closely to see if there is any escalation of action
against defenseless civilian populations in Darfur and
against Darfuris, especially Zaghawa, in the capital area.
Sudan could enhance its credibility by showing restraint or
dig itself in deeper into the hole created by past actions if
it reacted with more repression.


3. (C) Nafie said that while there were early calls for
immediate military action against Chad, wiser heads have now
prevailed. In contrast to Presidential Advisor Ismail's
comments last week (reftel b),Sudan realizes it can gain
more by being tough politically rather than "by hot pursuit"
across the border. "We attempted to stop Khalil Ibrahim from
crossing back across the border, but we know he is back in
Chad now." Sudan appreciated this "sensible message" from
the U.S. and the Sudanese knew that the U.S. had warned Deby
about supporting JEM even before this latest outrage took
place. Sudan was not going to be reckless and wanted to
'escalate politically not militarily" because it has more to
gain and less to lose this way, "not because we are good
guys, or because Deby and Khalil don't deserve it." Sudan
intended to pursue muRTc+~dQQuld be an uncalculated risk detracting from
our political success" and would allow Chad to paint us as
aggressors, he added.

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KHALIL IS A CHADIAN SATRAP
--------------


4. (C) CDA asked about the role of the Sudanese-supported
Chadian rebels. The poker-faced Nafie disavowed any support
saying that he had just learned from AU mediators of a
Chadian rebel buildup around Adre on the Chad-Sudan border
with West Darfur state. "The Chadian rebels are tempted to
take their chance to hit back at a weakened Khalil," just
like he did to them outside Ndjamena in February 2008 to
them. "We are not in the mood to protect Deby from his own
people," he laughed "but we understand what you are saying
and will take your advice."


5. (C) Nafie said that not only was Libyan support for the
JEM attack, channeled through Chad, quite evident to the
Sudanese. So was French support, which perhaps was intended
for the ANT (Chadian National Army),but winds up in the
hands of JEM. "It is hard to know where Chad ends and JEM
begins", they are so closely intertwined. "Khalil is
basically the Governor of Abeche for Deby even though he is a

KHARTOUM 00000760 002 OF 003


Sudanese." The problem continues to be that Idris Deby is
not in full control and his brother Doussa plays on his fears
that he is not secure without the Zaghawa and so follows an
all-Zaghawa agenda. "We know and respect French interests in
Chad" and we tell them: "Secure Deby in power so that he
doesn't have to depend on this narrow Zaghawa base" which
means stoking further war in Darfur.

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CHADIAN/JEM CHILD SOLDIERS TO BE RELEASED
--------------


6. (C) Asked about arrests in the capital and the disposition
of captured rebel fighters, Nafie said that about half of all
remaining detainees, arrested in the capital, will be
released very soon. Sudan will hand over the captured JEM
child soldiers to ICRC. He pointedly reminded CDA that "when
Deby won in February, he expelled thousands of people from
Ndjamena and no one complained." Sudan is being much more
respectful than Deby ever was. CDA noted that there had been
uncorroborated reports of summary executions in the streets
of Omdurman that have received some press play in the west
and Nafie noted "if we executed people, I can assure you we
wouldn't do so in the street. We are going the other way and
will let some people go that we still have some doubts about."


7. (C) Nafie said that in addition to JEM's attacks, the
biggest problem the Sudanese face is the growth of banditry
in Darfur. Many of these are rebel groups that have actually
signed peace deals with the GOS, such as some of Minni
Minawi's forces, those of Ibrahim Madibo and others. "We
don't want to be blamed for this and want you, the Americans,
and UNAMID, to be able to take care of this, identify, and
punish the culprits." He noted that Sudan had increased
police patrols to protect WFP convoys from these bandits. CDA
corrected Nafie that, as of May 16, the increased police
patrols and convoys had not yet occurred. CDA had confirmed
this with WP Sudan Director Kenro Oshidari who knew and
appreciated that the Sudanese had made this promise and
intended to fulfill it "but it had not yet happened, perhaps
because of the JEM attack." Nafie asked that CDA follow up
with MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq "because we want to keep our
promises to SE Williamson." He said that these bandits were
particularly destructive because they loot humanitarian aid
and they scare IDPs from considering returning home
voluntarily.

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WILLING TO DISCUSS CREATIVE IDP SOLUTION
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8. (C) Nafie said that the GOS is hearing chatter that Chad
(with perhaps the same Libyan/French backing) may be seeking
to make the Fur forces of SLM leader Abdulwahid Nur much more
operational than they have been in the past. He noted that
despite the focus on Darfur over the past two years, there
hasn't been much actual fighting with anyone other than JEM
and if Abdulwahid gets infusions of vehicles and weapons like
JEM's Khalil Ibrahim, there would be even more violence in
Darfur. "We want to solve this now, with your help," he
added. Nafie welcomed a possible upcoming visit by SE
Williamson to solve all outstanding issues and agreed with
CDA Fernandez that "something needs to be done about the IDP
issue or Sudan will never be able to get out of this mess."
He welcomed creative American suggestions on defusing
tensions with IDPs and taking tangible steps demonstrating
Sudan's commitment to solving this problem that would meet
international scrutiny. One idea the GOS is interested in is
community policing drawn from the IDP population as a way of
combating crime and increasing security.


9. (C) Comment: Often - rightly - described as the hardest of
the Sudanese hardliners, Nafie was at his most positive and
collegial. He asked for American help three or four times -
at the UNSC in sanctioning Khalil, in intervening with Chad,
and in fighting banditry in Darfur. As is his wont, Nafie was
quite candid that Sudan would punish both Khalil and Idris
Deby if it could but has decided it can gain more politically
by playing the victim. This makes a virtue out the ability of
regime leaders, like Nafie, to transform a military
embarrassment like the JEM raid into a political event which
strengthens the NCP's hold on power in Khartoum as it basks
in some unaccustomed rallying around the flag from across the
Sudanese political spectrum. Nafie's comments reinforce our
sense that now is the time to press the Sudanese on
substantive (as opposed to just procedural) issues of concern
to us - on UNAMID deployment, humanitarian access, IDPs, and

KHARTOUM 00000760 003 OF 003


on Abyei - in return for some cosmetic steps on sanctions and
diplomatic support against JEM. End comment.
FERNANDEZ