SUDAN'S MESSAGE TO U.S., FOLLOWING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000734 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/C, SE WILLIAMSON, NEA, IO, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UNSC SU CD SUBJECT: SUDAN'S MESSAGE TO U.S., FOLLOWING CHADIAN-SUPPORTED DARFUR REBEL RAID REF: A. KHARTOUM 732 ¶B. KHARTOUM 727 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) CDA Fernandez met Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismail on May 14 at NCP HQ shortly after Ismail received his diplomatic marching orders from President Al-Bashir (Note: Sudan's Foreign Minister, Deng Alor, belongs to the SPLM and Ismail is Al-Bashir's and the ruling National Congress Party's (NCP) chief foreign policy advisor. Alor is, in any case, unavailable in Juba at the SPLM National Convention). ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez noted some strange calls at a peaceful rally held by the NCP earlier in the day to denounce Chad and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. These included "Khalil is a Zionist and Crusader Agent" (also the catchy, rhyming in Arabic, chant - "Deby, Khalil, you cowards, Al-Bashir is on the field"). Ismail laughed noting that "people get carried away at rallies." Ismail said that Sudan had four serious points to communicate urgently to the United States on the current crisis. First, Sudan was grateful for the position of the United States and also for the U.S. position at the UN Security Council on the JEM attack in Omdurman. ¶3. (C) Second, there was "absolutely no doubt of Chadian involvement" in the invasion. Sudan is indeed ready to respond to Chad's provocation. Khalil had started his misadventure with 309 brand new four wheel drive vehicles, each with 7-12 men, he now has 9 vehicles with him. He was back in Darfur seeking to escape and calling the Chadians to extract him by air. That is the reason the Sudanese had temporarily suspended UNAMID flights, "our radar is not as advanced as yours," and the Sudanese would like to shoot down any such attempt to rescue Khalil Ibrahim and also don't want to shoot down any UN aircraft by mistake. ¶4. (C) Sudan is ready to forgo retaliation if Chad stops interfering in Darfur and supporting Khalil Ibrahim. Chad should not rescue Khalil or offer him safehaven, those steps are further clear evidence, if any was needed, of Chadian complicity. For the sake of regional peace and security, Sudan was willing to reject revenge and break the circle of retaliation if the United States could deliver on these points but thought that it was unlikely given the intimate relationship of JEM with the Deby regime. CDA responded that obviously Sudan would try to utilize this incident in its favor but should be extremely careful about not igniting a wider regional conflagration. There was some sympathy internationally for Sudan right now but that would dissipate immediately if Sudan did anything that caused further misery in Darfur or Chad. ¶5. (C) The third point was that Sudan will now consider the JEM - Khalil Ibrahim faction as a terrorist organization and will not deal with it. Hundreds of people died in the attack on Omdurman, many of them civilians. Ismail noted that the "terrorist label" only applied to Khalil's faction not to SLM-Abdul Wahid Nur or even JEM splinters like JEM-CL or other Zaghawa-led groups. Khalil will be tried in absentia and Sudan will ask European countries who harbor JEM-Khalil leaders to expel them or treat them as terrorists. He had just informed the UK Ambassador of this decision. ¶6. (C) The fourth point is that Sudan is ready "more than ever" to find a peaceful, political solution to Darfur and welcomes the bilateral help of the United States and the multilateral help of the UN/AU team. It means that Sudan wants to respond favorably to American concerns on accelerated UNAMID deployment, enhanced humanitarian access and political steps to be taken. Al-Bashir would be speaking to the Sudanese National Assembly in about a week and that could be an opportunity to take about a positive way forward (Note: Or to declare war on Chad. End note). Ismail suggested that SE Williamson come to Sudan as soon as possible but no later than late May/early June. ¶7. (C) Ismail said that Sudan would soon be giving Western diplomats a direct opportunity to talk to the many JEM child soldiers they had captured, "we don't know what to do with them." CDA Fernandez asked about Libya's role and Ismail said that Al-Bashir was so furious that he had rejected 10 attempts by Qaddafi to phone him and still hasn't done so. Al-Bashir reluctantly met with the Libyan SG of CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) but it was more a photo KHARTOUM 00000734 002 OF 002 op than a meeting as the President did not want to talk. Sudan would not talk publicly about the Libyan role but their involvement was clear. ¶8. (C) Comment: The Sudanese regime, although embarrassed militarily, has reaped some political benefit from this crisis. It caused the political leadership across the spectrum to close ranks in defending the motherland. Khalil Ibrahim is a rather unsavory character - not surprisingly since he is cut from the same jib as his enemies in the NCP - and many in Khartoum resent the violence and uncertainty he visited on the capital's twin city. There seems little doubt that the Sudanese will respond militarily somehow to Chad as long as the Chadians maintain that intimate link with Khalil Ibrahim. Meanwhile, the Sudanese regime is clearly basking in some unaccustomed international solidarity, especially by countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia, who are nervous about the arrogant Islamist Khalil Ibrahim's links with not only Chad, but libya and, supposedly, Eritrea. If this does lead to a wider conflagration, Ibrahim clearly hopes to continue fishing in troubled waters that could lead him - not to peace in Darfur - but to ruling in Khartoum, visiting further disasters on the long-suffering Sudanese people. Clearly the time for the United States to reach out directly to the Sudanese leadership is now, with a message of forbearance, of harsh condemnation of Khalil Ibrahim, but also of warning to Sudan to consider, and consider again, the unforeseen consequences of a crisis that they and the Chadians (Deby came to power with Al-Bashir's help) have together created. End comment. FERNANDEZ