Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM726
2008-05-13 12:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
CHAD: NATIONAL ALLIANCE POSITION UNCHANGED BY
VZCZCXRO2902 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0726/01 1341227 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131227Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0799 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0358 RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000726
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: NATIONAL ALLIANCE POSITION UNCHANGED BY
KHARTOUM ATTACK
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00713
B. NDJAMENA 00123
C. NDJAMENA 00126
D. NDJAMENA 00127
KHARTOUM 00000726 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000726
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: NATIONAL ALLIANCE POSITION UNCHANGED BY
KHARTOUM ATTACK
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00713
B. NDJAMENA 00123
C. NDJAMENA 00126
D. NDJAMENA 00127
KHARTOUM 00000726 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)
1. (C) The main Chadian rebel factions have not changed their
strategy as a result of the Justice and Equality Movement's
(JEM) May 10 brazen assault on Omdurman, National Alliance
(AN) Secretary General Abakar Tolli told POLOFF in a May 12
meeting. The AN--composed of the Union des Forces du
Developpement et de la Democratie (UFDD),the
UFDD/Fondamental (UFDD/F),and the Front du Salut de la
Republique (FSR)--prefers political reconciliation among the
armed and unarmed opposition, civil society, and President
Idriss Deby's government over violent conflict, claimed
Tolli. However, the AN will continue to prepare "quietly"
for another attack on Deby's government in the event that a
political process laying the foundation for democratization
in Chad is not in place before the onset of the rainy season.
"We realize, though, that war will not solve the problem,"
said Tolli.
2. (C) POLOFF noted that UFDD leader Mahamat Nouri, during a
May 8 meeting that Tolli attended, spoke of his desire for a
"global solution" to Chad's political conflicts leading to a
culture of democracy (Ref. A). The USG, explained Poloff,
would view any attempt to overthrow Deby's government by
force as an indication that the AN is not interested in
lasting political change and is acting as a proxy for Sudan's
ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Tolli reiterated that
the AN prefers a peaceful solution to Chad's internal
problems and continues to welcome the opportunity to
demonstrate its willingness to negotiate by meeting with USG
officials. The AN will, however, have no choice but a return
to war if Deby continues to refuse any dialogue with the
armed opposition, he said, adding that the Chadian Government
has not made contact with any members of the AN since the
fall of 2007.
3. (C) Tolli maintained that, even in the aftermath of the
Omdurman attack, Sudan has not increased pressure on the
Chadian rebel movements to move against N'djamena. The NCP
understands the AN's preference dialogue unless and until no
prospect of a political process exists before the rainy
season begins, claimed Tolli. (Note: The rainy season is
expected to begin by the end of May or early June. End note.)
Sudan believes that power-sharing arrangements with Deby's
government--including both the AN and the unarmed
opposition--will lessen the threat from Chad and end
N'djamena's sponsorship for Darfurian rebel groups. Tolli
acknowledged, however, the NCP's intense anger toward Chad in
recent days--"even the President." He also boasted that as a
result of the near-universal condemnation of the JEM attack,
and of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, among Sudanese opposition
parties and the population, the base of support in Sudan for
the AN has expanded beyond the NCP.
4. (C) While Deby directed the JEM attack on Omdurman,
according Tolli, it is impossible to determine whether JEM
was reinforced by Chadian military elements because "Chad has
no national military--"it's just a collection of militias
loyal to Deby, like JEM." Asked why Deby would risk mass
Sudanese retaliation given JEM's limited ability to affect
actual regime change in Khartoum, Tolli said, "Deby has no
fear, and he does not care about the international
community." Denying reports that Chadian rebel groups are
now confronting JEM inside Darfur, Tolli said the conflict is
in fact between JEM and a JEM breakaway faction,
JEM/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL),led by Ibrahim's former
secretary general, Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda, and former chief
military commander, Abdullah Banda. (Note: UN-AU Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) sources also attest that fighting in West
Darfur involves JEM and JEM/CL rather than the Chadian
rebels. Several independent sources, including UN contacts
and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi,
confirm reporting in Refs. B-D that such confrontations may
indicate splits within Deby's government on its support for
JEM, with Deby increasingly disaffected with Ibrahim's
faction. End note.)
KHARTOUM 00000726 002.2 OF 002
--------------
Comment
--------------
5. (C) While it is difficult to verify the level of pressure
Sudan is placing on the Chadian rebel movements to attack
Deby's regime to avenge the JEM assault on Omdurman, Tolli
was reluctant to speak over the phone about the AN's
intentions in the wake of recent events. This reticence may
indicate that, while during meetings with U.S. officials the
AN continues to emphasize its willingness for dialogue, it is
also placating the government in Khartoum--which is reeling
from a severe security breach in the capital--with promises
to take revenge on Deby's government. Though UN sources in
West Darfur continue to report that the Chadian rebels are
mobilized for an attack, there are no indications of troop
movements. During a late-night meeting with Minawi on May
12, Vice President Ali Osman Taha said the NCP will wait for
one-week for tensions to cool between Sudan and Chad before
deciding on a course of action, according to Minawi. End
comment.
6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND
AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
PARIS FOR KANEDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: NATIONAL ALLIANCE POSITION UNCHANGED BY
KHARTOUM ATTACK
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00713
B. NDJAMENA 00123
C. NDJAMENA 00126
D. NDJAMENA 00127
KHARTOUM 00000726 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (
d)
1. (C) The main Chadian rebel factions have not changed their
strategy as a result of the Justice and Equality Movement's
(JEM) May 10 brazen assault on Omdurman, National Alliance
(AN) Secretary General Abakar Tolli told POLOFF in a May 12
meeting. The AN--composed of the Union des Forces du
Developpement et de la Democratie (UFDD),the
UFDD/Fondamental (UFDD/F),and the Front du Salut de la
Republique (FSR)--prefers political reconciliation among the
armed and unarmed opposition, civil society, and President
Idriss Deby's government over violent conflict, claimed
Tolli. However, the AN will continue to prepare "quietly"
for another attack on Deby's government in the event that a
political process laying the foundation for democratization
in Chad is not in place before the onset of the rainy season.
"We realize, though, that war will not solve the problem,"
said Tolli.
2. (C) POLOFF noted that UFDD leader Mahamat Nouri, during a
May 8 meeting that Tolli attended, spoke of his desire for a
"global solution" to Chad's political conflicts leading to a
culture of democracy (Ref. A). The USG, explained Poloff,
would view any attempt to overthrow Deby's government by
force as an indication that the AN is not interested in
lasting political change and is acting as a proxy for Sudan's
ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Tolli reiterated that
the AN prefers a peaceful solution to Chad's internal
problems and continues to welcome the opportunity to
demonstrate its willingness to negotiate by meeting with USG
officials. The AN will, however, have no choice but a return
to war if Deby continues to refuse any dialogue with the
armed opposition, he said, adding that the Chadian Government
has not made contact with any members of the AN since the
fall of 2007.
3. (C) Tolli maintained that, even in the aftermath of the
Omdurman attack, Sudan has not increased pressure on the
Chadian rebel movements to move against N'djamena. The NCP
understands the AN's preference dialogue unless and until no
prospect of a political process exists before the rainy
season begins, claimed Tolli. (Note: The rainy season is
expected to begin by the end of May or early June. End note.)
Sudan believes that power-sharing arrangements with Deby's
government--including both the AN and the unarmed
opposition--will lessen the threat from Chad and end
N'djamena's sponsorship for Darfurian rebel groups. Tolli
acknowledged, however, the NCP's intense anger toward Chad in
recent days--"even the President." He also boasted that as a
result of the near-universal condemnation of the JEM attack,
and of JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, among Sudanese opposition
parties and the population, the base of support in Sudan for
the AN has expanded beyond the NCP.
4. (C) While Deby directed the JEM attack on Omdurman,
according Tolli, it is impossible to determine whether JEM
was reinforced by Chadian military elements because "Chad has
no national military--"it's just a collection of militias
loyal to Deby, like JEM." Asked why Deby would risk mass
Sudanese retaliation given JEM's limited ability to affect
actual regime change in Khartoum, Tolli said, "Deby has no
fear, and he does not care about the international
community." Denying reports that Chadian rebel groups are
now confronting JEM inside Darfur, Tolli said the conflict is
in fact between JEM and a JEM breakaway faction,
JEM/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL),led by Ibrahim's former
secretary general, Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda, and former chief
military commander, Abdullah Banda. (Note: UN-AU Mission in
Darfur (UNAMID) sources also attest that fighting in West
Darfur involves JEM and JEM/CL rather than the Chadian
rebels. Several independent sources, including UN contacts
and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi,
confirm reporting in Refs. B-D that such confrontations may
indicate splits within Deby's government on its support for
JEM, with Deby increasingly disaffected with Ibrahim's
faction. End note.)
KHARTOUM 00000726 002.2 OF 002
--------------
Comment
--------------
5. (C) While it is difficult to verify the level of pressure
Sudan is placing on the Chadian rebel movements to attack
Deby's regime to avenge the JEM assault on Omdurman, Tolli
was reluctant to speak over the phone about the AN's
intentions in the wake of recent events. This reticence may
indicate that, while during meetings with U.S. officials the
AN continues to emphasize its willingness for dialogue, it is
also placating the government in Khartoum--which is reeling
from a severe security breach in the capital--with promises
to take revenge on Deby's government. Though UN sources in
West Darfur continue to report that the Chadian rebels are
mobilized for an attack, there are no indications of troop
movements. During a late-night meeting with Minawi on May
12, Vice President Ali Osman Taha said the NCP will wait for
one-week for tensions to cool between Sudan and Chad before
deciding on a course of action, according to Minawi. End
comment.
6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ