UNAMID STRUGGLES TO BRIDGE GAPS WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000723 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPKO SOCI UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID STRUGGLES TO BRIDGE GAPS WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY REFS: A) KHARTOUM 333 B) 07 KHARTOUM 1172 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As local civil society institutions begin to emerge in Darfur, tensions between traditional government-supported institutions and newer donor-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are rising. Resentment and distrust have hampered the development of a cohesive civil society movement and raise questions about who, if anyone, will have both the credibility and capability to represent civil society interests at future peace talks. UNAMID's Civil Affairs unit, which should be well-placed to fill the leadership gap, has instead positioned itself as a passive moderator. UNAMID's hands-off approach has not allowed civil society groups to find common ground or build trust, and risks deepening existing divides. Without leadership, the civil society movement in Darfur is likely to suffer a fate similar to that of the rebel movements - fractionalization and marginalization - and may eventually become a spoiler to the peace process in which it has fought so hard to participate. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- UNAMID Acknowledges Divide, Pushes "Organic" Process -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to local NGO sources, civil society institutions that existed in Darfur before the current conflict began in 2003 were largely used as mechanisms for directing financial and material support to GOS supporters. As such, those organizations that still exist today, such as local trade and labor unions, are viewed with skepticism by the fledgling group of independent NGOs that have sprung up in the past 5 years. The GOS, both directly and through the civil society organizations it sponsors, is equally skeptical of the new civil society movement, carefully monitoring NGO staff, activities and influence. The resulting mutual distrust has created a disjointed civil society environment in which it is difficult to identify community leaders and the interests they represent. ¶3. (SBU) Wariara Mbugua, head of the UNAMID Civil Affairs (CA) team, is acutely aware of the divisions within civil society. She admits that her early efforts have focused disproportionately on interaction with GOS officials and organizations. "The government made it clear early on that it would not accept the Civil Affairs office engaging in any activities designed to undermine the government, or to incite civil society groups against it," Mbugua said. As such, CA has had to walk a fine line, promoting independent civil society development, while carefully managing its own relationship with the GOS and dispelling lingering suspicions. "The key is transparency - everyone is invited to all of our events," she said. ¶4. (SBU) Mbugua admitted that her open-door policy had meant that many early participants in CA activities were "briefcase" NGOs - groups that were less interested in real civil society activities and more interested in advancing their own political agendas. However, she hoped, as the Political Affairs office gains traction, those political parties will be drawn away from civil affairs and into legitimate political activities. Mbugua said it had been difficult to avoid being sucked into societal fractures. However, she claimed that the CA team's approach had been successful, and that GOS interference had declined as more officials participated in CA activities. ¶5. (SBU) The most visible of CA sponsored activities is a weekly meeting open to all NGOs. CA's Mbugua explained that her office does not dictate agendas for these meetings, but instead allows the NGOs themselves to "raise issues organically, the issues that are important to them." Mbugua emphasized that it was important for local groups to dictate the agenda, to ensure that issues which affect them are kept in the public dialogue. -------------- Independent NGOs Critical of UNAMID -------------- ¶6. (SBU) While CA may be effectively managing its relationship with GOS, it has not fared as well within the independent NGO community. Independent NGO leaders visibly bristle at the mention of the CA office, and many no longer participate in CA-sponsored activities. The respected Ahmed Adam Yousif, head of the Ajaweed Organization for Peace and Reconciliation, told fieldoff that he had attended a few of the initial UNAMID Civil Affairs organized events. However, he claimed that the CA team did not distinguish between the "real" - i.e. independent - NGOs and those supported by the government. In fact, most of their events and meetings were dominated by GOS-backed organizations, including other NGOs and the university peace center. Yousif claimed that the CA team was "a partner to the GOS - it has no interest in hearing other voices." If UNAMID continues down this KHARTOUM 00000723 002 OF 002 path, he warned, they would fail. ¶7. (SBU) Mansour Osman, head of the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO),called CA's organic approach "amateur." He noted that effective NGOs do not work in all areas of civil society, but rather focus on a particular element or issue. "How can I know if a meeting will be interesting or useful to me if I have no idea what is on the agenda?" he wondered. With so many GOS representatives present, and such a high degree of skepticism between them and independent civil society groups, Osman also questioned how open or honest any dialogue could actually be. He speculated that the only independent local groups who would attend such meetings were new NGOs which hadn't yet established their mission or goals, and were only looking for funding. -------------- Identifying Civil Society Leaders -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Mbugua said that beyond encouraging dialogue, the weekly meetings had a more important goal. As key issues began to emerge, she reasoned, so also would local leaders. CA could then work with those leaders to develop the skills necessary to effectively participate in peace talks, Mbugua said. "We have worked with JMST to identify specific issues that will arise in any future peace talks," she noted, and CA plans to organize workshops and seminars for leaders to discuss these topics in more detail. (Comment: This approach will force Mbugua to develop an agenda, which will appeal to the independent NGOs but will raise alarms for the GOS. End comment.) ¶9. (SBU) Mbugua admitted that the older, government-supported groups had a leadership advantage, as they tended to have better internal organizational structures. CA had shied away from targeted assistance to independent NGOs, citing transparency concerns, but Mbugua hoped to push the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) to help support the development of weaker NGOs, and to even out capacity levels between the two groups. The newer independent groups, after all, are "stronger on substance," she added. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) CA clearly does not want to be seen as a leader on civil society issues, but rather as a mediator. It suffers from the same weaknesses, passivity and careerism of much of the entire UNAMID operation in Darfur. Given the internal political dynamics, this may be the only role that is acceptable for the office to play under the watchful eye of the GOS. However, CA must become more assertive in using its position to shape the development of the civil society community by setting the parameters for discussion - especially if it is to regain the confidence of the independent NGOs. Few issues in Darfur are not politicized, though perhaps Mbugua could start with merely controversial issues such as education, then move on to explosive issues such as water access, before touching on radioactive issues such as governance that will link slightly better with organized JMST efforts. FERNANDEZ