GOS BOMBINGS IN NORTH DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000691 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU SUBJECT: GOS BOMBINGS IN NORTH DARFUR ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The last week of April and first week of May witnessed a spate of Government of Sudan (GoS) bombings in remote parts of North Darfur against rebel positions. Civilians have been the primary victims, sounding alarm bells for the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),which is scrambling to determine how best to address the situation. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE PLACES HIT -------------- EL-HELIF -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to JEM and UN sources, on April 29 the GoS military reportedly bombed for three hours the town of El Helif in North Darfur, approximately 135 km north of El Fasher. The GoS was targeting training camps used by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels. Due to the remoteness of this location, exact casualty figures are unknown, although UNAMID sources indicated that one woman was killed. JEM representatives confirmed this. UMM SIDIR -------------- ¶3. (SBU) According to rebel and UN sources, between April 30 and May 1 the GoS used Antonov aircraft to bomb the town of Umm Sidir in North Darfur, approximately 63 km northeast of Kutum. Eight casualties resulted and were evacuated, in coordination with OCHA and ICRC, to El Fasher civilian hospital by two UNAMID helicopters. Two of the eight evacuees were detained by GoS forces upon El Fasher arrival, as the GoS deemed them to be combatants. UNAMID Humanitarian Liaison Chief had been working to ensure access by UNAMID Human Rights and ICRC to these individuals, but as of May 4, the GoS denied such access, citing preoccupation with a visiting Japanese delegation to El Fasher as the reason behind its refusal (the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister came to El Fasher to discuss with the Force Commander UNAMID deployment and challenges). UNAMID expects that the other victims will be similarly detained once they are released from the hospital. AIN BISHARO AND SHEGAG KARO -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Beginning at 0830 on May 4 in the North Darfur town of Ain Bisharo, 350 km northeast of El Fasher and 150 km east of Malha, the GoS again conducted an aerial bombardment using white fixed wing Sudan Armed Forces aircraft from El Obeid. According to reports by Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) sources in the area, three children of the same family were killed, with a fourth wounded and in critical condition. The injured boy, aged eight, was reportedly transported to the UNAMID military site in Malha, North Darfur, and was awaiting May 5 evacuation to El Fasher. UNAMID sources later reported that 14 had been killed in the attack, including the three children and two women. ¶5. (SBU) More serious reports of casualties came in at 1730 on May 4 following an alleged SAF bombing in Shegeg Karo, about 50km north of Umm Baru in North Darfur. According to unconfirmed reports from UNAMID military reps, ten were killed and between 10-16 injured. UNAMID Humanitarian Liaison officer told FieldOff on May 5 that 29 had been injured, 19 of whom required medical evacuation to El Fasher, which ICRC would lead, using UNAMID helicopters, on May 5. An ICRC team would be dispatched on May 6 to attend to the other 10 wounded on the ground. HATTAN, EL HARA, JEBEL EISA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Other areas in remote parts of North Darfur, including Hattan, El Hara and Jebel Eisa, experienced similar bombings during the time period between April 29 and May 3, with no concrete casualty figures due to the lack of international (or even GoS) presence in those regions. -------------- THE COMMON DENOMINATORS -------------- REMOTE LOCATIONS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) It is not by accident that these areas in North Darfur have lately become targets for the GoS (which, sources indicate, vehemently deny any involvement in these incidents). Their remote desert locations and the absence of any international presence, including UNAMID, are contributing factors. Eyewitness reports by victims are the only source of information. MEDOB TRIBESMEMBERS KHARTOUM 00000691 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The areas bombed, in particular Ain Bisharo, Hattan, El Hara and Jebel Eisa, are all predominantly inhabited by members of the African Medob tribe. SLA/MM representatives claimed to FieldOff that such targeting constituted "ethnic cleansing," as the GoS wants to clear North Darfur of the Medob, starting from the Chad-Sudan border and spreading eastward through Jebel Moun into Umm Sidir and all the way to An Bisharo. The SLA/MM reps warned that violence begets violence, and in the absence of a concerted international response to this trend, "must we become terrorists to deal with it?" REBEL ROUTING -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The most likely explanation for this spate of GoS bombings across this swath of North Darfur relates to the recent tendency of rebel movements in this area, particularly among SLA factions, to unite against the GoS. This region is home to Suleiman Marjan, the SLA commander for North Darfur (himself a Medob as well),who has reportedly begun to mobilize citizens against the census. Such instigation provides the GoS with a convenient excuse to send a warning to Marjan, although not for his anti-census activities. Marjan has been involved in efforts to consolidate SLA/Abdelwahid and SLA/Unity in this region. As SLA/MM reps pointed out, "Tragedy unites," and they expected movements in the region to unite against the GoS' latest aerial activity. -------------- UNAMID SCRAMBLING TO RESPOND -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Initially there was no solid confirmation of the bombings and therefore the GOS has received little public criticism. However, now that there is multiple-source confirmation, the USG needs to condemn these acts and point out to the GOS that this is not in keeping with our bilateral discussions. Post suggests that the Department make a statement condemning the bombings and especially noting the fact that there were civilian casualties. Post also suggests that the Department call in the Sudanese Charge d'Affaires to inform him that these actions are not acceptable and risk derailing our bilateral discussions. ¶11. (SBU) These events underscore the need for UNAMID to find an effective way to monitor the ceasefire. UNAMID military is often the last to know of the details of these incidents and has accordingly been slow to respond. As of May 5, the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) has been activated to investigate, but as of 1730 on May 4, some of its members had not been made aware of either the Ain Bisharo or Shegag Karo incidents. Investigating these bombings provides an opportunity for the CFC to get back to work, and for UNAMID, in whatever monitoring capacity, to be seen by civilian populations as carrying out its mission. Moreover, the UN and the international community must remind the GOS that regardless of the actions of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, the GoS is still bound by the DPA ceasefire mechanisms and should accordingly be held accountable for violations. FERNANDEZ