WFP TO REDUCE DARFUR FOOD AID RATIONS IN MAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000654 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AF/C, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, FFP/W, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/EA/FFP, OFDA/ECARO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND BPITTMAN ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU USUN FOR FSHANKS BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU SUBJECT: WFP TO REDUCE DARFUR FOOD AID RATIONS IN MAY KHARTOUM 00000654 001.2 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) On April 14, the UN World Food Program (WFP) informed key donors that in May it would be forced to nearly halve the general food aid ration distributed in Darfur, due to ongoing banditry against contracted commercial vehicles resulting in decreased commodity dispatches. WFP issued a press release announcing the impending reduction on April 17. A rash of banditry since late 2007 has pushed WFP's transport capacity to the limit as drivers now refuse to travel without a Government of Sudan police escort. However, insufficient escort capacity has significantly reduced commodity dispatches to Darfur at a time when WFP should be building up warehouse stocks in advance of the rainy season. The decision to reduce rations is meant to stretch stocks of food so that WFP can resume full rations during the height of the hunger season (July-September),when food aid needs are highest. End Summary. -------------- A DANGEROUS ROAD TO TRAVEL -------------- ¶2. (U) Though carjackings, lootings and abductions have been a persistent and insidious risk for humanitarian groups operating in Darfur since 2003, the deliberate targeting of Sudanese commercial trucks carrying humanitarian goods is a relatively recent phenomenon. Attacks on commercial transport picked up significantly in September 2007 and have continued apace in 2008. ¶3. (U) According to WFP, since January 1 60 WFP-contracted commercial trucks have been hijacked in Darfur. Thirty-nine trucks have yet to be recovered and 26 drivers remain unaccounted-for. One driver was killed last month while attempting to deliver commodities to Nyala. ¶4. (SBU) WFP security has classified incidents in three main categories: - Banditry against one or two vehicles: incidents usually result in the theft of food cargo, communications equipment, or money. Some incidents have resulted in abduction and ransom demands for the driver. Most incidents of this kind have taken place along the Ed Daein-Nyala road and along the Nyala-Kass-Zalingei road. - Banditry against large convoys, including convoys of empty trucks: WFP security speculates that these incidents are primarily meant to replenish rebel groups' logistics (transport assets) and to sell stolen trucks on the black market in Chad. Transporters have reported to WFP that they are aware of at least nine of their stolen trucks now with Chadian plates operating on the other side of the border. A significant majority of these incidents (24) have occurred along the En Nahud (Western Kordofan) to El Fasher road in North Darfur. - Taxation at checkpoints: incidents of taxation or extortion occur primarily in rebel-held areas, or areas that are only loosely patrolled by GOS military and police. WFP security speculates that armed groups - both rebels and GOS-allied militia - are increasingly using the taxation of commercial traffic as another means of funding their operations. -------------- WAITING FOR ESCORTS -------------- ¶5. (U) WFP-contracted transporters are now refusing to deliver food from logistics hubs outside of Darfur (El Obeid, Khartoum) without a GOS police escort. Further, in South Darfur, the GOS is requiring all commercial traffic to have a GOS police escort and threaten to fine/detain drivers that don't comply. ¶6. (U) Though WFP notes that GOS police escorts have likely deterred some attacks - particularly in South Darfur - banditry even on escorted convoys continues. For large convoys (greater than 100 trucks) travel over long stretches of road, in particular, well-armed bandits are able to quickly attack and steal vehicles from the middle of convoys before the lead and follow vehicles have time to respond. ¶7. (U) The unfortunate consequence of transporters' demand, as well KHARTOUM 00000654 002.2 OF 003 as GOS requirements, for escorts has been a significant reduction in commodity deliveries from logistical hubs to warehouse locations within Darfur. Due to limited capacity and slow GOS response at the state and local levels, convoys are often backed up awaiting escorts. The net result has been an overall decrease in trucking turnaround times and delivery speed. ¶8. (U) WFP generally aims to keep at least one month's food aid requirement - two months during the rainy season - in each Darfur state at any given time. To maintain these stocks, WFP must dispatch between 40,000 - 60,000 metric tons to Darfur each month, depending on seasonal variations in the beneficiary caseload. Due to the inefficient pace of escorts and decreased turnaround time, however, WFP is now only able to deliver approximately 30,000 metric tons to Darfur each month. As a result, WFP's buffer stocks are being drawn down at a worrying rate. -------------- BETTER NOW THAN LATER -------------- ¶9. (U) At present, WFP has sufficient food stocks in the pipeline - meaning either in Darfur, in logistical hubs elsewhere in Sudan, or committed by donors but not yet in Sudan - to provide full rations to the planned caseload through September (assuming no hindrances to internal deliveries, which is not the case currently). Further, WFP forecasts sufficient stocks in Darfur warehouses to distribute full rations in May - over 67,000 metric tons still in stock by end April. Nonetheless, WFP took the decision to reduce the May ration in order to ensure that food stocks would be available for full rations during the more critical months later in the summer, when food insecurity and humanitarian needs are at their peak. ¶10. (U) Specifically, WFP will reduce the cereals, pulses and sugar portion of the general ration, planned for 2.8 million people in Darfur during the month of May, by 50 percent. The other commodities - oil, corn-soya blend (CSB),and salt - will remain at full ration size. The overall kilo-calorie value of the ration will drop from the recommended 2,156 kcals per day to 1,242 kcals per day, representing an overall 40 percent reduction in the intended ration size. ¶11. (U) WFP has revised their dispatch strategy to prioritize non-cereal deliveries in May, given their nutritional importance relative to cereals. Assuming present dispatch rates - 50 percent of planned amounts due to the delays with escorts - WFP forecasts being able to restore a full pulses ration in June; sugar rations will depend on the timely delivery of planned imports. Also based on present dispatch rates, WFP believes it will be able to restore full cereal rations in July. Without the reductions made in May and June, and assuming current, diminished delivery rates into Darfur, WFP would run out of food by the middle of June, and would not have sufficient stock or inflows to continue meeting the needs of an expanded caseload in July. Note: During the hunger gap months of July-September, WFP's total caseload in Darfur increases to a peak of approximately 3.1 million beneficiaries, well above the average monthly caseload of 2.3-2.4 million beneficiaries during the rest of the year. ¶12. (U) Based on current nutritional and food security indicators, WFP does not believe that the ration reductions will significantly affect the humanitarian situation before full rations can be restored. On the other hand, if the cuts were to take place during the hunger season and/or be greater than 50 percent, the risk, in humanitarian terms, would be much more significant. Among all humanitarian actors, the biggest worry about the reductions is not a deterioration of humanitarian conditions but the risk of unrest in IDP camps throughout Darfur. WFP and its implementing partners are reaching out to camp leaders to explain the rationale for the impending reduction. -------------- LIMITED RESPONSE OPTIONS -------------- ¶13. (U) Barring any significant breakthrough on the peace process and assuming that UNAMID capacity will continue to be constrained for the near future, the international community's options to halt, or even marginally disrupt, the rash of banditry occurring in Darfur are limited given the lucrative nature of the robberies to rebel KHARTOUM 00000654 003.2 OF 003 groups and to the black market in Chad. WFP is procuring additional banners to provide to commercial transporters so that vehicles can be clearly marked as carrying humanitarian aid, and has publicized the reasons for the ration reduction in the local press. ¶14. (U) Given the significant quantities involved, WFP does not believe that restarting airlifts out of El Obeid and/or Al Kufra (Libya) are feasible or desirable options at this time for making up the current gap in overland deliveries. At the height of the air operations in 2005, WFP was transporting 11,000 metric tons per month by air (5,000 MT/month from El Obeid and 6,000 MT/month from Al Kufra)- less than half of the amount needed to make up the present transport shortfall. Nonetheless, WFP is investigating options for keeping two IL-76 airplanes on standby in El Obeid, which would offer approximately 3,000 MT additional transport capacity per month. If the situation warranted returning to airlifts to deliver food into Darfur, WFP would look to use this capacity strategically, for transporting high-value commodities (non-cereals) and only for areas where humanitarian indicators are most severe or life-threatening. ¶15. (U) According to WFP, the only realistic, immediate term option for increasing deliveries is to increase the number and frequency of GOS escorts for commercial transport - police, military or national security. More frequent and efficient escorts would increase truck turnaround time and minimize convoy backup at logistical hubs, not to mention attacks on longer convoys. WFP does not believe that more regular patrols - either by GOS forces or UNAMID - would help the situation, given the long distances involved. -------------- GOS APPEARS RESPONSIVE -------------- ¶16. (SBU) WFP has approached UN leadership in Khartoum to discuss the possibility of UNAMID escorts along the most problematic route (En Nahud - El Fasher),and discussions are ongoing. WFP reported to USAID/FFP staff that at a meeting between WFP leadership, HAC, GOS National Security and the heads of WFP's main transport companies April 24, the GOS pledged to provide police escorts every 48 hours for convoys traveling from logistical hubs to Darfur. WFP stated that this pledge, if actually implemented, will make a significant difference in trucking turnaround times and would bring primary deliveries to Darfur back up to target levels, assuming the security situation does not continue to deteriorate. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (U) The ration reductions planned for May and June are the unfortunate but necessary triage that has to occur when faced with significantly reduced supply, growing demand and the time limitations of the approaching hunger and rainy season. While a severe deterioration of humanitarian conditions due to the ration reduction is not expected at this time, USAID will continue to closely monitor the situation, particularly any signs of unrest in IDP camps once rations begin to be distributed in early May. ¶18. (SBU) The US Mission will continue to impress on rebel leaders that banditry against humanitarian and commercial vehicles not only hurts their people through reduced service delivery, but makes any prospect of recovery and development in Darfur a distant possibility if commercial transport cannot be assured safety along even primary roads. One unexplored option would be to somehow seek to dry up the lucrative black market trade in stolen property in Chad - a difficult prospect. Likewise, the US Mission will continue to press the GOS to increase the number and frequency of escorts allocated to commercial vehicles carrying humanitarian cargo. Following the US-Sudan bilateral talks in Rome, and the discussion of escorts for humanitarian convoys, the GOS made a commitment to provide additional security and escorts along WFP's routes. Although limited in their capacity to provide security along the long routes, it appears that the GOS is making a concerted effort to appease donors and improve the situation. FERNANDEZ