TCCS FORCE AGWAI TO CHANGE UNAMID PRIORITIES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000650 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/C, IO, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC CD ET SU SUBJECT: TCCS FORCE AGWAI TO CHANGE UNAMID PRIORITIES REF: A. KHARTOUM 434 ¶B. KHARTOUM 502 ¶C. KHARTOUM 573 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Force Commander (FC) Agwai compromised on his number one deployment priority while in Addis Ababa, according to UNAMID's Chief of Planning. As he did with the Egyptians in Um Kadada (ref A),Agwai agreed to let the Ethiopian battalion deploy as a whole only to one location, Kulbus, instead of splitting it between Kulbus and Silea, as had been his intention, given the rampant insecurity in that part of the Chad-Sudan border. Problems on the engineering and procurement sides of the house are preventing Agwai's other top priority, construction of a camp at Korma, from commencing, and lack of staffing in UNAMID's Movement Control (MOVCON) division is prolonging delays in getting equipment to forces on the ground. This situation is exacerbated by the possible departures within the next month of the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Force Commander, leading the Planning Chief to ask, "Who is Agwai going to lean on then?" END SUMMARY. ETHIOPIANS PLAYING SAME GAME AS EGYPTIANS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an April 27 meeting, UNAMID Chief of Planning debriefed FieldOff on his 16-19 April visit with FC Agwai to Addis Ababa [NOTE: Agwai proceeded to New York after his Addis stop and is expected to return to Sudan within the coming days. END NOTE]. He described the FC's meeting with the Ethiopian Army Chief of Staff, Samora Yunis, as a "breath of fresh air after Cairo," where the FC had had a contentious meeting with Egyptian MoD officials as he attempted to sway them to re-locate their pledged battalion from Sector South to Sector North (ref A). ¶3. (SBU) According to the Planning Chief, Yunis was upfront with the FC about the GoE's unhappiness at the "lack of notice" about the FC's intention to re-locate Ethiopia's pledged battalion from the relatively quiet Sector North El Fasher Headquarters to more volatile Kulbus and Silea in Sector West (ref A),per the FC's designation of these locations as priority spots for UNAMID, given the rampant insecurity in this area of the Chad-Sudan border. Yunis expressed concern that this area was controlled by the Chadian-supported Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group, whom he had been trying unsuccessfully to contact as a pre-emptive measure ahead of the battalion's eventual arrival. Yunis mentioned that there was "an Eritrean brigadier" operating in JEM's ranks in this territory, which raised some flags for the GoE [NOTE: Several high-ranking JEM leaders and field commanders carry Eritrean, as well as Chadian, passports. END NOTE]. ¶4. (SBU) As a compromise, Yunis told the FC that the Ethiopian battalion would not occupy both Kulbus and Silea initially but would go first as a whole to Kulbus in order to build confidence with the Government of Sudan, with JEM and with local populations. (Comment: This seems unnecessary, given the "special" relationship that already exists between the GoE and the GoS. END comment.) Yunis said the Ethiopian battalion would patrol to Silea but would not occupy that area for at least the first three months of the battalion's deployment. Egypt struck a similar deal when the FC asked the Egyptian MoD in March to re-locate its pledged battalion from the calmer Sector South Nyala Headquarters to more unsettled Um Kadada and Shangil Tobaye in Sector North as part of his prioritization plans for deployment. The Egyptians agreed to go as a full unit only to Um Kadada (there are currently 69 Egyptians there),which the FC now considers a "wasted deployment." ¶5. (SBU) FieldOff pressed the Planning Chief on the FC's willingness to compromise on his deployment priorities for Sector West, especially on his failure to dictate terms as Force Commander on a battalion whiQQQ1CVQQ v would engage with JEM himself upon his return to Darfur. The Planning Chief acknowledged, however, that neither the FC nor he had had time in fall 2007 to focus on where to deploy the additional Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions which UN HQ ordered them to accept, since the FC was preoccupied with sorting out MSA payments for rebel commanders and since the Planning Chief was the Acting Chief of Staff at the time. "That's how we got ourselves into this mess," he admitted, when they made the decision at that time to "dump" the additional battalions into the El Fasher and Nyala super-camps. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS HINDER OTHER FC PRIORITIES -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) In addition to the Ethiopian refusal to deploy to Silea, KHARTOUM 00000650 002 OF 002 engineering, contracting and procuring problems threaten other FC deployment priorities. In particular, the Planning Chief noted that "nothing has happened on Korma," where the FC planned to have constructed a new camp for a rotating Rwandan battalion, a second priority for 2008 deployment (ref A). Engineering contracts for this construction had not yet been competed, and "you know how long it takes the UN to do that," the Chief of Planning warned. Contrary to the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services' assurances in ref c, construction that was to have begun on the new Silea camp in mid-April has not yet begun, as land there has not yet been procured. ¶7. (SBU) Persistent issues with local contractors continue to plague the delivery of equipment to TCCs. According to the Planning Chief, over 70 items for the Chinese engineering party in Nyala still remain in Port Sudan due to a local contractor issue that is "out of our control." The Planning Chief noted that much of the Egyptian equipment destined for Um Kadada had already been moved but that forklifts needed to get this equipment off the trucks were not available. Finally, the UN had yet to negotiate contracts with local traQJQQu this department had only a recently-arrived Chief to coordinate its operations. GAPS IN SENIOR LEADERSHIP MAKE EVERYTHING WORSE -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) It was not only gaps at the working level that were plaguing UNAMID deployment progress, but potential vacancies at the top as well, starting with the British Chief of Staff (CoS),said the Planning Chief. Despite an alleged order by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Chief Guhenno for the FC and the Joint Special Representative to engage the GoS personally on extending the CoS' contract until the END of May, no such intervention has yet been made. If the GoS insists, as expected, that the CoS leave by 30 April, then Chief Operations Officer COL Joseph Prah (Ghana) will likely be Acting, a decision that even El Fasher DPA signatory rebel movements admit will be a "catastrophe" for the mission (Prah is currently seized with getting his holiday plans approved rather than dealing with operational problems in the mission). ¶9. (SBU) The Planning Chief was also concerned that the Rwandan Deputy Force Commander (D/FC) may return to El Fasher on May 4 only to pack his bags and leave the mission, due to allegations by a Spanish investigation about the murder of a Canadian priest in Rwanda in 1997. The D/FC's Military Assistant has not confirmed the Deputy's departure from UNAMID, and most people in the mission are holding out hope he will stay. If he and the CoS go, the Planning Chief wondered aloud, "who will Agwai lean on then?" COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) UNAMID needs to get its priorities straight, and this necessity is something UN HQ in New York needs to respect, as do TCCs. It is already bad enough that Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon struck a unilateral deal with President Bashir in Dakar by which he accepted an additional battalion from Egypt and Ethiopia for UNAMID without the concurrence of the Force Commander, leaving the FC to re-jigger deployment plans to accommodate them. Now TCCs are acting like the GoS in dictating to the FC where they do and do not want to deploy, giving everyone else in this mission final say over deployment except for the one person who should be informing all military decisions. The loss of senior UNAMID personnel would not be felt to such a degree if there were a hard and fast deployment plan in place, rather than one that changes at the whim of certain TCCs. Giving TCCs this kind of latitude is perhaps unavoidable but remains a dangerous precedent to set, and UN HQ should step in to stop it. ¶11. (SBU) With its additional battalion to Um Kadada, Egypt is now the third largest troop contributor to UNAMID, and as such will likely seek a Sector Commander appointment. From UNAMID's perspective, such an appointment would be a mistake, as it considers Egyptian troops ineffective, disliked by Darfuris, and complicit with the GoS but deals made elsewhere may preclude a more effective use of resources on the ground in Darfur. ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ